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ABSTRACT 
In the seventeenth century Denmark-Norway joined other 
north European states in building forts on the Gold Coast of Africa 
and in seeking islands in the Caribbean on which to cultivate tropical 
products. The Danish West India Company, established in 1671, 
permanently occupied the uninhabited island of St. Thomas in 1672. 
In 1718 the Danish company settled St. John, and in 1733 Denmark 
purchased St. Croix from France. St.  Croix developed into the 
principal supplier of raw sugar for Denmark, where sugar refining 
became an important industry. The export of surplus sugar from 
Denmark to Baltic countries comprised an important part of the 
nation's foreign trade in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Initial attempts at using indentured servants from 
•• r*r 
Scandinavia as agricultural laborers failed, and by the early 
eighteenth century African slaves formed the source of labor for 
the island's sugar and cotton plantations. Foreign slavers as well 
as Danish ships supplied slaves to the Danish West Indies, though the 
Crown frequently sought to restrict the trade to Danish slavers. 
The slave trade on Danish vessels thrived when France and England 
were at war, for Danish ships then supplied the French sugar islands 
with slaves. But in peacetime the trade languished. By the late 
1780s the slave trade stood condemned on humanitarian grounds in 
the eyes of thoughtful Europeans, including prominent members of the 
i v  
V  
Danish government. 
In August 1791 the Danish Crown, at the request of Finance 
Minister Ernst Schimmelmann, appointed a committee of government 
officials to investigate the slave trade. The Committee on the Slave 
Trade, guided and dominated by Schimmelmann, decided that the slave 
trade should be abolished after a ten-year transition period. In 
the meantime, the Crown encouraged a rapid increase in the slave 
population and urged the planters to improve the treatment of their 
slaves in hopes that the labor force would become self-perpetuating by 
1803. Schimmelmann knew that no Caribbean sugar island had yet been 
able to sustain its slave population without access to the Atlantic 
slave trade. But he and the committee hoped that the planters, faced 
with the prospect of abolition, would adopt amelioration out of a 
sense of enlightened self-interest.  The planters, however, maintained 
their traditional interest in short-term profits and apparently did 
not take the threat of abolition seriously. Slave deaths continued 
to exceed births, and in 1802 the planters asked for a continuation of 
the slave trade. 
In May 1804 Schimmelmann, with strong support from Johan Philip 
Rosenstand-Goiske, a member of the government agency in charge of West 
Indian affairs, got the Council of State to postpone a decision on the 
planters'  appeal. The delay thus obtained proved permanent, and 
Denmark became the first European slave-trading nation to outlaw the 
slave trade. 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction: The Danish West Indies and Slave Trade to 1784 
Denmark-Norway was the first European slave-trading power 
to abolish its slave trade from Africa to its possessions in the 
Americas and to prohibit i ts subjects from participating in any 
aspect of the Atlantic slave trade. It  did so by means of a royal 
edict issued on March 16, 1792, which stated that the trade in slaves 
between Danish Guinea and the Danish West Indies was to cease on 
January 1, 1803. In the meantime, the slave trade to the Danish West 
Indies was to be encouraged so as to provide the plantations with a 
labor force large enough to enable the islands to prosper after 1802 
without reliance on further slave importsJ Despite opposition in 
Copenhagen and in the West Indies, participation in the trade became 
illegal for Danish subjects in 1803. 
The kingdom of Denmark-Norway began trading with Asia, the 
Guinea Coast of Africa, and the West Indies in the seventeenth 
century, inspired by the success of the Dutch and the proposals of 
Dutch merchants resident in Copenhagen.^ The Danish East India 
^Danish State Archives, Copenhagen, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente 
samt Generaltoldkammer, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Forordning 
om Negerhandelen, March 16, 1792, p. 2. 
^Georg N0rregaard, Guldk.ysten: de danske Etablissementer 
i  Guinea, Vol. VIII of Vore gamle Tropekolonier, e3. by Johannes 
1  
Company, established in 1616, grew out of a plan of two Dutch 
merchants who arrived in Copenhagen in 1615.3 jn  igl8 the company 
sent i ts first expedition to Ceylon, and in 1620 the Danes took 
possession of Tranquebar on the southeast coast of India; for more 
than two centuries Tranquebar served as headquarters for Danish 
Asian trade.^ 
Competition with the Swedes, long intense in the Baltic, 
encouraged Danish trading ventures to Africa and the New World. 
In December 1624 Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden granted a Dutch 
merchant the privilege of establishing a Swedish company to conduct 
such overseas trade; in January 1625 Christian IV of Denmark (1588-
1648) did the same.^ Nothing came of this Danish project, however, 
mainly because of the impoverishment of Denmark resulting from 
£ 
Christian IV*s intervention in the Thirty Years'  War. 
Only in the early 1650s did Danish efforts at trade with 
Africa and the New World revive. In 1651 the Glueckstadt Company w< 
established at Glueckstadt, a town on the Elbe founded in 1615 by 
Br0ndsted (8 vols.,  2d. ed.; Copenhagen: Fremad, 1966), p. 12. In 
the eighteenth century Denmark-Norway, hereafter referred to as 
Denmark, also included Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, the 
duchy of Schleswig and parts of the duchy of Hoi stein. 
3Gunnar 01 sen, Dansk Ostindien 1616-1732: de Ostindiske 
Kompagniers Handel paa Indien, Vol. V of Vore gamle Tropekolonier, 
pp. 3b and 49. 
4Ibid.,  pp. 76-78. 
^N0rregaard, Guldk.ysten, pp. 19-21. 
*\J. 0. Bro-Jorqensen, Dansk Vestindien indtil 1755: 
Kolonisation og Kompagnistyre, Vol. I  of Vore qamle Tropekolonier, 
p. 12. 
3 
Christian IV as a base for trade with western Europe. A few years 
later the Danes began building forts on the Gold Coast, where they 
were to remain for 200 years.7  That smaller naval powers such as 
Denmark were able to enter the fiercely competitive African trade 
was due in large part to the Africans' policy of promoting 
competition among as many European states as possible in order to 
obtain better trade arrangements. The chieftains resisted stubbornly 
any attempt by a European company to establish a monopoly along a 
stretch of the Gold Coast; thus the Danes, English and Dutch 
coexisted on the Gulf of Guinea in Accra, capital of modern Ghana, 
competing with one another to the benefit of the Africans.** Because 
of the risky nature of the West African trade, European merchants 
sought protection in chartered trading companies enjoying a national 
g 
monopoly. 
In 1652 the first Danish ships sailed to the West Indies, 
and in 1653 Frederik III (1648-70) chartered a West India Company. 
The new company was not awarded a monopoly, but i t  received privileges 
with regard to payment of customs duties. The Danes wished to 
acquire tobacco, sugar, ginger, and indigo in exchange for Icelandic 
lamb, dried fish, whale oil ,  and Danish bread and beefJ® Though as 
^N0rregaard, Guldkysten, pp. 24-27 
O 
Kwane Yeboa Daaku, Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast, 
1600-1720: A Study of the African Reaction to European Trade 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 37. 
^Robert 0. Collins, Europeans in Africa (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1971), p. 28. 
^Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 13-14. 
4 
yet the Danes did not participate in the Atlantic slave trade, 
interest in such commerce was expressed by a Copenhagen merchant, 
who in 1653 appealed to the Spanish government for permission to sell 
slaves to the Spanish American colonies.^ 
Trade with the West Indies was interrupted by the war with 
Sweden from 1657 to 1660, but in 1662 a ship was sent out by the 
first Danish West India Company with the task of locating uninhabited 
19 
islands--of which there were still  many—suitable for occupation."-
In 1665 the Danish company proposed settling St. Thomas, a small 
(slightly over 33 square miles), mountainous island with an excellent 
harbor. Later that year Danish settlers arrived on St. Thomas, but 
this first colonizing effort fell victim to disease, pirate raids, 
a hurricane, and lack of support from the company, which was 
13 
desperately short of capital and soon collapsed. 
By 1671 conditions for creating a larger, stronger West India 
Company were improved. The new king, Christian V (1670-99), was 
eager for enterprises which promised glory for himself and his realm; 
and his trusted advisor, Peter Schumacher, wished to encourage trade 
and industry by government action. In addition, a Board of Trade 
"^Waldemar Westergaard, The Danish West Indies under Company 
Rule, 1671-1754; with a Supplementary Chapter, 1755-1917 (New York: 
MacMillan Company, 1917), p. 21. 
Parry, Trade and Dominion; The European Oversea Empires 
in the Eighteenth Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicol son, 1971), 
pp. 42-43. Spain had largely ignored the Lesser Antilles, stretching 
from Puerto Rico in a great arc east and south to Trinidad. Other 
powers began settling these islands in the seventeenth century, a 
process which an enfeebled Spain could not resist.  
^Bro-Jtirgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 17-26. 
5 
(Kommercekol1 egiurn) headed by the king's energetic half-brother was 
created in 1668 to promote commerce.^ Direct involvement of the 
royal family, lacking in the case of the first company, would be 
important for the success of any new endeavor in the West Indies, 
for i t  was the court and high nobility, and not the relatively 
15 
small merchant class, which possessed the necessary capital.  
A new Danish West India Company received its charter on 
March 11, 1671; i t  was authorized to settle St. Thomas and other 
available areas in the Americas, to defend and administer these 
areas, and to exercise a monopoly on trade with them. The three 
directors of the company, all  of them also members of the Board 
of Trade, were appointed by the Crown. The King invested a large 
sum and encouraged others, in particular the wealthier nobles, to 
do the same. The King further agreed to provide two ships to 
be used by the company for three years.^ 
A Danish expedition commanded by Jtfrgen Iversen, a Dane 
who had spent several years on St. Kitts and knew the Caribbean 
well,  reached St. Thomas in May 1672. Soon the Danes were joined 
by Dutch, English, French, and even Danish planters from nearby 
islands—accompanied by their African slaves—seeking on the neutral 
Danish island refuge from the effects of the Dutch War (1672-78). 
These refugees, already acclimated and experienced in producing 
1 4Westergaard, Danish West Indies, p. 31. 
15 
Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 43. 
1 6Ibid.,  pp. 44-46. 
6 
tropical products, were a critically important source of population 
growth for the new colony, for of the 324 Danes and Norwegians (who 
were mainly convicts, male and female) sent out by the company 
between 1672-75, only 64 survived the journey and the dangerous 
first half-year on the island. Included among the foreign colonists 
were small tobacco farmers and artisans driven from the older 
islands by the advance of sugar cultivation with i ts accompanying 
gang slavery; on St. Thomas these immigrants planted mainly tobacco 
and cotton, crops which required few if any slaves. To promote the 
rapid development of St. Thomas the company allotted land to 
immigrants in exchange for only a nominal rent—at first usually a 
couple of chickens a year.^ 
The Glueckstadt Company, no longer able to carry on trade 
with the Gold Coast, renounced its privileges in 1673. In 1674 the 
West India Company took over the African trade and became the West 
India and Guinea Company. Except for a brief period in the early 
1690s, when Danish Guinea and St. Thomas were leased to private 
merchants, the company governed both the Danish forts on the Gold 
Coast and the Danish West Indies until 1754.^ 
As sugar cultivation grew in importance on St. Thomas in 
the last years of the seventeenth century, the need for laborers 
increased dramatically. An attempt to solve the labor problem by 
1 7Ibid.,  pp. 55ff. 
^N0rregaard, Guldkysten, pp. 86-87. From 1690-94 St. Thomas 
was run by the Norwegian merchant, Jtfrgen Thorm0hlen. 
7 
using Danish and Norwegian indentured servants and convicts failed. 
Indentured servants were difficult to recruit,  especially as St. Thomas 
acquired a reputation as a graveyard for whites. Virtually no one 
who could make a living in Denmark was willing to go to St. Thomas 
as an indentured servant, so only the poorest, and sickliest,  signed 
contracts. In the early years of settlement indentured servants 
and convicts were treated as brutally as the African slaves—Governor 
Iversen (1672-80) beat several to death as punishment for failing 
to work hard enough. After 1701 convicts were seldom sent to the 
island, and after 1706 the company stopped selling indentured servants 
to planters, for Scandinavian laborers, when they survived at all in 
the warm climate, were said to be capable of doing only about one-
1Q 
fourth as much work as black slaves. Therefore the Danish colony, 
in common with other European colonies in the Caribbean, sought a 
solution to the labor problem by importing slaves from Africa, for 
which enterprise a Brandenburg slave-trading company had provided 
the Danes with a model and a stimulus. 
The Brandenburg African Company had established forts on 
the Gold Coast in the early 1680s, with the goal of building up 
a profitable trade in slaves to Spanish America. The company needed 
a base in the Caribbean and, in 1685, after failing to acquire 
either St. Vincent or St. Croix from France, signed with the Danish 
West India and Guinea Company a thirty-year accord which granted the 
Brandenburgers a strip of land on St. Thomas for a factory and a 
^Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 50ff, 92-93, 174. 
8 
plantation and gave them the right to import slaves from the Gold 
Coast and export them to European colonies in the Caribbean. The 
Brandenburgers promised to provide the Danish company with slaves 
at a low price. This promise was important for St. Thomas, for as 
20 
yet there was no regular slave trade conducted by Danish vessels. 
During the War of the League of Augsburg the Brandenburg 
company thrived by smuggling slaves into the English islands, 
especially the nearby English Virgin Islands, which, like St. Thomas, 
were experiencing a rapid growth of sugar cultivation with a 
corresponding increase in the demand for slaves. After 1699 the 
Brandenburg African Company stopped transporting slaves from Africa 
to the West Indies, perhaps because of the withdrawal of important 
Dutch stockholders and a loss of interest in the company by the King, 
Frederick I.  The company's factory on St. Thomas slowly declined 
until,  in 1715, the Brandenburgers'  treaty with the Danish company 
expired, and the Brandenburgers left the island. 
In 1696, however, the temporary success of the slave-trading 
venture of the Brandenburg company, coupled with the need to assure 
St. Thomas an adequate labor supply for its expanding sugar planta­
tions, had prompted Governor Johan Lorentz to urge the Danish West 
21 India and Guinea Company to begin a regular slave trade of i ts own. 
Accordingly, in 1698 a Danish ship carried 280 slaves from the Gold 
20c.C. Alberti,  "Den danske Slavehandels Historie," N.yt 
Historisk Tidsskrift,  2d. series, III (1850), 206-07; 
N0rregarrd, Guldk.ysten, pp. 87ff. 
21 
Westergaard, Danish West Indies, p. 145. 
9 
Coast to St. Thomas, beginning a regular Atlantic traffic in slaves 
22 
on Danish vessels. 
The population of St. Thomas numbered about 100 in 1673, and 
reached 331 in 1680, including 175 slaves, either brought in by 
foreign planters or purchased by Governor Iversen from foreign slave 
traders.^ By 1691, the population had risen to 1,136 including 751 
slaves. Of the 101 plantations on St. Thomas, eighty-seven were 
planted in cotton, only five in sugar. But sugar cultivation expanded 
rapidly in the 1690s and early 1700s, mainly at the expense of tobacco 
farming, so that forty out of 160 plantations in 1715 were planted 
solely in sugar. The rapid growth of the slave population indicated 
the advance of labor-intensive sugar production: by 1720-21, the 
number of slaves reached 4,504; the free population grew much more 
slowly, to 524.2 4  As elsewhere in the West Indies, small planters 
were being squeezed out by larger ones using gang slavery to produce 
?5 
sugar. Sugar was a rich man's crop; i t  brought large profits once 
the initial capital investment had been made. Sugar planters bought 
22Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 162-64. The Danish 
East India Company had traded in slaves prior to this, transporting 
them from the southeast coast of India to the slave market at 
Malacca. See 01 sen, Dansk Ostindien, p. 207. 
23 
Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 40-41. 
24 Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 171ff. The figures 
given for the slave population are minimum ones only, for in 1691 a 
head tax, or kopskat, was introduced, which thereafter gave slave 
masters a good reason to try to conceal the actual number of slaves 
in their possession. 
^Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 123ff. 
10 
out small tobacco farmers and brought in a stream of African slaves 
to work the fields and serve as artisans, displacing the class of 
white laborers and advancing a process which produced a population 
sharply divided between a mass of black slaves and a small group of 
white planters.2 6  
Though the Danish West India and Guinea Company continued 
to engage in the slave trade until the company was dissolved in 
27 
1754, profits from the trade were rare. The difficulties faced 
by the Danish company were similar to those faced by other companies 
engaged in the African trade: losses at sea, dishonest employees, 
the high costs of maintaining forts on the Gold Coast, and high death 
rates on i ts slave ships. Of the twenty ships owned by the company 
between 1697-1733, eight were lost at sea.2** Slave deaths on Danish 
slave ships in the period 1698-1754 amounted to 25 per cent, with only 
about 7,500 slaves out of some 10,000 surviving the trip from Africa 
to the West Indies.2 9  Nevertheless, the company continued to transport 
slaves to the West Indies, though i t  seldom had more than two ships 
engaged in the trade at any time, and i ts activity in the first two 
decades of the eighteenth century served primarily to supplement the 
2 6J. H. Parry and P. M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West 
Indies (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd.,  1956), pp. 66ff. 
27 
N0rregaard, Guldkysten, p. 149. 
28 
Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 151-52. 
2 9N0rregaard, Guldkysten, p. 146-47. Slave deaths on Danish 
ships would have been near the norm of 18 per cent for other European 
slave-trading powers were i t  not for the loss in 1706 of a Danish 
slave ship with 820 slaves on board. 
efforts of Dutch interlopers. Indeed, the company instructed its 
employees on St. Thomas to encourage interlopers to sell slaves in 
the Danish colony--thereby disregarding the monopoly on the trade 
held by the company—but urged that the company have exclusive right 
to buy slaves so that a profit could be made subsequently by selling 
on 
the slaves to local planters. 
From the start of colonization on St. Thomas, the West India 
and Guinea Company had hoped to acquire other islands, and had on 
several occasions in the late seventeenth century sent men to live 
on the uninhabited island of St. John, about four miles east of St. 
Thomas. Englishmen from the Leeward Islands drove out the Danes each 
time. Finally, in 1718, when all agricultural land on St. Thomas was 
in use, a well-armed force of twenty planters, five soldiers, and 
sixteen slaves was sent to occupy St. John. Defying English demands 
for their withdrawal, and the threatening visits of two English 
frigates, the Danish governor stood firm, and by 1733 there were 109 
plantations on the island, with 208 whites and 1,087 slaves working 
them.^ 
Even after acquiring St. John, the Danish company lacked an 
adequate basis in the West Indies for production of tropical products, 
for St. Thomas and St. John were both very small,  only thirty-three 
and twenty-one square miles respectively. In 1733, at the urging 
of the Danish crown, the West India and Guinea Company purchased the 
^Alberti,  "Den danske Slavehandel," p. 214. 
^Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 216-22. 
unoccupied French island of St. Croix for 750,000 1ivres (164,000 
rigsdaler), with the Crown providing a large part of the initial 
payment. St.  Croix lay forty miles south of St. Thomas, and with 
eighty-four square miles was large enough to become a major center 
of sugar production.3 2  
An attempt to encourage settlement of St. Croix by Danish 
subjects was largely unsuccessful. From the start the island was 
dominated by immigrant planters from the nearby English islands. 
The lures of virgin soil and religious toleration attracted a 
number of English Catholic planters from Montserrat,  who with their 
slaves added about one thousand people to the population of St. Croix 
in the first years after the Danish takeover.3 3  
St. Croix grew rapidly to become the Danish sugar island 
par excellence. The slave population increased between 1742 and 
1755 from 1,906 to 8,897. At the same time, agricultural production 
on St. Thomas was declining after peaking in the 1720s, when the 
slave population there had reached 4,490; by 1754 the number of 
slaves on St. Thomas had fallen to 3,481. On St.  John, colonized 
more recently than St. Thomas, production continued to expand between 
1739 and 1755, with the number of slaves there rising from 1,414 
to 2,031.3 4  
3 2Ibid.,  pp. 240ff. 
33 
Ibid.,  pp. 250ff. Religious toleration, though illegal 
in Denmark, was practiced on St. Thomas out of practical necessity 
from the earliest years of settlement. 
3 4Ibid.,  pp. 269ff. 
13 
Despite acquisition of St. Croix, the West India and 
Guinea Company continued to be troubled by the high costs of 
administering and defending its possessions. By mid-century there 
was growing opposition in Denmark to continuing the special privileges 
enjoyed by the company, as these increasingly were viewed as harmful 
to economic growth. The price of sugar in Denmark, for one thing, 
was 30 per cent above the price at Hamburg.In 1749 the Board of 
Trade decided that the company's near-monopoly over the sugar-refining 
industry in Denmark hindered further development, and from 1750 a 
number of new sugar refineries were given permission to begin 
operation.On top of this setback for the company came the loss 
of three ships at sea in 1751-52, and in 1753 a slave revolt on 
another ship caused heavy financial loss. In that same year the 
St. Croix Burger Council (the planters), furious at new trade 
07 
restrictions aimed at strengthening the company's trade monopoly, 
urged Frederik V (1746-66) to take over the Danish West Indies. 
In May 1754 the Board of Trade recommended that the Crown 
buy out the company. The president of the company was Adam Gottlob 
P.O. Sveistrup and Richard Willerslev, Den danske 
Sukkerhandels oq Sukkerproduktions Historie (Copenhagen: Nordisk 
Forlag, 1945), pp. 31-32. 
Ibid.,  pp. 41ff. Prior to this there had been only a 
refinery in Schleswig and one in Copenhagen to provide some competi­
tion for the big refinery owned by the company in Copenhagen. 
07 
It  was trade restrictions more than anything else which 
angered European colonists throughout the Americas. See D. K. 
Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the 
Eighteenth Century (New York: Delacorte Press, 1966), p. 88. 
^Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 238-39. 
1 4  
von Moltke, the king's favorite; he accepted the Crown's offer to 
pay the shareholders the par value of their stock (500 rigsdaler 
per share) and assume all debts owed by and to the company.39 Since 
shares in the company had sold for only 300 rigsdaler in the years 
immediately preceding the sale, the shareholders did very well.^ 
From the late seventeenth century the main reason for 
maintaining Danish forts on the Gold Coast had been to supply 
slaves to the Danish West Indies; trade in gold and ivory was 
not extensive enough to justify the continued expense of maintaining 
the Danish forts. Yet i t  probably would have been cheaper to buy 
slaves in the West Indies from the Dutch and the English. A slave 
trade on Danish ships was justifiable only as a means of guaranteeing 
a sufficient labor supply to the Danish company's sugar islands in 
case ships of the other maritime powers were for some reason unable 
to meet the demand.^ 
Altogether, approximately 15,800 slaves were imported into 
the Danish West Indies between 1687-1754. After 1715 Danish vessels 
provided most of the slaves sold in the Danish islands: in the period 
1739-54, for instance, only Danish slave ships supplied the islands, 
landing about 3,675 slaves there in twenty-one voyages.^ 
In 1755, when the Crown took over the Danish West Indies 
3 9Ibid.,  p. 240. 
^Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 280-81. 
^N0rregaard, Guldkysten, p. 154. 
A O  
Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 320ff. 
15 
and the forts on the Gold Coast, trade with the former company 
possessions was opened to all Danish subjects. But the entire 
export of the islands was to go to Denmark, and only Danish 
products, except when such were unavailable—which was often 
enough—were to be imported by the islands.^ 
The end of the restrictive rule of the West India and 
Guinea Company encouraged a major expansion of the slave trade to 
the Danish West Indies, in particular from 1755-77 and from 
1792-1803. Danish slavers took advantage of the colonial wars of 
the second half of the eighteenth century to sell slaves to the 
American colonies of the warring powers, especially those of France.^ 
To govern the islands after the Crown took over, a centralized 
administration was established. A governor-general residing on St. 
Croix was the top executive official in the islands, with a 
commander (kommandant) on St. Thomas looking after affairs there 
and on St. John. A miniature bureaucracy grew up, consisting of 
warehouse managers, bookkeepers, customs agents, weigh-masters, and 
surveyors. Many of the men who staffed these positions had served 
earlier in Africa and India; a class of Danish colonial officials 
was making i ts appearance. A new government agency was created in 
1760 in Copenhagen to take charge of West Indian affairs, the West 
^P. P. Sveistrup, Bidraq t il  de tidliqere Dansk-Vestindiske 
0ers 0konomiske Historie med saerlig Henblik paa Sukkerproduktion 
og Sukkerhandel (Copenhagen: Nordisk Foriag, 1942), p. 91. 
^"Udtog af Forestillingen til  Kongen angaaende Negerhandelens 
Afskaffelse," Minerva, Copenhagen, April 1792, p. 53. 
16 
India-Guinea Treasury and General Customs Department (Vestindisk-
quineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer), usually referred to as the 
General Customs Department (Generaltoldkammer). It  had far-reaching 
power over the Danish West Indies.^ 
In 1764, in an attempt to increase the slave trade to 
St. Croix, the right to participate in the slave trade to the Danish 
West Indies was extended to include foreigners, who thenceforth 
were allowed to sell slaves in the Danish colonies in exchange for 
sugar and cotton, a privilege clearly in conflict with the prevailing 
mercantilist view that favored confining shipment of colonial raw 
materials to the home country. As an additional stimulus to the 
slave trade, no customs duty was to be paid on slaves brought directly 
from Danish Guinea to the Danish West Indies in Danish ships. Danish 
slave ships carrying slaves not purchased in Danish Guinea, as well 
as all foreign ships regardless of the origin of their slaves, had 
46 
to pay the duty. 
In 1766 the Danish forts on the Gold Coast were assigned 
to a new slave-trading company, the Royal Chartered Danish-Guinea 
Company (det kgl. oktroyerede danske guineiske Kompaqni), better 
known as Bargum's Trading Association (det Bargumske Handelssocietet).  
This company sent more than 3,000 slaves to the West Indies from 
1767 to 1776 and sold 1,873 slaves to French slavers between 1770 
45jens Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, 1755-1848; Vestindiens 
Storhedstid. Vore gamle Tropekolonier, II,  ed. by Johannes 
Br0ndsted (2d. ed; Copenhagen: Fremad, 1966), pp. l lff.  
^Alberti,  "Den danske Slavehandels Historie," pp. 220-22. 
and 1773.^ st. Croix imported more than 6,000 slaves from Africa 
between 1767-77; a great many of these slaves must have been brought 
in on foreign vessels.^® Bargum's Trading Association encountered 
problems in the mid-1770s, and in 1776 the Crown resumed control 
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over the forts in Danish Guinea. 
The slave population on St. Croix grew from 8,897 in 1755 
to 15,699 in 1765 and to 23,834 in 1775. On St.  Thomas the slave 
population increased from 3,481 in 1754 to 3,979 in 1775; on St. 
John the number of slaves grew from 2,031 in 1755 to 2,355 in 1775. 
After 1775 a slight decline occurred until the early 1790s; in 1792, 
the year the abolition edict was promulgated, the slave population 
on St. Croix was 22,240.5® 
All increases were due to imports of slaves from outside 
the islands, for as elsewhere in the West Indies, the slaves' death 
51 
rate was consistently higher than their birth rate. From 1767 to 
1777, approximately 1,160 slaves were imported and retained each year 
on St. Croix. These slaves came both from Africa and from other 
^Ntfrregaard, Guldkysten, pp. 193ff. 
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Svend Green-Pedersen, "The Scope and Structure of the 
Danish Negro Slave Trade," Scandinavian Economic History Review, 
XIX, No. 2 (1971), 171. 
dQ 
^ N0rregaard, Guldkysten, p. 205. 
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Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . .  of the Danish .  .  .  Slave 
Trade," pp. 150ff. 
51 Patrick Richardson, Empire and Slavery (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., Ltd.,  1968), p. 12. For instance, on Barbados 
between 1712 and 1768, the slave population increased at an annual 
rate of only 465, despite the importation of an annual average of 
3,570 slaves. 
islands in the West Indies, in particular from the British Leeward 
Islands. Yet there was an average yearly increase of only about 660 
slaves. From this i t  appears that St. Croix, as other West Indian 
sugar islands, had an excess of deaths over births; for St. Croix i t  
was about 500 a year.5 2  Without a continued supply of slaves, the 
slave population, so long as its living conditions were not improved, 
would decline. 
The prosperity of the Danish West Indies as plantation 
colonies always depended on the amount of rainfall.  Droughts were 
frequent, rainfall irregular and violent. In the decade 1828-38, 
the average annual rainfall on St. Thomas was forty-three inches, 
CO 
not a large amount for an island in the tropics. Once the original 
forests had been destroyed, erosion became a serious problem as 
torrential rains washed away much of the topsoil.  On none of the 
islands was the soil especially rich, and overuse, a situation 
aggravated by the prevalence of monoculture, soon began to exhaust 
i t .5^ St. Thomas, however, possessed perhaps the best harbor in the 
Lesser Antilles, a fact which, coupled with favorable legislation, 
made i t  a major Caribbean trading center in the second half of the 
eighteenth century.5 5  
5 2Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . .  of the Danish .  .  .  Slave 
Trade," pp. 155-56. 
5^Westergaard, Danish West Indies, p. 5. 
54 Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 269. 
55 
Sveistrup, De Dansk-Vestindiske 0ers flkonomiske Historie, 
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After 1764 St. Thomas and St. John were separated economically 
from St. Croix; legislation thenceforth aimed at making St. Thomas 
a transit trade center, while St. Croix was to concentrate on sugar 
production for the Danish market. St.  Thomas and St. John were made 
into free-trade areas, with foreign merchants allowed to settle there 
and conduct trade with the Americas and, after 1767, with Europe as 
well,  though Danish ships in the European trade enjoyed preferential 
customs duties.Especially during wartime St. Thomas was an 
important center of the Caribbean transit slave trade.5 7  
The slave trade to the Danish West Indies declined after 
1777 as an edict of that year prohibited importation of slaves into 
the islands aboard foreign ships and again required that all sugar 
exported from the islands be sent to Denmark.5 8  Furthermore, only 
ships built in Denmark and operated by Danish subjects resident in 
Europe could engage in the slave trade. Crews were to be Danish 
whenever possible, and captains and first mates had to be Danish in 
every instance. Also, customs duties were imposed on slaves imported 
into the Danish islands: four riqsdaler for an adult slave, two 
cq 
for an adolescent, and one for a child. 
56 
Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 64. 
57 
Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . .  of the Danish .  .  .  Slave 
Trade," p. 158. 
5 8These restrictions were motivated primarily by a desire to 
bolster the foreign commerce of Copenhagen and to hinder the illegal 
export of sugar from the Danish West Indies to Amsterdam. 
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Alberti, "Den danske Slavehandelpp. 226ff. 
Treatment of slaves in the sense of day-to-day living 
conditions in the second half of the eighteenth century was apparently 
as harsh in the Danish islands as elsewhere in the West Indies; the 
slaves were constantly undernourished and were quite simply worked 
to death. They could be easily replaced by means of the Atlantic 
slave trade: "So long as the slave trade remained open, slaves 
were greatly abused in all [slave] systems."®® 
At mid-century a typical St. Croix plantation of 150 acres 
fil  
was worked by about 48 slaves. Their working day was long, then 
and later in the century as well,  beginning at 5 a.m. and lasting, 
with a rest period during midday, until 6 or 7 p.m. During the 
harvest season they worked even longer. The slaves were given 
Sunday off so that they could tend their gardens and visit the 
towns to sell produce at the Sunday market.®^ During the second 
half of the eighteenth century, as land prices rose, the slaves' 
nutritional standards declined, for planters tended to enlarge 
the area planted in sugar at the expense of the slaves' garden plots 
C O  
and to supply more of the slaves' food themselves. Around 1790 
fiO 
Eugene D. Genovese, "The Treatment of Slaves in Different 
Countries: Problems in the Application of the Comparative Method," 
in Slavery in the New World, ed. by Laura Foner and Eugene D. Genovese 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J .  :  Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,  1969), p. 208. 
61 Richard Haagensen, Beskrivelse over Eylandet St. Croix i  
Amerika i  Vest-Indien, (Copenhagen, 1758), p. 32. 
^Hans West, Bidrag t il  Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, med en 
kort udsigt oyer St. Thomas, St.  Jean, Tortola, Spanish Town, og 
Crabeneiland (Copenhagen, 1793), pp. 69-71, p. 77. 
^^Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 140. 
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planters usually gave their slaves ten to twelve pots of meal from 
North America twice a week and some salted herring.6^ Undoubtedly, 
during the boom periods, plantation slaves on the Danish islands 
65 
were exploited more than earlier. 
The tendency for slaves to suffer most during periods of 
rapid economic growth was a characteristic of New World slavery 
in general—for example, in Brazil,  during the boom of the first 
half of the eighteenth century, planters in their rush to maximize 
production found i t  most profitable to work their slaves to death 
and replace them by means of the Atlantic slave trade.®6  "Whenever 
slaves were worked under boom conditions, as in the West Indies in 
the mid-eighteenth century and the Brazilian coffee plantations in 
the nineteenth, the institution was one of grinding attrition."67 
The planter class in the Danish West Indies was dominated 
by men of English and Dutch descent, whose treatment of their slaves 
was unlikely to be affected by living under the Danish flag, 
especially since the Danish government did not attempt to protect 
the slaves from arbitrary and cruel treatment by their masters. A 
slave code promulgated in 1733 by Governor Philip Gardelin, a French 
6^West, Bidrag t il  Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, p. 72. 
Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 161. 
6 6C.R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil,  1695-1750: Growing 
Pains of a Colonial Society (Berkeliy: University of California 
Press, 1962), pp. 7-9. 
^David Brion Davis, "The Comparative Approach to American 
History: Slavery," in Slavery in the New World, ed. by Foner and 
Genovese, p. 67. 
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Creole, provided for barbaric punishments, including the provision 
that any slave who threatened a white or swore at a white could be 
pinched three times with red-hot iron tongs and thereafter hanged, 
if the white so desired, or lose a hand. Testimony of a reputable 
white would suffice against any slave in court.  The aim of this 
slave code, which was being used as a basis for punishing slaves as 
late as 1791, was to terrorize the slaves into obedience. Captured 
rebel slaves were burned alive, or had their backs broken prior 
to being placed on a platform to die slowly in public as a warning 
to others.^ 
A slave code drawn up by the Board of Trade in 1755 was 
never used, or even made public. The governor decided i t  would 
create too much controversy and undermine the good relationship 
the Danish government wished to have with the planters, for the 
code asserted that the slave masters had duties towards their slaves-
it  prescribed basic rations of food and clothing owed the slaves--
and forbade slaveowners to kill  a slave arbitrarily or to separate 
married slaves. 
Fears of a slave revolt were natural in view of the 
numerical preponderance of the slaves and the treatment to which 
they were subjected. On St. John development after 1718 was rapid, 
and by 1733 there were 109 plantations on the island, worked by 
6®Georg H(6st, Efterretninger om 0en Sanct Thomas oq dens 
Gouverneurer, optegnede der paa Landet fra 1769 indtil 1776, 
(Copenhagen: Nicolaus M011er og S0n, 1791), pp. 85-88. SeeAppendix I 
fiQ 
Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 146-48. 
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1,087 slaves. Only 208 whites were present. The garrison consisted of 
eight Danish soldiers in a tiny hi 11-top fort,  and these was no town 
in which whites could gather for protection. The rapid growth of 
the slave population on the island resulted from a relatively high 
percentage of recently enslaved Africans, who were normally more 
inclined to rebel than were slaves who had either been born in 
the Americas or who had lived there as slaves for a number of 
years. 
In November 1733 a major slave revolt began on St. John. 
Circumstances surrounding the revolt corresponded in several important 
ways with those present on Jamaica and thought to be main factors in 
the latter island's unusually numerous instances of slave revolt: 
1) there was a high ratio of slaves to whites; 2) a high ratio of 
African-born to native-born slaves; 3) rebel leadership was provided 
by former warriors from militaristic African tribes; 4) absenteeism 
(many owners of plantations on St. John spent most of their time 
at Charlotte Amalia on St. Thomas) was a serious problem, weakening 
the ability of the whites to control their slaves; 5) food shortages 
or the threat of them convinced the slaves their customary rights 
were being violated; and 6) a mountainous terrain offered hiding 
places for rebel slaves and inhibited the military efforts of the 
whites. On both Jamaica and St. John the rebelling slaves were 
weakened by the deep antipathy which divided African from native-born 
7OBro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 222ff. 
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slaves.7 1  Though 146 slaves joined the revolt,  many others 
fought alongside their white masters. Only with the help of 228 
French soldiers from Martinique were the last of the rebel slaves 
hunted down, in late May 1734, after forty-four plantations had 
been destroyed. Recovery was surprisingly rapid, however, and by 
1739 St. John had 1,414 slaves while the number of adult white males 
17 
was actually below what i t  had been in 1733. 
The racism prevalent in other West Indian slave societies 
was found in the Danish islands as well and served to rationalize 
slavery. Richard Haagensen, a Dane who was employed by the West 
India and Guinea Company on St. Croix in the mid-eighteenth century, 
wrote that the blacks were created for enslavement and worked happily 
in the fields, singing as they labored. "They are all evil by nature, 
and l ittle that is good can be found in them; indeed, if I dare say 
so, I truly believe that their black skin indicates they are evil 
and that they are destined for slavery, so that they should not have 
any freedom." The slave revolt on St. John was a frightening memory, 
an event which demonstrated the cruelty of the slaves: i t  was "a 
horrible rebellion which cannot but be constantly in our thoughts." 
Harsh penalties are a necessity to deal with rebellious slaves, and 
"it  is necessary to keep the slaves constantly at work so that they 
will have neither the time nor the energy to plot rebellion."7"^ 
^Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery; An Analysis 
of the Origins, Development and Structure of Negro Slave Society in 
Jamaica. (Rutherford: Fairleiqh Dickenson University Press, 1967), 
pp. 274ff. 
72Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 230-34. 
73hlaagensen, Beskrivelse over St. Croix, pp. 50-53. 
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Hans West, a teacher on St. Croix in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, believed that the black skin of the Africans 
equipped them well for labor under the tropical sun; indeed, "they 
can be seen sleeping under the sun at midday." In addition to 
having a foul odor, the slaves are physically inferior to northern 
Europeans: "The blacks lack the strong muscles, the broad shoulders, 
and the appearance which demonstrates nordic strength.The slaves 
are more fortunate than the poor in Denmark, for they need not worry 
about obtaining their daily bread nor about what the future will 
bring: "no fear about the problems of feeble old age disturbs this 
easily satisfied creature (denne njdisomheds s#n)." West ignored the 
fact that slaves were allowed to starve when food was scarce and 
could be freed to subsist as beggars when they became too old to 
work. He argued that slaves actually were freer than many wealthy 
whites who were slaves of fashion. So content were the slaves, 
according to West, that they soon came to prefer life on St. Croix 
to life in their native Africa and did not want to return home. 
Yet i t  was important, he added, to avoid letting the slaves think 
their condition oppressive, for such thoughts could lead to a 
dangerous situation.^ 
A more sympathetic and understanding view of the slaves was 
held by J.  C. Schmidt, a Norwegian doctor and administrator on the 
plantations owned by the Schimmelmann family trust (det Schimmelmannske 
7\lest,  Bidraq t il  Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, pp. 25-26. 
7 5Ibid.,  pp. 84-89, p. 104. 
fideikommis), Schmidt knew the language spoken by the slaves and was 
a careful observer. He wrote: 
They [the slaves] are far from being stupid or simple. I have 
overheard them many times in the evening on the plantations 
conducting very rational conversations and lines of argument 
concerning the behavior and moral character of the whites; 
the slaves are reserved and pretend to be very simple. They 
are not vengeful, .  .  .  and they must be tyrannized for a 
long time before they consider rebel ling.7° 
Another sympathetic eyewitness was the Moravian missionary 
Christian Georg Andreas Oldendorp, who lived in the Danish West 
Indies in 1767-68. According to him, "Unalterable necessity and 
coercion make the slaves pliant [gesmeidig] so that they gradually 
assume those slavish manners, some of which still  cling to them 
when they have obtained their freedom."^ 
Paul Erdmann Isert,  a physician and amateur botanist born 
in Brandenburg in 1756, lived in Danish Guinea from 1783 to 1786 
and traveled to the interior of Africa, where he visited with 
Africans in their villages and studied the fauna and flora. Isert 
served as a doctor under Governor Jens Adolph Ki0ge during the 
latter 's military campaigns against rebellious tribesmen along the 
Volta River.^ On October 7, 1786, Isert,  returning to Europe by 
the only available means, sailed for St. Croix on the Danish slave 
7 6  J. C. Schmidt, "Blandede Anmaerkninger, samlede paa og over 
Eilandet St. Kroix i  Amerika," Samleren, No. 39, 1788, p. 232. 
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Christian Georg Andreas Oldendorp, Geschichte der Mission 
der evangelischen Brdder auf den caraibischen Inseln S. Thomas, 
S. Croix und S. Jan, (2 vols; Barby: 1777) I ,  p. 413. 
^Thorkild Hansen, Slavernes 0er (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 
1970), p. 247. 
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ship "Christiansborg" under Captain Jens Jensen Berg. There were 
36 crewmen and 452 slaves on board. On the second day at sea there 
was a slave insurrection during which Isert was seriously wounded 
(see Appendix II).  He had recovered by the time the "Christiansborg" 
reached St. Croix two months later and spent three months on the 
island, becoming a bitter opponent of the slave trade and slavery.79 
Isert was one of the few Europeans who had seen something 
of the Africa that lay beyond the slave stations on the coast; he 
was horrified by the contrast between the free blacks he had seen 
in Africa'and their enslaved brethren on St. Croix. 
The atrocious toil and the beatings in conjunction with 
a wretched diet soon combine either to kill  the slave or else 
leave him completely deformed, he who was once so well built.  
Oh, what were you before? And what are you now? These sad 
questions I have often asked myself when observing a gang of 
these wretches with their driver. " 
In sharp contrast to the portrait of the fortunate slave 
drawn by West, Isert wrote that the slaves were worked very hard: 
The normal treatment of these wretches in this region, 
especially of those engaged in field labor, is beyond all 
that is human. I saw--0h! that I had never seen it!—I saw 
how as punishment for small,  often imaginary transgressions 
slaves are bound to a stake in public and have their flesh 
slashed apart by a whip! The backs of most of them bear for 
life the bloody evidence of their whippings. It  is not always 
enough merely to cut up a slave's skin, oh no, that would 
involve insufficient suffering; one must attempt to tickle 
him afterwards as well.  Therefore the slave's wounds are 
79 
Paul Erdmann Isert,  Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaisc.hen 
Inseln in Columbien, in Briefen an seine Freunden beschreiben 
(Copenhagen, 1788), p. 305. 
^Ibid.,  p. 336. Note: All translations, unless otherwise 
specified, have been made by the author. 
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rubbed with Spanish pepper and salt.  And what was the crime 
which had earned the poor culprit such deathly pain? "The dog 
has run amy'." roars the infuriated overseer. "Put an iron 
collar with a pair of prongs on him so that one can recognize 
him." 
I once saw on a slave woman a singular device for weaning 
a slave away from rum drinking, which in the slave's misery 
is the only pleasure he knows. She had over her entire head 
a thin, metal mask, which was closed under her throat with 
a lock. There were openings for the eyes and small openings 
for the nose to let in air,  but the slave woman could not 
without permission, that is,  without having the mask unlocked, 
eat or drink anything at all.  She was constantly to wear this 
muzzle, day and n i g h t .81 Oh, that this invention never reaches 
northern Europe] for if i t  should, I fear all the houses would 
swarm with such masked persons. Of course the north Europeans 
would also wear these ornaments with greater dignity than do 
the unhappy slaves. '82 
Isert wrote that the slaves had to work from before sunrise 
until after sunset. The bombas (black slave-drivers) were always 
present and were quick to use their whips. 
A black slave has absolutely no rights. For no reason at 
all he can be clubbed half to death by a white to whom he is 
of no concern, and he may not hinder the white in the least.  
If the slave were even to raise his hand against the white, he 
would incontestably forfeit his life. In fact, such a strict 
code of justice is necessary in order that the slaves be unable 
to obtain time to hit upon the natural idea of rebelling— 
various horrible examples of which one already has in the 
Americas--but on the contrary be kept constantly sweating under 
the yoke of tyranny. 
But, say the defenders of slavery, the blacks are obstinate, 
rotten people, addicted to thievery, to riotous behavior and all 
8  This was a common way of punishing slaves in Brazil,  where 
the physical treatment of slaves was probably as harsh as in the 
West Indian sugar islands. But placing metal masks on slaves was 
apparently unknown in the United States. See Carl N. Degler, 
Neither White Nor Black; Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and 
the United States (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971), p. 70. 
Isert,  Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln, 
pp. 332-35. 
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the vices which arise out here. And have we not here on 
St. Croix slaves who, if  they were asked whether they would 
like to return to their fatherland, would answer no? To 
these defenders of slavery I want nothing more than to answer 
that if they want to be converted from their beliefs, they can 
take the trouble to travel to the interior of Africa, to see 
whether they will not find everywhere there signs of innocence 
and the most honest people imaginable. Major vices, such as 
murder and thievery, are almost unknown. These agents of 
Belial rule only in places where the lure of European products 
has reached thus far. Ach.'  I  fear the greater part of Africa 
will soon be tainted. It  is possible that a slave who is used 
here on St. Croix as a chamber servant would have no desire to 
return again to his fatherland, for things are tolerable for 
him here and he is uncertain whether, once back in Africa, he 
would not be sold again to European slavers, in which case he 
perhaps would not receive as good a job as he now has. But 
ask the legions of field slaves what they would answer, if they 
knew beforehand that one was serious and really wanted to 
return them to Africa. Yet what good does i t  do that I join my 
complaints about this most unnatural and unjust traffic with 
the groans of brave philosophers about the great irresolvable 
burden of the Europeans, to have partly wiped out or ruined 
two entire continents of people!83 
West, whose views on West Indian slavery were different from 
Isert 's,  criticized Isert for making exaggerated judgments based on 
insufficient experience in the West Indies and said Isert 's writing 
O A  
"gives evidence of haste."0  West showed pettiness by adding that 
Isert erred in writing that carrots are grown on St. Thomas, when in 
fact everyone knows they are imported from North America. "Thus one 
learns anew, how easy i t  is to make a mistake, when one describes the 
nature of a region from preconceived views (af et  daekket B o r d ) . " 8 5  
Rapid growth of the slave population on St. Croix after the 
island's acquisition by the Danish company in 1733 led to fears of 
^^Ibid.,  pp. 336-38. 
^West, Bidrag t il  Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, p. 96. 
8 5Ibid.. ,  p. 333. 
a revolt there; nevertheless, the garrison remained small: 
V  .  
in 1749 i t  consisted of only fourteen soldiers, who were seldom 
in condition to fight due to their taste for "kill devil," the fresh 
rum produced in the West Indies. The percentage of whites in the 
population of St. Croix declined steadily as the number of slaves 
rose; in 1755 whites comprised 13 per cent, in 1775 8 per cent, and 
in 1803 slightly more than 6 per cent of the population.A plot 
to initiate a slave rising at Christmas, 1759, was uncovered a few 
weeks in advance; the suspected leader was the exiled son of a 
slave executed on Antigua in 1736 for plotting a revolt,  and was 
07 
described as intelligent and able to read and write. 
Attempts to deal with the problem of runaway slaves were 
largely unsuccessful. There was a steady flow of runaways from the 
Danish West Indies to Puerto Rico, some forty miles west of St. 
Thomas. By 1745 an estimated 300 slaves had escaped from the Danish 
islands to Puerto Rico.8 8  Once in Puerto Rico a slave could easily 
hide in the mountains, or else could obtain freedom by working a 
year for the government and becoming a Catholic. "Throughout the 
eighteenth century Puerto Rico followed the practice of giving 
asylum to fugitive slaves from non-Spanish islands, with very l ittle 
variation from the principle that, once they had embraced the Roman 
Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . .  of the Danish .  .  .  Slave 
Trade," p. 150. 
8 7Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 156. 
8 8Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 224. 
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Catholic religion, they were not to be returned."®^ In 1767 the 
governor of the Danish islands signed an agreement with his counter­
part on Puerto Rico calling for mutual return of runaways, but the 
on 
measure was not enforced. 
Runaways could also hide in the mountains in the north­
western part of St. Croix. Forty-eight free colored were recruited 
from St. Thomas to hunt runaway slaves on St. Croix at mid-century, 
but the runaways were in close touch with the plantation slaves and 
were usually able to avoid capture.^ 
Though there were no laws in the Danish West Indies restricting 
the power of the masters over their slaves and no legal rights for 
slaves, they did enjoy certain de facto rights. There was general 
recognition, for instance, of the right of a slave to marry as he 
pleased, to own property acquired by selling produce raised on the 
small garden plots set aside for slaves to grow food, and to purchase 
92 
his freedom. 
Manumission, accomplished when a slave purchased his 
freedom or was freed by his master, often in the latter 's will,  was 
sufficiently common to have created by the late eighteenth century 
a growing population of free colored in the towns; in Christiansted 
89e1 sa Goveia, "The West Indian Slave Laws in the Eighteenth 
Century," in Slavery in the New World, ed. by Foner and Genovese, 
p. 116. 
9 OH0st, Efterretninqer om 0en Sanct Thomas, p. 159. 
91 
Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 275. 
92 
Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 146. 
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on St. Croix there were approximately 800 free colored in 1790 out 
93 
of a total population of about 4,800. Though they were free, 
they were not held in esteem by the whites; an ordinance of 1747 had 
attempted to keep the free colored in a segregated part of 
Christiansted.9^ West thought "their freedom is unfortunate for 
themselves and for the society in which they live."9^ Yet some of 
them occupied significant positions in the local economy. For 
instance, nearly all of the sailors who manned the sloops and 
schooners engaged in the inter-island trade were free colored; some 
of them rose to become captains.9** 
White hostility towards the free colored could be intense, 
however, as shown by an unsigned, undated letter, written in Danish 
interspersed with French, English, and Latin by a town bailiff on 
St. Croix and sent to a committee which in 1792 was assigned the 
task of drawing up a new slave code for the Danish West Indies. The 
9 3West, Bidrag t il  Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, p. 58. 
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Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 257. 
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West, Bidrag t il  Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, p. 59. 
96 
Johan Peter Nissen, Reminiscenses of a 46 Years'  Residence 
in the Island of St. Thomas in the West Indies (Nazareth, Pa.: 
Senseman and Co., 1838), p. 58. A mulatto captain named Iserum won 
fame for his skills as a navigator, though he had never received any 
training: he once supposedly sailed straight to Trinidad after 
having been told only that the island lay somewhere south of Grenada, 
where he had been before. H0st provides a l ist of free colored on 
St. Thomas in 1772, at which time most were employed as carpenters, 
tailors, construction workers, fishermen, sailors, and shoemakers; 
two were planters. See H0st, Efterretninger om 0en Sanct Thomas, 
p. 170. 
writer argued that slavery was not so much an economic as a social 
necessity; i t  was better for everyone that blacks were enslaved, and 
manumission should be outlawed: "It ought to be totally forbidden 
for a white under any circumstances to free a slave and especially 
a female slave without suffering the maximum capital loss," for the 
free-colored are a "corrupt, pernicious race of vipers that at the 
very least ought to be reduced in numbers if not extirpated (au 
moins etre Diminuee sinon extirpee)." The Danish government should 
take note of what happened when the French National Assembly attempted 
to ignore "the natural difference between blacks and whites" by 
granting equality to the free colored on St. Domingue, an event which 
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had disastrous consequences. 
Isert,  describing a gruesome torture inflicted by a free 
colored-woman on her female house slave, said the free colored were 
even more barbaric than the whites in their treatment of slaves. 
He referred to the free colored sarcastically as "that glorious 
breed, the free mulattoes! (die herliche Brut, die Freymulattenl) 
or the cross (Mitteldinge) between Europeans and N e g r o e s ."98 
Until 1732 there was no systematic attempt to convert the 
slaves in the Danish West Indies to Christianity. In that year 
Count Zinzendorf, leader of the Church of the United Brethren, or 
07 
Danish State Archives, Copenhagen, Vestindisk-guineisk 
Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse. 
Anonymous letter from St. Croix to the committee established in 
1792 to draw up a new slave code for the Danish West Indies. 
^Isert,  Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln, 
p. 333. 
Moravians, launched a mission to convert the slaves in the Danish 
islands. Zinzendorf had been introduced to a Negro slave living 
in Copenhagen and, inspired by the slave's tale of how much his 
fellows in the West Indies would appreciate an opportunity to 
become Christians, decided to turn the evangelistic fervor of 
the Moravians towards the goal of converting the slaves in the 
99 
Danish West Indies. 
The Moravians gradually overcame the suspicions of the 
planters and won general support for their mission—the planters 
came to realize that the purely religious teaching of the missionaries 
posed no threat to them; indeed, Christian slaves proved more obedient 
and trustworthy than their pagan fellows.^ By the end of the 
eighteenth century there were two mission stations on each of the 
three inhabited Danish islands, with the Moravians using slave labor 
to operate their own plantations in order to cover their expenses. 
So accepted had the Moravians become that one of their Creole converts 
became governor of the Danish West Indies in 1796.^ Wherever the 
missionaries established themselves in the West Indies in the 
eighteenth century, they concentrated on religious instruction of 
99h. Lawaetz, Brgidremenighedens Mission: Dansk-Vestindien, 
1769-1848 (Copenhagen: J.  Cohens Bogtryckkerier, 1902), pp. 20ff. 
^0 001dendorp, Geschichte der Mission der evangelischen BrOder, 
p. 5 of preface; I .  K. Hegner, Fortsaettelse af David Cranzes Brfldres 
Historie (Copenhagen, 1792), p. 97. Count Zinzendorf, on a visit to 
St. Thomas, argued that enslavement of Africans was divinely 
sanctioned and cited the Bible to illustrate his view. See J.  E. 
Hutton, A History of Moravian Missions (London: Moravian Publication 
Office, 1922), p. 44. 
^Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 209ff. 
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the slaves and saw no alternative but to accept the existing social 
in? 
order. c  
The mission of the Danish Lutheran Church, which lasted 
from 1755 to 1799, accomplished l ittle other than to publish some 
religious literature in the language of the slaves, creole Dutch 
(hollandske kreolsk or bastardhollandsk), which was a simplified 
Dutch with some African elements, used by the slaves to communicate 
among themselves and with their masters. The language originated 
on St. Thomas around 1700 and was largely replaced by English by 
about the turn of the next century. During the nineteenth century 
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i t  gradually disappeared. 
Though relatively small and weak, Denmark, by virtue of 
i ts possession of colonies in Africa and the West Indies, was able 
to join with the larger European colonial powers in profiting from 
the South Atlantic System, "a complex economic organism centered on 
the production in the Americas of tropical staples for consumption 
in Europe, and grown by the labor of Africans.1 , 1 0 4  During the period 
of company rule, sugar and cotton remained the chief exports of the 
Danish West Indies. These products were purchased from the planters 
^Elsa Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands 
at the End of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1965), pp. 272ff. The Moravians also established highly 
successful missions in the British Leeward Islands at Antigua (1756) 
and St. Kitts (1774). 
1 0 3Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 195ff. 
1 f)4 
Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade; A Census 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 3. 
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by the company factor and sold in Copenhagen. In keeping with the 
dominant economic ideas of the time, no sugar refining was permitted 
in the islands, that task being reserved for Denmark, where the 
c o m p a n y ' s  s u g a r  r e f i n e r y  e n j o y e d  a  v e r y  s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n . ^  
In the years after 1754 sugar refining became the most 
important industrial activity in Copenhagen. In 1770 there were 
twelve refineries there, producing sugar and syrup worth 760,000 
rigsdaler.^ There were eleven refineries in other parts of the 
, 107 
monarchy. 
Denmark supplied the islands primarily with luxury goods, 
food, tools, and equipment for sugar production; the Gold Coast 
exported slaves to the islands; North America sent timber and food; 
Spanish America, agricultural animals and building equipment.^8 
After the government took over the islands in 1754, i t  sought to 
use the West Indies as sources of raw materials for Danish industry 
and to reserve them as a market for Danish products J  
The wars of the second half of the eighteenth century proved 
highly beneficial to Danish foreign trade and shipping, as Danish 
merchants took advantage of their country's neutral status to supply 
^0 5Sveistrup, De Dansk-Vestindiske 0ers {Jkonomiske Historie, 
pp. 91-92. 
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Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 73. 
^0 7Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 75. 
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Sveistrup, De Dansk-Vestindiske 0ers tfkonomiske Historie, 
p. 97. 
109 
Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 60. 
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the West Indian colonies of the warring powers, in particular the 
French and, to a lesser extent, the Dutch islands.^® The man who 
laid the foundations for this so-called golden age of Danish commerce 
was Johan Hartvig Ernst Bernstorff, foreign minister in the reign 
of Frederik V; Bernstorff stressed the importance of overseas trade 
combined with a policy of neutrality.^ During the Seven Years'  
War the number of ships sailing from .Copenhagen to the West Indies 
increased rapidly from a yearly average of 4.2 in the period 1751-55 
112 
to 13.5 from 1756-60, and reached 23.2 from 1761-65. During the 
War of the American Revolution Danish foreign trade again experienced 
a major boom: in 1780, 90 Danish ships sailed to the West Indies; 
in 1781, 135; and. in 1782, 226. Copenhagen was the most important 
port in the Danish monarchy—in 1780, 70 per cent of the ships 
113 
bound for the West Indies sailed from it ,  and in 1782, 50 per cent. 
Imports from the West Indies into Copenhagen in 1782-83 reached 
4,498,259 riqsdaler, surpassing those from Europe (2,323,290) for the 
first time.^4 
iTOjens Vibaek, Reform oq Fall i t  1784-1830, Vol. X of Danmarks 
Historie, ed. by John Danstrup and Hal Koch (14 vols.;  Copenhagen: 
Politikens Forlag, 1964), p. 161. 
l^Marius Vibaek, Den danske Handels Historie (Copenhagen: 
Nordisk Forlag, 1932), p. 223. 
^ S v e i s t r u p ,  De dansk Vestindiske 0ers 0konomiske Historie, 
p. 93. 
1 1 301e Feldbaek, Dansk Neutralitetspolitik under Krigen 
1778-1783 (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag, 1971), p. 191. 
. l^sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 50. 
Imports from Asia remained far greater than from either of the former. 
As the only Baltic state with significant tropical colonies, 
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Denmark enjoyed a great advantage over her neighbors. Sugar 
from the Danish West Indies was available in such quantity that i t  
became an important part of Denmark's exports to the Baltic area, 
as well as supplying all of Denmark's needs. In 1778, exports of 
syrup, refined sugar, and muscavado (brown sugar, from the 
Portuguese menos, less, arid acabado, finished^®) amounted to 
65.7 per cent of total exports from Copenhagen; in 1784, the figure 
was 50.3 per cent. The most important Baltic markets for Danish 
sugar were Prussia, Sweden, and Russia. In 1778 and 1784, sugar 
products accounted for 68.4 and 45.8 per cent of total exports from 
Copenhagen to Prussia; 50.4 and 63.8 per cent of total exports from 
Copenhagen to Sweden; and 20.2 and 58.4 per cent of total exports 
from Copenhagen to Russia. Among industrial exports from Copenhagen 
in 1778 and 1784, refined sugar and syrup accounted for between 80 
and 90 per cent of the total.  Export of sugar, including muscavado, 
was of overwhelming importance for Denmark's balance of trade.^ 
Sugar made the Danish West Indies an important source of 
wealth for Denmark, and i t  was reasonable to assume that the govern-
^^Sweden acquired the tiny island of St. Bartholomew from 
France in 1784, but with i ts small population of 950, over half of 
whom were white, and a size of only eight square miles, St. 
Bartholomew never became more than a small trading station. See 
Sten Carlsson, Svensk historia (2d. ed.; Stockholm: Svenska 
Bokftirlaget/Bonniers, 1964), II,  222-23. 
n fi 
Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar (2 vols.; London: 
Chapman and Hall Ltd.,  1949), 1, 109. 
^Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, 
pp. 122-26. 
merit would continue to encourage the production of raw sugar in 
the islands. In 1784 the Danish islands were thriving colonies, 
but they were dependent on the labor of Negro slaves, who were so 
4) 
exploited and mistreated that their numbers could be maintained 
only by means of the slave trade. There was no indication that in 
just eight years the Danish government would condemn the slave 
trade and set a deadline for ending i t .  
CHAPTER II 
Ernst Schimmelmann and the Prelude to Abolition 
The decision to abolish the Danish slave trade was 
facilitated by the oligarchic nature of Danish absolutism in the 
late eighteenth century and by the presence within the ruling elite 
in the period after 1784 of men who favored a broad range of reforms. 
The men in power after 1784 inaugurated an era of reform which has 
been called "perhaps the happiest period" in Danish hi storyJ 
King Christian VII (1766-1808) was mentally i ll  during 
all but the very first years of his reign. This circumstance 
enabled first Johan Friedrich Struensee, from 1770 to 1772, and 
thereafter the king's stepmother, Juliana Maria, second wife of 
Frederik V, to rule Denmark through the King, who merely signed 
O 
documents placed before him. For twelve years following the over­
throw of Struensee, Juliana Maria and her favorite, Ove H0egh-
Guldberg, a doctrinnaire conservative, ruled Denmark. This so-called 
Guldberg regime revoked most of the reforms inaugurated by Struensee, 
^Vibaek, Reform og Fallit ,  1784-1830, Vol. X of Danmarks 
Historie, p. 35. 
^Svend Cedergren Bech, Oplysning og Tolerance, 1721-1784, 
Vol. IX of Danmarks Historie, ed. by John Danstrup and Hal Koch 
(14 vols.;  Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag, 1965), pp. 408ff. 
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including freedom of the press. It  also ended recent moves toward 
improving the position of the peasants, and in general represented 
an attitude hostile to the ideas of refqrm which Struensee had 
3 
sought to apply to Danish society. 
The young Crown Prince, Frederik, son of Christian VII, 
was sixteen in 1784. Outraged at the insults he had suffered at 
the hands of the ruling clique, Frederik gave his support to 
organizing a conspiracy to overthrow theGuldberg regime; prominent 
among the conspirators was the nephew of J.  H. E. Bernstorff, 
Count Andreas Peter Bernstorff, who had been removed from his 
position as foreign minister by Guldberg a few years before. On 
April 14, 1784, the Crown Prince, at a meeting of the Council of 
State (Statsraadet), got the king to sign a document ordering an 
end to the Guldberg regime.^ Thenceforth every royal order was to 
be signed by both the King and the Crown Prince. By weakening the 
power of the King, this measure actually violated the King's Law 
(Kongeloven) of 1665, which was the legal basis for Danish absolutism, 
and which had no provision for removing a king in case of insanity.^ 
The new regime sought to modernize Danish society and apply 
to Denmark some of the social and economic ideas of the enlightenment. 
3Ibid.,  pp. 492ff. 
^Vibaek, Reform oq Fallit ,  pp. 21ff. 
^Edvard Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie fra den store nordiske 
Krigs slutninq til  Rigernes Adskillelse, 1720-1814 (7 vols.l  
Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad, 1896-1909). Vol. VI, Part I:  Styrelse 
og Reformer, 1784-1791, pp. 1-2. 
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A small group of reform-minded ministers actually governed the 
country with the consent of Crown Prince Frederik until Bernstorff 's 
death in 1797, after which the Crown Prince increasingly took power 
into his own hands.^ The leading ministers were well-educated, 
cosmopolitan men who opposed arbitrary governmental interference 
in the lives of the people; they were certainly not modern democrats 
and favored a tolerant, aristocratic rule. For them the ideal type 
of government was that of England.^ 
Denmark had been a strongly centralized state since 1661, 
under the rule of an absolute monarch. In i ts efforts to achieve 
reform the Danish central government, unlike the governments of other 
monarchies such as France and Austria, did not have to contend with 
dangerous opposition from powerful privileged bodies such as 
parlements and provincial assemblies; the Danish nobility posed no 
O 
threat to the monarchy. Yet the government, when devising important 
laws affecting Danish society, did have to consider the views of 
the public. The days when, as under the early absolute monarchy, the 
q 
government could pretend to ignore public sentiment were past. 
Freedom of the press was once again in effect after 1786, 
®Aage Friis, Axel Linvald, and M. Mackeprang, ed.,  Schultz 
Danmarkshistorie; vort folks Historie qennem Tiderne (6 vols.;  
Copenhagen: J.  H. Schultz Forlag, 1941-43), Vol. IV, Part I ,  
Opl.ysningens Tidsalder, by Axel Linvald, p. 10. 
?Vibaek, Reform oq Fall i t ,  pp. 35-36. 
O 
Linvald, Schultz Danmarks Historie, IV, Part 1, p. 10. 
g 
Holm, Danmark-Norges Histories VI, Part 1, p. 85. 
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when the police were forbidden to interfere with the journals. 
Between 1770, when press freedom was first permitted under Struensee, 
and 1800, 116 new journals were startedYounger reformers 
such as Count Ernst Schimmelmann (1747-1831) and Count Christian 
Ditlev Reventlow wanted to use the press to enlist public support 
for their views in their struggle with conservatives in the govern­
ment. They could hope to obtain the backing of the public because 
support for reform was widespread in Copenhagen in the years after 
1784.1 1  
The three leading ministers were Bernstorff, Reventlow, 
and Schimmelmann. Each was born to great wealth and educated for 
a career in government, and they were closely connected by friendshp 
and marriage. Although there was resentment at their German back­
ground, they were patriots with a genuine desire to serve D e n m a r k . ^  
Bernstorff was foreign minister and the dominant figure in the Council 
of State, where final decisions were made on the recommendations of 
the departments; that Bernstorff was held in awe by Crown Prince 
Frederik was an important reason for the power which he, along with 
Reventlow and Schimmelmann, was able to e x e r c i s e . ^  Reventlow was 
head of the Treasury Department (Rentekammeret) and a member of the 
Board of Trade; he is best known as the architect of the great 
^Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t ,  pp. 186-87. 
^Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, VI, Part 1, pp. 42-43, 88. 
^Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t ,  pp. 34ff. 
13 
Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, VI, Part I ,  p. 4. 
agricultural reforms which included the decree of 1788 liberating 
peasants from the StavnsbaandSchimmelmann held the title of 
Finance Minister and was head of the Board of Trade and of the 
Board of Finance; he was primarily responsible for the decree of 
1792 on the abolition of the slave trade. 
It  was Schimmelmann and Christian Ditlev Reventlow "who 
took the initiative in by far the greatest number of governmental 
decisions concerning Denmark's internal development and conditions 
which characterized the last sixteen years of the eighteenth century."^ 
Schimmelmann's reformist inclinations can be seen from a letter he 
wrote to Reventlow on June 28, 1788, eight days after the decree 
abolishing the Stavnsbaand had been issued: 
How I hope, dear Reventlow, that your desires may be 
fulfilled for both of us, that we may exert all of our strength 
in order to advance the good cause. Still  there is much left 
to do; our efforts must be devoted both to getting men who 
share our goals to join with us, and to promoting the spread of 
that spirit  which guides us, so that i t  can become ever more 
common. Only then can we hope to see great and swift resultsJ6 
l^The Stavnsbaand had been initiated in 1733; i t  forced male 
peasants from childhood to middle age to remain on the estate where 
they had been raised. The official reasoning behind the Stavnsbaand 
was the need to guarantee that each district could supply a sufficient 
number of soldiers; in fact the Stavnsbaand became a means of 
insuring that the estate owners had a large enough labor supply. A 
gradual abolition of the Stavnsbaand was decreed on June 20, 1788; 
freed instantly were male peasants under 14 and over 36 years of age. 
For those in between, the Stavnsbaand was to continue in effect for 
another twelve years. 
^Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part I ,  p. 46. 
1 fi 
Louis Bobe", Efterladte papirer fra den Reventlowske 
Familiekreds i  Tidsrummet 1770-1827 (10 vols.; Copenhaqen: Lehm & 
Stage, 1895-1931), IV, 31-32. 
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Bernstorff served as the great spokesman in the Council 
of State for the reforms Reventlow and Schimmelmann sought. 
Without Bernstorff 's assistance the latter two could never have 
overcome the opposition of conservative members of the government, 
for they depended on Bernstorff 's ability to influence the young 
Crown Prince.^ 
Schimmelmann, born in Dresden, had moved to Denmark with 
his father, Heinrich Carl Schimmelmann, when the latter 's success 
as a merchant in Hamburg brought him to the attention of the Danish 
government in 1761. At that time the elder Schimmelmann's wealth 
was estimated at 1,250,000 rigsdaler J8  
Danish finances were in a deplorable condition, and i t  
was believed that a man of Schimmelmann's ability and reputation 
could obtain favorable loans abroad for the state. He was placed 
in charge of the effort to reduce the debt. To accomplish this 
task he resorted to the sale of crown property J9  Exploiting his 
position for his own personal gain, the elder Schimmelmann in 1763 
purchased the four plantations in the West Indies and the sugar 
refinery in Copenhagen which the Crown had taken over from the West 
India and Guinea Company in 1755. For them he paid, in eight annual, 
interest-free installments, 400,000 rigsdaler, a low price for such 
1 7Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part I ,  p. 47. 
0. Bro-J0rgensen, Heinrich Carl Schimmelmann: en Studie 
i  Skatmesterens Fortid (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1970), p. 197. 
^Bech, Opl.ysninq oq Tolerance, Vol. IX in Danmarks Historie, 
pp. 399-400. 
valuable properties. The plantations and sugar refinery became an 
important part of the Schimmelmann family h o l d i n g s .20 
Ernst Schimmelmann, who was well-educated and trilingual, 
rose rapidly in the Danish government under the patronage of his 
father. Made a member of the Board of Trade in 1773, he became 
head of that department and a member of the Board of Finance three 
years later. Following the overthrow of the Guldberg Regime in 
1784, he became head of the Board of Finance and received the title 
of Finance Minister. In 1788 he obtained a seat in the Council of 
State, where he was an ally of Bernstorff and a proponent of reform.^ 
Schimmelmann's first wife died five years after they were 
married. In 1782 he married Charlotte Schubart,  an intelligent, 
well-educated woman, sister of the wife of Ludwig Reventlow, who 
was the brother of Christian Ditlev Reventlow and himself an 
important figure in Danish government after 1784.^ 
Countess Charlotte Schimmelmann became the leading hostess 
in the social world of the intellectual and governmental elite in 
Copenhagen. At her salon poets, diplomats, intellectuals, and 
prominent figures in the government discussed philosophy and politics 
in an atmosphere receptive to the latest ideas and fashions. So many 
foreigners were present at these salons that a guest could get the 
Of) 
Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 8. 
pi 
C. F. Bricka, ed.,  Dansk Bioqrafisk Lexikon, t illiqe 
omfattende Norqe for Tidsrummet 1537-1814 (20 vols.; Copenhagen: 
Gyldendal, 1887-1906), XV, 132-133. 
^Vibaek, Reform oq Fall i t ,  pp. 53-54. 
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23 
impression of being in Germany or France rather than in Denmark. 
The elder Schimmelmann died in 1782, leaving an inheritance 
of three million rigsdaler.^ The plantations, sugar refineries, 
and an arms factory were placed under a trust (fideikommis) in 
which Ernst Schimmelmann was the main partner. The most valuable 
properties of the Schimmelmann family were the plantations on 
St. Croix, which in 1779 were valued at 850,000 rigsdaler, and two 
25 
sugar refineries in Copenhagen then valued at 145,000 rigsdaler. 
The Schimmelmann plantations and sugar refineries were very 
profitable enterprises. Much of the sugar from the refineries was 
sold in Norway: in 1793, when total sugar sales of the Schimmelmann 
refineries amounted to 334,000 rigsdaler, 240,000 were from sales in 
Norway. Profits that year from the sugar refineries totaled 62,552 
^Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part 2, Forskjellige 
Samfundsforhold og indre Tilstande, 1784-1799. p. 373"] Schimmelmann 
gave financial support to many Danish and foreign intellectuals, 
such as the Danish poets Jens Baggesen and Adam Oehlenschlaeger, 
and the German writer Johann Friedrich von Schiller. Schimmelmann 
and the Duke of Augustenborg wrote to Schiller: "Accept this offer, 
noble man! Do not let our t itles lead you to decline i t .  We know 
no other sign of greatness than to be human beings, citizens of 
the great republic whose borders include more than the life of 
one generation, more than this planet. We are only human beings, 
your brothers, not vain men of high rank." Cited in Vibaek, Reform 
oq Fall i t ,  p. 55. 
OA 
Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t ,  p. 50. Danish rigsdaler prior 
to 1813 were valued at 390 to 375 English grains fine silver, which 
was somewhat greater, for instance, than the value of the German 
Convention thaler in the second half of the eighteenth century. See 
Alexander Del Mar, A History of the Monetary Systems of France and 
Other European States (New York: The Cambridge Encyclopedia Co., 
1903), pp. 301, 352-53, 358-59. 
Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 114. 
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p/r 
r igsdaler; from the sugar plantations, 171,132. The number of 
slaves on Schimmelmann's St.  Croix plantations remained fairly 
constant from 1773 to 1782 at about 960.^ 
The Schimmelmann estate also included an armaments factory 
at Hellebaek, landed estates in Jutland and on Zealand, and a 
palatial home in Copenhagen. After his father's death Ernst 
Schimmelmann purchased a copper-works, an industrial establishment 
in Jutland which produced bricks, earthenware, and soap, and half-
ownership in a paper mill.  
Schimmelmann was also deeply involved in overseas trading 
ventures as a director of major trading companies in which he had 
large investments. During the War of the American Revolution, when 
Danish West Indian trade expanded rapidly by taking advantage of 
Danish neutrality and the temporary inability of Britain to enforce 
the Rule of 1756, the government supported the creation of chartered 
trading companies which were largely controlled by and heavily 
dependent on the Crown.^ The largest of these companies was the 
^Danish State Archives, Copenhagen. Ernst Schimmelmanns 
Privat Arkiv, Pk. 72, Fideikommisset vedkommende Papirer 1782-1800, 
Vortrag zur Generalversammlung, May 1794, p. 4. 
2 7Danish State Archives, Copenhagen. Vestindisk-guineisk 
Rente samt General to!dkammer, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen 
t il  Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse samt Efterretninger 
om Negerhandelen i  Vestindien ,  Tabelle (lber die Neger auf den zum 
Gr&flich v. Schimmelmannschen Familien Fideicommis gehtJrenden 
Plantagen auf St. Croix. 
20 
Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t ,  pp. 51-52. 
29 
Feldbaek, DanskNeutralitetspolitikpp. 53ff. 
Royal West India Company (Kongeligt Vestindisk Handelsselskab) 
created in 1778. Of the six directors of the company, five were 
members of the government, including both Heinrich Carl Schimmelmann 
and Ernst Schimmelmann; the latter became chairman of the board 
(f0rste direkt0r) and invested 20,000 rigsdaler in the company. 
The company's requests for assistance from the government were 
30 
usually sympathetically received. 
The West India Company was granted the right to customs 
duties and anchorage and weighing fees on St. Thomas and St. John 
in return for a yearly payment of 16,000 rigsdaler. Most important, 
however, the company was to receive the income from import duties 
and excise taxes on coffee imported into the Danish monarchy in 
return for an annual payment of 20,000 rigsdaler. The Crown also 
favored the company by granting i t  interest-free loans and free use 
of a warehouse on St. Thomas, and by promoting sales of company 
stock. Unlike the former West India and Guinea Company, i t  had no 
monopoly on the trade with the West Indies; nor did the share­
holders have any say in the policies of the company or in the 
selection of i ts directors.^ 
Schimmelmann was also chairman of the board of the 
Baltic-Guinea Company (0sters0isk-Guineiske Handelsselskab), 
established in 1781. This company represented an attempt to connect 
30 P. P. Sveistrup, "Det Kongelige Danske oktroyerede 
Vestindiske Handelsselskab, 1778-85; en drifts0konomisk Unders0gelse, 
Historisk Tidsskrift,  10th series, VI (1942-44), 389ff. 
^Ibid.,  pp. 387-88. 
the Baltic trade with the African trade; i t  received a monopoly 
on trade with the Gold Coast, which meant i t  was to be heavily 
involved in the slave trade. To help the company maintain the 
forts on the Gold Coast, the Crown gave the company a yearly sum 
of 25,000 rigsdaler. The company also benefited from export 
premiums on Danish goods traded on the Gold Coast in exchange for 
slaves, gold, and ivory. The board of directors was selected by 
the Crown from the ranks of the government bureaucracy, and 
shareholders were without influence on company policy. The Crown 
gave the Baltic-Guinea Company thirty-seven ships formerly used in 
the Greenland and Guinea trade, as well as warehouses and a shipyard 
in Copenhagen.3^ 
In 1783, with the end of the War of the American Revolution, 
the circumstances which had helped create a boom in Danish overseas 
commerce ended. The harbor at St. Thomas, which after the English 
attack on St. Eustatius in 1781 had been the most important entrepot 
in the West Indies, often containing between three and four hundred 
ships, in the spring of 1785 was visited by only five ships. Income 
from customs duties in Copenhagen fell from 731,689 rigsdaler in 
1783 to 490,505 in 1787. Exports from Copenhagen fell from 1,503,032 
rigsdaler in 1784 to 1,064,057 in 1785, and to 609,937 rigsdaler 
in 1790.3 3  
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Knud Klem, "Det kgl. oktr. 0sters0isk-Guineiske 
Handelsselskab," Handels-og S0fartsmuseets Aarbflger. 1970, p. 16, 
18, 12. Among the ships that were to be used in the slave trade was 
the "Baron Ernst von Schimmelmann." 
3 3Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part I ,  p. 166. 
The great Danish overseas trading companies created during 
the war were doomed with the return of peace. The profitable trade 
with the French West Indies ended in February 1783 when France 
banned trade by foreign vessels with the French colonies. Other 
countries soon restored pre-war trade restrictions, thereby dealing 
a fatal blow to both the Danish West India Company and the Baltic-
Guinea Company.34 The Crown had been primarily responsible for 
the creation of these companies and had induced several thousand 
families to invest in them; i t  was now urged by the Board of Trade 
to do everything in its power to help the companies overcome their 
difficulties.3 5  
In 1785 the directors of the West India Company asked the 
Crown to buy up the company's stock at 300 rigsdaler per share, 
three times the original price, and said the government could 
operate the company at a profit,  something the directors had given 
up all hope of doing themselves. The Board of Trade and the 
Board of Finance agreed to pay the shareholders 260 rigsdaler 
per share, despite the admitted fact that the shares then had a 
market value of only 60 rigsdaler each. The Crown's generosity 
was probably due to Schimmelmann's position as a major shareholder 
and chairman of the board; as head of the Board of Trade and the 
Board of Finance, he was in a position to reward himself with 
state funds. Schimmelmann was not so self-denying as to refuse to 
•^Sveistrup, "Det Vestindiske Handelsselskab," p. 412. 
3 5Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, VI, Part I ,  p. 153. 
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make money at the expense of the state and the taxpayers. From 
the sale of his stock in the company at 260 rigsdaler, his 
remuneration as chairman of the board, and the dividends he earned 
on his stock during the boom, Schimmelmann enriched himself by 
50,000 rigsdaler more than he could have earned by investing his 
money in a bank at normal interest.  Other government officials 
profited, too, though not as much as Schimmelmann. 
The Baltic-Guinea Company also had problems when the war 
ended. In an attempt to improve the company's situation, the Crown 
in 1786 cancelled 1,150,000 rigsdaler of the comapny's debt to 
37 
the state, and gave the company 400,000 rigsdaler. Still  the 
company's prospects were poor. 
Schimmelmann, seeking a solution to the problems of the 
Baltic-Guinea Company, in 1786 sent D. G. Moldenhawer, a professor 
of theology at the University of Copenhagen, on a secret mission to 
Spain with the primary goal of obtaining for the Danish company the 
right to sell slaves in the Spanish American colonies. Moldenhawer 
was also to attempt to trade some of the Danish African forts for 
Spanish recognition of Denmark's right to occupy the uninhabited but 
•^Sveistrup, "Det Vestindiske Handelsselskab," pp. 422ff. 
Ernst Schimmelmann lacked his father's all-consuming interest in 
business and has often been viewed as a poor businessman. See Axel 
Linvald, Kronprins Frederik og hans Regering, 1797-1807 (Copenhagen: 
G. E. C. Gads Foriag, 1923), p. 349. It  would seem more accurate 
to regard him as a man highly adept at making money, not least by 
using his position in the government to promote his own financial 
well-being. 
37|<lem, "Det 0sters0isk-Guineiske Handelsselskab," p. 41. 
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fertile Crab Island off the coast of Puerto Rico. Nothing 
came of Moldenhawer's negotiations with Count Floridablanca, however; 
Spain could purchase slaves cheaper from the English and did not 
39 
want to abandon its claim to Crab Island. 
Schimmelmann finally arranged to have the greatest merchant 
in Denmark, Frederic de Coninck, take over the trade of the Baltic-
Guinea Company; de Coninck believed he could make a profit where 
the company could not. Accordingly, the government bought up the 
stock of the Baltic-Guinea Company at seventy rigsdaler per share, 
well below the original price of 100 but nearly twice the current 
value.40 The government then signed a contract with de Coninck, 
granting him the former company's possessions and a monopoly on 
trade with Danish Guinea, in return for his payment of a sum well 
under that which the government i tself had paid for the shares of the 
Baltic-Guinea Company; all  together the government lost more than 
two million rigsdaler on the Baltic-Guinea Company.^ Schimmelmann 
secretly acquired 24,000 rigsdaler worth of stock in de Coninck's 
new slave-trading venture. Schimmelmann probably received this stock 
O O  
E. Gigas, "En theologisk Professors diplomatiske Mission," 
Historisk Tidsskrift,  8th series, I (1907-08), 185ff. 
3 9Ibid.,  p. 227. 
^Klem, "Det 0stersj6isk-Guineiske Handelsselskab," p. 44 
and p. 48. 
4 1Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part I ,  pp. 156-57. 
The contract said that de Coninck would continue the Guinea trade 
for twenty-eight years, with the regulations governing the trade 
under the Baltic-Guinea Company to continue at least for the time 
being. 
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as a gift from de Coninck in appreciation for assistance to 
A O  
de Coninck in completing the transaction. 
The Danish government had been concerned not only by the 
poor performance of the Baltic-Guinea Company but by the tendency 
of the slave population on St. Croix to decline. Between 1780 
and 1790 the number of slaves on St. Croix fell from 22,687 to 
22,119.4 3  The number of slaves sold was not sufficient to maintain 
the slave population. 
From 1778 to 1789 the overwhelming majority of slaves 
transported by Danish slavers from Africa to the. Americas were sold 
in foreign colonies rather than in the Danish islands. Danes bought 
17,113 slaves in Africa, an average of 1,426 per year. Of these, 
12,062 were bought at the Danish forts on the Gold Coast; but only 
6,229 slaves were sold by Danish slave ships in the Danish West 
Indies. In 1784 and 1785 there were eight Danish ships involved in 
the slave trade; these were the peak years, corresponding to the 
end of the War of the American Revolution.4 4  Not all  slaves brought 
to St. Croix came directly from Africa. At Frederiksted, the town 
on the western end of the island, slaves were imported from other 
parts of the Caribbean, especially from the English Leeward Islands.4 5  
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Julius Schovelin, Den danske Handelsempire; Forhold og 
Personer i  det 18 Aarhundredes sidste Halvdel (2 vols.;  Copenhagen: 
Nordiske Forlag, 1899), II,  135, 
4 3"Forestillingen angaaende Negerhandelens Afskaffelse," 
Minerva, April 1792, p. 64. 
4 4Ibid.,  pp. 53-54. See Appendix III.  
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Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . .  of the Danish .  .  .  Slave 
Trade," p. 155. 
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Foreigners were allowed to sell slaves at St. Thomas by 
an edict of 1785 which was intended to help that island become 
a center of the transit slave trade. In 1785-1786, and 1789-1790, 
only about 25 per cent of the slaves brought to St. Thomas were 
retained for labor there and on St. John; the rest were exported 
to other colonies in the Caribbean, in particular to Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and Santo Domingo. Slaves from the Dutch, English, and 
French Lesser Antilles were also funneled through St. Thomas for 
A C  
sale to the Spanish islands in the Greater Antilles. 
On April 28, 1787, the Board of Finance sent to the General 
Customs Department for its consideration some proposals for improving 
the slave trade. The latter department decided to obtain suggestions 
from the government of the Danish West Indies and on May 15 sent 
the Finance Department's letter on to St. Croix. The sixteen-page 
report sent back to Copenhagen by the government on St. Croix, dated 
October 15, 1787, contained introductory remarks which, surprisingly, 
condemned the slave trade and slavery: 
So long as the black color, despite philosophy, is the mark 
of servitude on many thousands of people, so long as one 
continues to believe that the West Indian colonies can be 
cultivated only by slaves, so long as people can be exchanged 
for gold and silver, and so long as the European nations 
compete to see who shall enjoy the greatest advantage in this 
unnatural trade and who shall be most successful at increasing 
the number of slaves, so long as these conditions exist,  a 
sensitive business expert [en f01som Handelsk.yndig] must stifle 
every cry of freedom and sympathy in his bosom. He must consider 
himself to represent a state, and states, as we know, are aware 
of no more important law than to seek to become richer than 
4 6jjbjd^., pp. 162ff. 
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their neighbor . . . .  
In the European balance Denmark is not rich enough (nor 
does i ts example seem likely to be strong enough) to be able 
to free all the slaves from their bonds wherever the Danish 
flag flies, and to cause a revolution in the Guinea trade. 
That honor seems to be reserved for a richer nation and a 
more favorable era. We therefore should now, as instructed, 
furnish our views concerning means by which the slave trade 
can be made most profitable for Denmark and the Danish colonies, 
and forget the disagreeable aspects involved in such an 
investigation. However, surrounded as we are by enslaved 
blacks, we find consolation in the thought of beinq able to 
contribute to making their circumstances bearable.2" 
These words of sympathy for the slaves and of distaste for 
the "unnatural trade" are all the more remarkable in view of the 
later role which their primary author, Governor-General Ernst Frederik 
von Walterstorff, was to play as a leading spokesman for those wishing 
to resume the slave trade after its cessation in January 1803. In 
1787 Walterstorff, who had married into the planter class on St. Croix, 
probably felt that an expression of humanitarian sentiment would 
favorably impress his superiors in the Danish government without 
actually leading to anything that would endanger the prosperity of 
the planters. Yet his criticism of the slave trade and slavery could 
only have been encouraging to those high officials in Copenhagen who 
favored abolition. 
The report was unsympathetic towards the Baltic-Guinea 
^Danish State Archives, Copenhagen. Vestindisk-guineisk 
Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse. 
Bemaerkninger ved den, Regieringen, igiennem det kongelige vestindiske 
Kammer h. d. 15de Maii 1787, tilsendte Extract af det kongl: 
Finants-Collegii Skrivelse d.d. 28de April e.a.,  angaaende Slave-
handelen, og den sikkerste Maade, ievnligen directe at forsyne Ste. 
Crux med de forn0dne Negre (Report of the government of the Danish 
West Indies on the slave trade and the best way of guaranteeing 
St. Croix a regular supply of slaves), October 15, 1787. 
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Company. I t  argued that the company had not supplied St. Croix 
with enough slaves and had sold slaves on other islands where prices 
were higher.^ 
The report noted the complaints made by the Baltic-Guinea 
Company that prices for slaves were too low on St. Croix to make 
the slave trade to the Danish islands profitable. The report 
then suggested that prices in the French islands had been unusually 
high during the first years of the 1780s due to the influence of 
the War of the American Revolution, "when the French islands had 
virtually no supply of slaves, except what the Danish Guinea Company 
and Portuguese ships could supply them, which meant that prices for 
slaves had to be higher in the French colonies, where there were 
more buyers [than in the Danish islands]." Other reasons were given 
for the greater profitability of slave-trading to the French islands 
(see Appendix VI), but the report argued that the Baltic-Guinea Company 
could sell slaves to the Danish islands at a considerable profit if 
only the company followed certain basic rules of commerce listed in 
the report and said to be of great importance for success especially 
in the slave trade. The colonial government calculated the average 
price at which slaves were sold on St. Croix between 1778-1787 at 
214 riqsdaler and estimated the total cost of bringing each slave 
to St. Croix at 94 riqsdaler if purchased with rum, and 140 riqsdaler 
^The company was not required to sell i ts slaves in the 
Danish islands, yet its monopoly on trade with the Danish Guinea forts 
made i t  virtually impossible for private Danish merchants to 
participate in the slave trade. 
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if purchased with European merchandise. Therefore the company 
should have earned excellent profits from the slave trade to St. 
Croix. 
The government of the West Indies wrote that instructions 
received from the Management of the Royal Guinea Trade (den 
kongelige Guineiske Handels Direktion) in Copenhagen in 1781 had 
resulted in the sale of only the weakest and sickliest slaves 
(Udskudsvarer) on St. Croix while the better half of each slave 
cargo was sent on to St. Thomas for sale to foreigners.^® These 
instructions, the report said, had given rise to a hatred among the 
planters towards the Baltic-Guinea Company, for they had thought that 
the company was designed to supply St. Croix frequently with healthy 
slaves. The report said the average price of 214 rigsdaler per 
slave sold on St. Croix was rather low, considering the risks 
involved in the slave trade; i t  insisted that this low price was 
not caused by specific local conditions on St. Croix but rather by 
abundant "bad luck" [Uheld] and the poor condition of slaves offered 
for sale on the island. 
Part of the reason for the wretched condition of the 
company's slaves, according to the report,  could be found in the 
fact that some of the company's ships had originally been constructed 
^Report of the government of the Danish West Indies on the 
slave trade, October 15, 1787, pp. 2-5. 
^But i t  was not true that approximately half of each slave 
cargo was sent to St. Thomas. The government's own enclosed data 
contradicts this statement. See Appendix IV. 
for use in whaling; also, the surgeons on the Baltic-Guinea 
Company's slave ships were characterized by lack of knowledge and 
skill [Uvidenhed og Uk.yndighed]. Worst of all ,  in 1782 and 1783, 
years when demand for slaves was high in the French colonies, the 
company had sold no slaves on St. Croix. The average number of 
slaves sold by Danish slavers on St. Croix between 1778 and 1787 was 
508 annually. But the colonial government argued that St. Croix 
needed at least three times that many. It  would therefore not be 
harmful to the planters were the company to lose its monopoly on trade 
with the Danish Guinea forts.51 
The report suggested that all Danish vessels, including 
those from St. Croix but not those from St. Thomas (ships from the 
latter island were too likely to be owned by foreigners), should be 
permitted to participate in the slave trade from Danish Guinea; i t  
also listed other changes which i t  felt should be made in the rules 
regulating trade to St. Croix.5 2  Foreign ships, the report 
advised, should not be allowed to participate in the slave trade to 
the Danish islands: "For i t  is certain that the Americans can sail 
with less expense than most other nations, especially ours, and would 
therefore soon undersell the Danish merchants if their ships were 
Ibid.,  pp. 6-9. See Appendix V. 
5 2Ibid.,  p. 9. See Appendix VI. The report urged allowing 
Englishmen to serve as captains on Danish slave ships because English 
captains were better acquainted with the slave trade, withstood the 
warm climate better than Danes, spoke the language that was dominant 
on the Guinea Coast, and for these reasons would be likely to do a 
better job of looking after the interests of the ship owners. 
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permitted to transport slaves to St. Croix." 
The report closed with a comment on the value of freedom 
of trade and on the evils of trade restrictions, especially in the 
form of monopoly trading companies. Because of the lesson learned 
in recent years from the failure of so many Danish monopoly companies, 
the West Indian government concluded that "the patriot can now, 
with hopeful anticipation, look forward to .  .  .  happier times for 
the state."54 
By the time the report arrived, Schimmelmann had already 
arranged the liquidation of the Baltic Guinea Company and its 
replacement with de Coninck's company, enjoying similar privileges. 
Yet there remained the basic problem of what to do with a slave trade 
that seemed incapable of earning enough to meet expenses. 
In November 1786 Schimmelmann had set up a committee to 
study the Guinea trade. The committee reported in June 1787 that 
in i ts opinion the Guinea trade, including the slave trade, could 
not be expected to break even. This report led to renewed interest 
in the idea of establishing plantations in Africa so that tropical 
products could be produced there, ending the need to transport 
slaves to the West Indies. Bargum's Trading Association had originally 
suggested the possibility of establishing plantations on the Gold 
Coast and had even brought in three missionaries in 1768 in hopes 
5 3Ibid.,  p. 12. 
5 4Ibid.,  p. 14. 
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they would succeed in doing so. But the original missionaries and 
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their replacements died before they could accomplish anything. 
During his lengthy stay on the Gold Coast, Isert concluded 
that plantations in Africa were a possible means of making the slave 
trade unnecessary. After wondering whether Europeans could do 
without sugar, coffee, chocolate, and other tropical products, he 
wrote: 
No! That would only make a large number of Europeans unhappy, 
just as i t  might make the Africans happy. Why weren't our 
forefathers intelligent enough to establish plantations in 
Africa? Where they could have obtained enough workers at less 
cost? But no, the discovery of America was more flattering to 
their vanity [schmeichelte der Eitelkeit besser]. The Europeans 
would certainly have been ruthless enough to do the same thing 
to Africa as they did to America, but Africa is a large 
continent with too many inhabitants to be so easily brought under 
control . . . .  After the Europeans murdered the original 
inhabitants of America and populated the land with Africans, 
who had either been purchased or simply kidnapped [gestohlen] 
and brought to America, the Europeans believed they could enjoy 
undisturbed possession of a kind of property which causes nature 
to rebel and one's conscience to suffer torture. 
Africa remains that part of the world where, by establishing 
plantations, all the products which we now acquire from America 
could be produced and the shameful export of Negroes from their 
happy fatherland gradually could be restrained. The blacks would 
gladly grant to the Europeans the best and largest of the land 
areas which have lain desolate for millenia, if only the 
Europeans would approach them with an olive branch in hand instead 
of deadly weapons, and for only a small payment they would help 
us.  ̂ 6 
In Copenhagen Isert published a book on his experiences 
in Africa and the West Indies, and met with Schimmelmann, who agreed 
to support Isert 's plan for establishing plantations on the Gold 
^Ntfrregaard, Guldk.ysten, pp. 270-71 ,  206-07. 
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Isert,  Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln, 
pp. 338-40. 
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Coast.5 7  In 1788 Isert returned to Danish Guinea equipped with 
royal authorization to set up a plantation, money advanced by the 
government, and the rank of captain. With the help of an African 
friend, Isert established a plantation in the interior and formed 
an alliance with an African chieftain who agreed to protect the 
plantation in exchange for Danish arms. But Isert died on 
January 21, 1789, before any lasting results could be achieved. 
With his unique ability to work with Negroes, his faith in his 
mission, and his knowledge of Africa, Isert was undoubtedly the 
ideal man to establish successful plantations in Danish Guinea, and 
with his death the effort to do so lost all real hope of success. 
Though further attempts were made, a viable plantation economy was 
never established.5® 
5?Henrik Jeppesen, "Danske Plantageanlaeg paa Guldkysten 
1788-1860," Geografisk Tidsskrift,  LXV (December 1966), 50. 
5®N0rregaard, Guldkysten, pp. 272ff. That Isert 's death was 
lamented by Schimmelmann is shown in a letter from Countess Charlotte 
Schimmelmann to Countess Louise Stolberg (born Reventlow), on January9, 
1790, in which she wrote: "Isert died of a putrid fever after having 
made the most commendable beginning towards the new republic; alas, 
he spent only six months there. The blacks are lamenting his death 
as if they had lost their father. They say that his great genius 
had directed [preside] all he had done, and that no one could 
worthily replace him. His wife survived him by only a month. I 
have shed tears at the tragic end of this good family. Ernst was 
keenly affected when he learned the news and exclaimed: 'No, I 
am not at all happy, I ought to renounce these concerns [je devrois 
renoncer aux affaires]. '  It  is true that he has l i ttle happiness, 
when one thinks of what he would have been able to do and would have 
wished to bestow round about him; they have not understood him, 
they will never understand him in Denmark." See Bob^, Reventlowske 
Familiekreds, IV, 121-22. 
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Schimmelmann always believed himself to be marked by 
ill-fortune. He tTfed to So too much and was nearly overwhelmed 
by his many duties. His responsibilities were enormous: in addition 
to his many business enterprises and his posts as head of the Board 
of Finance and the Board of Trade, he was also head of the Bureau 
of Treasury Management (Skatkammerdirektion), the Credit Bureau 
(Kreditkassen), a director of the Greenland,Icelandic, Faroe Island, 
and Finmark trade, and head of the Commission for Liquidation of 
the West Indian Debt (den vestindiske gaelds likvidations Direktion). 
A countess wrote of him in 1787: "Schimmelmann continues to work 
and do his best to bring everything into disarray. His office is an 
abyss where everything is confused and disappears; if he doesn't go 
mad, i t  will be a miracle. 
Schimmelmann has been criticized for indecision and for a 
tendency to heed too willingly the opinions of his associates and 
subordinates. Holm view's Schimmelmann as "a lovable person .  .  .  
who wanted to do as much good as possible, easy to live with and 
unselfish as few others."6 0  A Norwegian official who worked with 
Schimmelmann discussed him thusly: 
This knowledgeable, broad-minded, ingenious [qeniale], and 
noble man was poorly fitted to serve as an administrator and 
least of all as finance minister under an absolute monarchical 
constitution. He lacked power of resistance and self-confidence. 
He was in addition insufficiently Scandinavian. He should have 
devoted himself to scientific and scholarly activities.6! 
5 9Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, VI, Part I ,  pp. 202-203. 
Letter by Countess Schulin, October 27, 1787. 
Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, V, 620. 
6 1  Ibid.,  VI, Part I ,  p. 203. 
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Schimmelmann's humanitarian sympathy for the poor in Denmark 
and the slaves in the West Indies was genuine, though he was ever 
CO 
mindful of his own financial self-interest.  In 1782, upon learning 
that he and Reventlow had been appointed directors of the slave-
trading Baltic-Guinea Company, Ernst Schimmelmann wrote to his 
fiancee, Charlotte Schubart: 
The fate of man is strange. To think that Reventlow and I 
are directors of a company involved in the slave trade. Ah, 
if  only we were directors of an association created to further 
the happiness of man! If instead of bringing turmoil and 
devastation into another part of the world in order there to 
appeal to avarice and perfidy, we could muster our energies 
to create there a happier day. This would be, I dare say, a 
destiny more worthy of us. But one does not serve men more by 
giving them gold. Those who do so believe in nothing but gold. 
All their other beliefs are mere formalities—the greatness of 
the soul exists only in our tales, i t  is a fiction of the 
statesmen [la grandeur d'ame n'existe que dans nos contes, 
c 'est la fabTe des hommes d'etat].  One does not with impunity 
cause others to suffer, the years and the centuries will bring 
a vengeance which they have been preparing in secret—already 
our slaves in America raise luxury products which corrupt and 
weaken us here in Europe by debasing us and making us more 
deserving of being slaves in our turn. But we will lose our vain 
riches one day, we will not have the means to pay for these 
creatures, these victims. What to do then, when in misery 
one ridicules, with l ittle success, heroism and mores [Comment 
faire alors, dans la mi sere on persifle avec moins de succes 
Vheroisme et les moeurs]? But, my dear friend, what a 
digression; i t ,  too, is the fault of this black company.6 3  
®2Schimmelmann was an ardent adherent of the agrarian reforms 
for which Christian Ditlev Reventlow and Ludwig Reventlow were the 
leading spokesmen. See Povl Engelstoft and Svend Dahl, eds.,  Dansk 
Biografisk Leksikon (27 vols.; Copenhagen: J.  H. Schultz Forlag, 
1933-44), XXI, 136. The man directly responsible for establishing 
the Schimmelmann plantations as model enterprises was Ernst 
Schimmelmann's first cousin, Heinrich Ludvig Ernst Schimmelmann, who 
arrived on St. Croix in 1768 to take charge of the plantations. He 
later served in the government of the Danish West Indies and was 
governor general. See Bricka, ed.,  Dansk Biografisk Lexikon, XV, 139. 
6 3Bobe", Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, 14. Letter from 
Ernst Schimmelmann to Charlotte Schubart,  January 9, 1782. 
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Yet Schimmelmann, despite his distress at being made 
director of a slave-trading company, invested 23,000 rigsdaler 
in the company.6 4  He later tried hard to save the company, and 
he secretly acquired stock in its successor. 
Schimmelmann1s income was heavily dependent on the 
production of sugar on his plantations in the West Indies and 
the refining of sugar in Copenhagen. With Isert 's death and the 
apparent failure of the attempt to establish plantations in 
Guinea, slavery seemed as necessary as ever for the production of 
sugar, and slavery itself apparently depended on the continuation of 
the slave trade, for without the latter the slave population would 
decline, and so would sugar production. Schimmelmann could not 
tolerate an immediate abolition of the slave trade; but perhaps 
some means of "gradual" abolition could be found which would end the 
immoral slave trade and still  permit the Danish West Indies to 
flourish. In the meantime no action was taken on the recommendations 
of the government of the Danish West Indies, and the monopoly on 
trade with Danish Guinee was continued after 1787 by de Coninek's 
slave-trading company. 
6 4Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 114. 
CHAPTER III 
The Report of the Committee on the Slave Trade 
In June 1791 Schimmelmann drew up a twenty-page proposal 
urging that a committee be established to investigate the possibility 
of abolishing the slave trade to the Danish West Indies. It  is 
clear that Schimmelmann himself, a deeply religious "man of feeling," 
regarded the slave trade with a strong sense of repugnanceJ His"""" 
protege Isert had condemned the slave system, and his sister Julie 
(Countess Juliana Reventlow) strongly urged him to help the slaves. 
Her concern for the slaves, which was based on her religious 
convictions, is credited by Otto Brandt with having been a major 
factor in motivating Schimmelmann to act in favor of abolition.2  
She believed one of her most important tasks was to promote, in 
cooperation with her brother, the work of the Moravian missionaries 
among the slaves in the Danish West Indies and to improve the lot of 
the slaves.3  
In a letter to Schimnelmann on February 17, 1789, Julie 
1Schimmelmann's own religious feelings are revealed in 
letters in Bobe',  Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, p. 13 and p. 22. 
He was president of the Danish Bible Society in 1813. 
20tto Brandt, Geistesleben und Politik in Schleswig-Holstein 
um die Wende des 18. Jahrhunderts (2d. ed.,  rev.; Kiel: Walter 
Mllhlau Verlag, 1927), p. 113. 
3Ibid.,  p. 107. 
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Reventlow noted that she had been deeply moved by a re-reading 
of David Cranz's history of the conversion of the slaves.^ She 
urged that the slaves be granted an extra day off each week to work 
their garden plots and that regulations be enacted to improve the 
treatment of slaves, especially elderly and sick ones. She 
proposed that Moravian missionaries, who had been "angels from 
Heaven" for the slaves, be used to see that ameliorative regulations 
were enforced on the plantations and expressed the belief that "It 
is our calling [Beruf] to alleviate the slaves' miserable existence 
and to obtain for them these improvements by means of our own 
personal sacrifice."5  One could not allow present conditions to 
continue: 
Something at least must be done for these oppressed people 
[diese Gedrtlckten] if we want our lives to be happy [wenn wir 
unsers Lebens froh werden wollen]. With horror I think of the 
arbitrary floggings which the slaves receive without the least 
justification. 
The poorest peasant, for whom one feels sympathy, is still  
far better off than the slaves. If our ideals are only 
impracticable schemes, oh, then I would like to hide myself 
in a hole .  .  .  .6  
Julie Reventlow did not envisage an immediate emancipation 
^David Cranz, Den gamle oq n.ye Br0dre Historie eller; Pet 
Evangeliske Br0dre-Unitets korte Historie i  de aeldre Tider oq i  
Saerdeleshed udi naervaerende Aarhundrede (Copenhagen, 1772). 
Cranz's book was a history of all the Moravian missions down to 1769. 
He was himself a Moravian. 
5Bobe',  Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, 340. Julie Reventlow 
was one of the five members of the Schimmelmann family trust,  which 
derived the overwhelming part of i ts income from the four Schimmelmann 
plantations and the sugar refineries in Copenhagen. 
6Ibid., p. 341. 
of the slaves, but thought of i t  as a long-range goal: 
To give the slaves complete freedom will indeed remain the 
ideal, but to ease their lot,  that we will be able to do, I 
pray to God; and perhaps we can, after a number of years, 
emancipate them and purchase no new slaves. The Quakers in 
Pennsylvania paid for the Negroes' labor and gave them their 
freedom, because they found i t  wrong for Christians to hold 
slaves. In so doing the Quakers benefited their worldly 
interests too. The loyalty and diligence of their black 7  
workers increased and none of them wanted to leave the Quakers. '  
The countess, by way of emphasizing the depth of her concern 
for the slaves, closed her letter by adding: "I have exhausted 
myself completely [Ich habe mich ganz epuisirt].  You cannot imagine 
how often-these thoughts occupy me and agitate my heart [mein 
innerstes erschtlttern].1 , 8  
Julie Reventlow's husband, Count Fritz Reventlow, was 
much more restrained than his wife in desiring to help the slaves. 
In a letter to Ernst Schimmelmann dated June 14, 1789, obviously 
written in response to some proposals by Schimmelamnn for improving 
the treatment of slaves on the Sch inane Imann family plantations, 
Reventlow made dutiful comments on the need to help the slaves, but 
urged an extremely cautious approach: "I share with you, my dear 
Ernst, your wish to improve the lot of the poor black slaves on our 
plantations .  .  .  ." Reventlow then argued that neither sentiment 
nor humanitarian feelings should motivate one to help the slaves but, 
rather, a sense of Christian duty which "requires our actions and the 




It  is no less true that a zeal which carried us beyond our 
capacities, a theory of duties which circumstances, and even 
those abuses intimately linked to the circumstances, prevented 
entirely from being practiced would—rather than being useful 
to the goal which we propose—only put us farther away from 
achieving it .9 
Reventlow added that though i t  was completely wrong for 
anyone to own other persons as property, "property rights to all 
possessions except human beings ought to be inviolable, .  .  .  
a natural right." He continued, apparently fearful that Schimmelmann 
would go too far in attempting to help the slaves, by arguing that 
there was no natural law or precept of religion "which obligates 
us or requires us to deprive ourselves of our whole fortune for the 
benefit of the slaves." Indeed, tampering with slavery might have 
"baleful consequences [consequences funestes]." 
The actual happiness of the slaves, their genuine well-being, 
is now determined by the fortune of their masters, and such is 
not only the .  .  .  abusive law of their own particular fate: i t  
is the law of all humanity. 
The divine sentence which condemned man to earn his bread by 
the sweat of his brow is quite general, since the exception is 
infinitely small in comparison with the number of those upon whom 
i t  is carried out daily, and in all probability will continue .  .  .  
as long as the world is as we know i t .  It  is to that sentence 
that the inequality among men, both as to power and means, is 
linked by an indissoluble bond, and therefrom stems the absolute 
impossibility of general or complete libertyJO 
Reventlow then urged Schimmelmann to take plenty of time 
selecting the right man to send to St. Croix to carry out reforms to 
help the slaves on the Schimmelmann family plantations, for choosing 
9Bobe, Reventlowske Familiekreds, VIII, 287. This letter 
was translated from the French by Channing Horner, Northwest Missouri 
State University. 
1°Ibid., pp. 288-89. 
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the wrong man "could wipe out instantly our whole fortune and with 
i t  all the good we intend to do." He proceeded to argue that more 
data concerning the plantations was needed before any action should 
11 be taken. 
Judging from Reventlow's letter, especially his rejection of 
the thought of "complete freedom," i t  would appear likely that 
Schimmelmann, writing to Reventlow at some time after receiving the 
letter of February 17, 1789, from Julie Reventlow, had, in addition 
to listing proposals to ameliorate the slaves' living conditions, 
also mentioned the possibility of emancipation. Schimmelmann clearly 
was concerned with improving the treatment of the slaves--he asked 
Hans West, prior to the latter 's departure for St. Croix in 1788, to 
1 ? 
send back recommendations for appropriate ameliorative measures. 
Schimmelmann's humanitarian desire to help the slaves on his planta­
tions probably was strengthened by his realization that improving the 
slaves' living conditions might make i t  possible to increase the 
slave-population by natural means, ending the need for further purchase 
of Africans. 
^Ibid.,  pp. 289-91. 
^2West mentions this in a plan for improving the treatment 
of the field slaves which he sent to the General Customs Department 
on August 17, 1791, entitled Plan t il  ved et enkelt Forsgig at befordre 
Mark-Negrenes Opl.ysninq og Formildelse i  Kaar m.v. paa Eilandet St. 
Croix, p. 12, DSA, Ventindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse. He wrote: "Schimmelmann, before I 
left the fatherland, often showed his trust in me by sharing with me, 
both orally and in writing, his thoughts on improvements he hoped to 
make on his plantations here to alleviate the lot of the slaves [at 
formilde den lavere Medbroders Kaar]." 
That there was already some anti-slavery sentiment in 
Copenhagen, aside from Schimmelmann's circle, is indicated by 
criticism in the weekly Laerde Efterretninger of West's comments on 
West Indian slavery contained in an eighty-three-page article 
entitled "Beretning om det danske Eiland St. Croix i  Vestindien, fra 
Juniimaaned 1789 t il  Junii maaneds Udgang 1790" which he published 
in the July 1791 edition of Iris. Laerde Efterretninger attacked 
West's views that the slaves were well treated, that the slaves and 
the free colored were lazy and debauched persons who were inclined 
to thievery, and said West praised the West Indian social and legal 
system only because i t  allowed 2,000 whites to rule 22,000 blacks. 
The writer added: "It is incredible that a thinking man can write 
such things. 
The Danish slave trade had continued to languish after being 
taken over by de Corn"nek's new company in 1787. Only four slave 
ships made the voyage from the Guinea Coast to the West Indies in 
1788-89, and in 1790-91 only two ships were sent out. (See Appendix 
III.) Schimmelmann concluded there was no likelihood that the number 
of Danish ships used in the slave trade could be increased. In 
1790-91 the Danish forts on the Guinea Coast sold their excess slaves 
to French ships.^ 
1 3 
Laerde Efterretninger. Copenhagen, No. 42, 1791, pp. 658-
63. West, though he defended slavery, did criticize the slave trade: 
"Of course, the slave trade is a horror which stains our Christianity 
and shames our so-called philosophical century." See Iris, 
Copenhagen, July 1791, p. 57. 
14 
DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre 
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The international situation was probably another influence 
on Schimmelmann's thinking. The English abolitionist movement had 
been gaining strength in the late 1780s, and i ts progress was 
followed closely by Schimmelmann, in whose private archives there 
is a 71-page, hand-written German translation of the April 18, 1791, 
debate in the House of Commons on the abolition of the slave trade.^ 
Despite the rejection of William Wi1berforce's motion for abolition 
of the slave trade, Schimmelmann, from his reading of the debate in 
Parliament, concluded that the victory of abolition in England was 
imminent, for the most influential and respected members of the 
Commons (William Pitt,  Charles James Fox, and Edmund Burke) had 
16 
favored ending the slave trade. If England (and, perhaps, France) 
were to oppose the slave trade, could smaller powers such as Denmark 
continue to engage in it? Was there not a risk that Denmark might 
be forced to abandon the slave trade at a time when continued 
importation of slaves was imperative for sugar production in the Danish 
West Indies? Perhaps by announcing that Denmark intended to abolish 
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Allerunterthcfnigste Vorstellung an ihro 
Kttnigliche Majestflt ,  December 28, 1791, p. 23. 
^DSA, Ernst Schimmelmanns Privat Arkiv, Pk. 11, Koncepter 
angaaende Slavehandelen og Negervaesenet i  Vestindien og Kopier vedr. 
Sierra Leone Kolonien, Debatten im Unterhause des englischen 
Parlaments Uber die Abschaffung des Sclavenhandels,.  The translation 
was based on an extract of the debate published "in one of the best 
English newspapers," The Diary or Woodfall 's Register, according to 
a note on p. 1. of the translation. 
^DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre 
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Ernst Schimmelmann's Bedenken (on the 
slave trade), June 18, 1791, p. 1. 
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the slave trade after a transition period lengthy enough to permit 
building up the slave labor force in the islands prior to abolition, 
the Danish government could protect itself from possible foreign 
pressure to end the slave trade and guarantee the future of sugar 
production in the Danish islands.^ 
Schimmelmann was also surely aware that his four plantations, 
two on St. Croix and one each on St. Thomas and St. Jan, would be 
better able than others to overcome any difficulties arising from 
abolition, for they were notably well stocked with laborers, and the 
slaves on them had in recent years shown a tendency to maintain their 
ranks without any great dependence on the Atlantic slave trade. 
Immediately prior to the publication of the abolition edict in 1792, 
Justitsraad C. Hansteen, a member of the General Customs Department,had 
presented to the department his arguments against abolition, and in 
so doing noted that Schimmelmann's plantations, unlike the others, 
already had enough slaves and had sufficient land to allow for 
planting yams, corn and other crops to provide ample food for the 
slaves, something which other plantations were hard pressed to 
18 
manage. Schimmelmann in fact stood to gain from any overall decrease 
in sugar production in the Danish West Indies, for his share of 
^Svend Green-Pedersen, "Danmarks ophaevelse of 
negerslavehandelen: omkring tilblivelsen af forordningen af 16. 
Marts 1792," Arkiv. Ill ,  No. 1, 1969, p. 36. 
^8DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l  Negerhandelens bedre 
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Justitsraads Hansteens Allerunderdanigst 
Forestilling, March 14, 1792, pp. 1-2. 
74 
production was likely to increase if abolition caused difficulties 
for other planters, as the price of sugar might then rise, and his 
share of the market for raw sugar in Denmark would expand. 
Schimmelmann's efforts to make the Danish slave trade 
profitable had failed, as had his attempt to use Isert to establish 
tropical plantations on the Gold Coast. He had long regarded the 
slave trade as immoral although, paradoxically, he had maintained 
major investments in i t ,  and obviously his moral sensibility was 
not strong enough to induce him to interfere with profits when there 
was a conflict between the two. Yet he knew that if he could devise 
a means of abolishing the trade without bringing financial harm to 
Denmark, the Danish colonies, or the Schimmelmann family trust,  he 
would win the praise of contemporaries in Denmark and obtain favorable 
recognition for the Danish Crown abroad. In the late spring of 1791 
his plans for ending the Danish slave trade solidified, perhaps in 
part because of the apparent progress of the abolitionist movement 
in England and the political prominence in France of Brissot de 
Warville, head of the amis des noirs. 
On June 18, 1791, Schimmelmann sent a proposal for abolishing 
the slave trade to an unknown member of the Danish government, 
addressed merely as "your excellency," along with a letter which 
explained the background and reasons for the proposal and urged full 
cooperation. In the letter, Schimmelmann noted that he had already 
spoken with Bernstorff and had received assurances of the latter 's 
cooperation, and said that Bernstorff favored implementing 
Schimmelmann's proposals by means of a special committee in Copenhagen 
75 
which would assign to another committee in the West Indies the 
task of carrying out reforms to help the slaves. According to 
Schimmelmann, "The proposals in my essay contain nothing which could 
bring about the destruction of private property or the infringement 
of private property rights, for the proposals are aimed at protecting 
private property and at prodding the planters to base their own 
profits [Vortheil] on something more secure than a temporary use 
[Benutzunq]."^9  
Schimmelmann added, "It has become necessary to reach a 
decision about the slave trade and the principles and regulations 
to be applied to i t  in the future," which was probably a reference 
to the inability of the Danish slave trade to prosper. He opposed 
involving the government of the Danish West Indies in drawing up 
a final plan, for that "would only be another way of rejecting the 
entire plan and would perhaps, for no reason at all,  stir up such 
a tumult [GShrunq] as not even a decision to adopt my proposals 
would produce."2^1  He concluded by stating that if his proposals 
were accepted, "the Crown Prince and Denmark could set a great 
19 
Letter by Ernst Schimmelmann accompanying his Bedenken 
on the slave trade, June 18, 1791. Here Schimmelmann meant that 
instead of continuing to rely on the slave trade to replace laborers 
who had been worked to death in just a few years (what he called 
"eine temporaire Benutzung), i t  would be more profitable for the 
planters to treat their slaves better and thereby end the need for 
the slave trade. 
on 
Apparently Schimmelmann feared difficulties would arise 
not from the government.of the Danish West Indies itself,  which had 
already recorded its distress at being involved with slavery (see 
above, pp. 55-56), but from the Borgerraad, or burger council,  
which represented the planters. 
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example. 
Schimmelmann in July 1791 convinced the government to 
establish a conmittee to investigate the slave trade and then sent 
the committee a copy of his essay. In a brief accompanying letter 
he noted that he had learned he was to be appointed to the committee 
and said he wanted to give the committee a chance to study his essay 
in hopes that committee members might use his Bedenken as a basis 
22 
for their deliberations. 
Schimmelmann began his twenty-page Bedenken by stating 
that the debate in the House of Commons of April 18, 1791, on a 
proposal to abolish the slave trade "cannot but rouse the greatest 
attention in all the other states which conduct the [slave] trade." 
The leaders of both parties in England, who are distinguished 
by their influence, talent, patriotism and authority, have voted 
for the abolition of the slave trade. The most important 
political and scientific societies as well as the best part of 
the nation have all declared themselves in favor of this motion 
[for abolition]." 
The proposal had failed, Schimmelmann believed, because i t  
had called for immediate abolition. Had the slave trade been abolished 
immediately, "the wealth and the profits [Erwerb] of many persons 
would have suffered and perhaps in part have been lost as a consequence 
of such an abrupt and absolute decision to abolish the slave trade." 
Letter by Ernst Schimmelmann accompanying his Bedenken 
on the slave trade, June 18, 1791. 
2 2Introductory letter of July 16, 1791, accompanying 
Schimmelmann's handwritten Bedenken (proposal on the slave trade). 
23 
Ernst Schimmelmann1s Bedenken, June 18, 1791, p. 1. 
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If .  .  .  immediate and complete abolition were decided upon, 
how could those who have placed their capital in this trade 
save their investments? How would they be able to dispose of 
their remaining merchandise, their factories, their claims 
[Forderungen], the wealth they have circulating in the slave 
trade, if all of these investments should become obsolete .  .  .  
as a result of abolition? How would the planters be able to 
save themselves, since their economy at present depends on the 
purchase rather than the breeding [Zuziehung] of slaves?2^ 
Schimmelmann then proceeded to a consideration of what 
he thought was the basic question which had to be answered before 
abolition of the slave trade could become feasible: could the slave 
population in the West Indies be maintained without continued 
dependence on the slave trade? He was well aware that, hitherto, 
slave populations in the West Indies and Brazil had failed to maintain 
themselves by natural means. He asked: 
How is i t  possible to establish on all the plantations the correct 
ratio of male to female slaves necessary for propagation, without 
importing more slaves? How can the debauchery which impedes the 
growth of the slave population be done away with promptly, and 
marriages and morals encouraged to promote population growth? 
How . . .  in conformity with the present system of cultivation 
in the West Indies .  .  .  [can] the labor of the slaves be 
lightened to the extent needed to further the growth of their 
population and the rearing of their children? What recourse 
[Rettunqsmittell is there for those who, because of misfortunes 
and calamities, such as epidemic diseases, lose a considerable 
part of their slaves and creole slave-children [Creol-Kinder].2^ 
Schimmelmann believed that both the abolitionists and their 
opponents had spent too much time discussing the harmful or beneficial 
effects of the slave trade and not enough studying "the fundamental 
point [Haupt-Bemerkung] .  .  .  that the great value of the West Indian 
?4 
Ibid.,  pp. 2-3. 
25 
Ibid.,  p. 4. "Creole" slaves were those slaves born in the 
Americas. 
colonies and the benefits they provide for the countries which 
possess them depend on the cultivation of sugar cane, and that the 
cultivation of this product has been pursued in accordance with an 
economic system which requires the constant acquisition of new slaves. 
He blamed the European nations, "England in particular," for enacting 
laws and encouraging commerce which made the slave trade a necessity. 
An unlimited form of slavery had been established in the West Indies 
and America leaving the slaves "completely abandoned to the absolute 
will of harsh masters and still harsher overseers."^ 
Schimmelmann then raised the question of whether a law 
abolishing the slave trade could be enforced at present. He noted 
that resistance to abolition would be strong among the planters and 
that forcing them to comply would involve so many difficulties that 
the mother country might eventually allow the law to be disregarded. 
Aware that the Danish slave trade could not be considered in isolation 
Schimmelmann wondered whether all the slave-trading nations would be 
able to unite in favor of abolition and to enforce i t  effectively. 
He was particularly conscious of the importance of England and 
France: 
Do England and France, if they should reach an agreement in 
favor of abolition, have the power to use force in compelling the 
obedience of their colonies? Will they really want to expose 
themselves to the embarrassment and the losses which could be 
the result of enforcing abolition? Does not the most important 
commerce of both nations, as well as the maintenance of their 
finances and their inhabitants, depend on the preservation of 
the West Indian colonies? If France and England unite on a 
26Ibid., pp. 4-5 
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common policy, will Spain, Portugal, Holland, and North America 
adopt the same measures? 
Is not an effective abolition measure more important than 
an unworkable prohibition?27 
Schimmelmann moved next to the immorality of the slave trade, 
stating he assumed that all persons "well-acquainted with the slave 
trade and the manner in which i t  is presently conducted would agree 
that the practicable abolition of the slave trade is a duty of 
humanity." 
It  is impossible to maintain that the sale of slaves in Africa 
does not, by means of the constant demands of Europeans to 
purchase slaves, give rise to a demand for brandy, rum, gun­
powder, guns, copper, and various manufactured goods, which have 
become indispensable for the African tribes [Neger-Nationen]. 
Slaves are at present virtually the sole important article of 
exchange [Tauschwaare] possessed by the Africans. Therefore the 
African tribes must procure slaves, no matter what the cost .  .  .  .  
Prisoners of war and criminals are sold to Europeans as slaves 
in accordance with the custom of the African tribes. When war 
and infringement of the laws do not by themselves provide 
enough slaves, should not private warfare, violence, and 
kidnapping be used and engaged in, so that the needed victims 
can be procured? There is yet another consequence which must 
follow from the slave trade: since slaves are the main article 
of trade which Africa produces, since slaves are themselves the 
most expensive merchandise, they are not used to produce and 
gather merchandise which could serve as articles of commerce 
with the Europeans. It  seems more profitable and convenient to 
exchange the people themselves instead of the potential products 
of their diligence and labor. Therefore every native industry 
and type of production must remain stifled in embryo [im ihrem 
ersten keim erstikt werden], and the epoch of savagery ana 
barbarism must last as long as the slave trade itself.2° 
Not only does the slave trade devastate Africa—it also causes 
corruption and depopulation in the West Indies. The plantation 
owners merely purchase new slaves instead of caring properly for the 
^Ibid.,  pp. 7-8 
O O  
Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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slaves they already own. As a result,  "the sparing of slave mothers 
and the rearing of slave children receive insufficient attention." 
Normal family life among the slaves is also rendered impossible by 
the planters'  recourse to the slave trade, for the planters have 
l ittle incentive to encourage "the kind of moral behavior [Sitten] 
29 
which promotes marriages, and consequently morals in general." 
Schimmelmann regarded individual examples of cruelty 
connected with the slave trade as unavoidable consequences of a 
system of commerce in human beings in which personal profit was the 
guiding motive of those involved: "It is impossible to shackle so 
large a number of people of different tribes and ages for many months 
in the hold of a ship without bringing on their untimely death and 
unnatural destruction, which are consequences of the journey and the 
accompanying sickness, debility, sorrow, and change of climate." 
To those who die on the ships during the Middle Passage must be 
added those who perish in the West Indies soon after their arrival. 
Normally from 30 to 40 per cent of the slaves taken from Africa die 
during these two periods, and "these usual and inevitable causes of 
destruction" can be augmented if ,  for instance, the ships are delayed 
and forced to sail along the African coast to complete their cargo 
of slaves, for there is then an added risk of epidemics and slave 
insurrections on the ships.3° 
^9Ibid.,  p. 9. 
^Ibid.,  pp. 10-11. 
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Concerning the treatment of slaves in the islands, 
Schimmelmann noted that West Indian slavery had been variously 
described as harsh or mild, depending on the purpose of the writer. 
Nevertheless, certain conclusions could be drawn: "deliberate 
inhumanity or cruelty" was not a major factor; rather, mistreatment 
of the slaves could be ascribed to the slave system itself.  
The labor of the slaves is in general extremely heavy and is 
rigorously exacted. Their diet and maintenance are confined 
to necessities. The women and children are used for heavy 
field labor; and the slave women, even when pregnant or suckling 
their children, must nevertheless engage in the usual field work. 
The work is evenly allotted, and the variations in physical 
strength among the slaves certainly are not considered carefully. 
Common matters of dispute among the planters and overseers are 
whether or not i t  is more profitable to overwork the slaves in 
the extreme, without any consideration of the impact of such 
overwork on the slaves themselves, or to take better care of 
the slaves [so that they might live longer]; and whether i t  is 
more profitable for the growth of the slave population to occur 
by means of natural increase or by the purchase of new slaves.3' 
Schimmelmann summed up the question of the morality of the 
slave trade by stating that "after sober study and the most careful 
examination," he was certain that all would agree "that evil,  
oppression, and misery for humanity in general are inevitably 
associated with the slave trade, that abolition would be worthy of 
the efforts of a wise law-giver [GesetzqeberLand that i t  must be 
the duty of everyone who can to assist in bringing about abolition 
and to contribute everything possible toward that goal."3^ 
Schimmelmann then began to discuss "the question we are here 
3 1  Ibid.,  pp. 11-12. 
3 2Ibid.,  p. 12. 
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primarily concerned with, that is,  how i t  might be possible to abolish 
the slave trade." He doubted that a total ban on the slave trade 
would succeed because constant complaints by those whose interests 
were harmed by abolition would lead the government to ignore violations 
of the law and would perhaps weaken the authority of the government. 
He thought that in order for abolition to succeed, "The colonies 
must be placed in a position where they can maintain their slave 
population in the future and increase their slave population at the 
present time . . . .  Customs and methods of treating the slaves which 
can induce a population increase must be established and maintained."3 3  
Schimmelmann's belief that the slave trade could be abolished 
successfully was based on his conviction that improved treatment of 
the slaves would make the trade unnecessary. The problem involved 
bringing about a situation, theretofore not achieved anywhere in the 
West Indies, where there were more births than deaths among the 
slave population. 
The principal reason for the unnatural decrease of the slave 
population and for the constant need to import new slaves from 
Africa is to be found in the treatment and condition of the slaves 
in the West Indies. If their treatment .  .  .  should ever be 
based on the principle of promoting the natural increase of the 
slave population, if the treatment and condition of the slaves 
were consequently improved and regulated, the time would come 
when the legislator could dictate as a law something that 
would already be a reality as a consequence of the measures 
which the legislator had earlier adopted and promoted.34 
Schimmelmann then proceeded to list his suggestions for 
3 3Ibid.,  pp. 12-13. 
34 
Ibid., p. 13. 
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solving the problem of the slave trade in a series of propositions 
which he hoped the Committee on the Slave Trade would use as a basis 
for its deliberations: 
1. In order first and foremost to maintain the present 
system of cultivation, as many slavesas are still  needed to 
populate the islands must be obtained. 
2. Those regulations and arrangements which are necessary 
in order to enable the slaves to multiply their own population 
by means of natural increase must be enacted. 
3. The trade in slaves in Africa and the subsequent 
transportation of slaves to America must, so long as there is 
no alternative but to permit i t ,  be organized in a regular 
manner under the supervision of the government. 
4. There must be put into effect a binding obligation 
[Verbindlichkeit] on the planters, compelling them to supply 
their plantations adequately with the number of slaves necessary 
for the attainment of the previously mentioned goal [that of 
maintaining the slave population by natural increase alone], 
and police laws [Polizeigesetze] which, by regulating the treat­
ment of slaves, will result in the preservation of the slave 
population must be put into effect by the planters. 
5. During the period in which the importation of slaves 
is considered a necessity, the slaves will have to be protected; 
but all regulations which would be drawn up should be considered 
only as a preparation for a point in time when the importation 
of slaves would no longer be tolerated (except perhaps as an 
exception in individual instances). 
6. If the arrangements decided upon are to have their 
intended effect, if voluntary agreements thereto are to be 
effective, i t  must be stated and made explicit in advance that 
this epoch is certain of coming to pass, and the date [when the 
slave trade will be abolished] must not be postponed for so long 
that the planters who prefer to remain inactive would feel free 
to do nothing. 
7. Care will have to be taken to make available to the 
planters the funds necessary to enable them to carry out the 
plan, insofar as the planters do not possess the wealth, on their 
own, to implement the plan. 
8. The less well-to-do as well as the wealthy planters 
for whom the needed credit would be provided must, insofar as 
possible, be given the means of providing the security which is 
indispensable for obtaining credit.35 
Thus Schimmelmann envisaged no change in the plantation system and 
35Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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no end to the institution of slavery; he wanted the Danish 
government both to try to improve slave treatment in order to attain 
the goal of a self-sustaining slave population, and to prod the 
planters to acquire the number of slaves needed to reach that goal 
on each plantation, with government aid made available for planters 
needing it for the purpose of buying fresh slaves. This latter 
proposal would also serve, as Schimmelmann was surely aware, to 
undermine the planters' opposition to abolition. In order to 
abolish the slave trade, it  would be necessary first to encourage it.  
There were additional suggestions which Schimmelmann wanted 
the committee to consider after it had dealt with the major points. 
He asked if it would not be wise to specify the number of slaves 
each plantation needed so that thereafter special attention could be 
devoted to attaining and maintaining that figure. Ought not the 
morals and family relationships of the slaves be strengthened as a 
means of encouraging the birth rate and the rearing of children? 
Perhaps an arrangement could be made by which de Coninck's slave-trade 
company (in which Schimmelmann had a secret investment) could sell 
slaves to the islands at a fixed, low price, in return for being 
guaranteed a sale? And, if so, would it  not be appropriate to allow 
those planters who lacked a sufficient number of slaves to buy the 
slaves they needed at that fixed, low price, according to a system 
which took into account the age and sex of the slaves? In exchange 
for being allowed to engage in so secure a commercial undertaking, 
ought not the company be subject to regulations for improving the 
treatment of slaves at the Guinea forts and during the Atlantic 
crossing? Perhaps the company could then be guaranteed payment for 
the slaves in fixed installments, with the government establishing 
a loan fund [Negociation] in the islands to make loans at an interest 
rate of four percent to those planters unable to pay for their 
slaves in the regular, fixed installments guaranteed to the company? 
(Schimmelmann apparently had not yet abandoned his attempts to make 
the slave trade profitable.) Perhaps it  would be advisable to allow 
the loan fund to serve as security [Hypothek] for the planters, 
because the plantations and slaves which previously provided the 
requisite security would be an inadequate mortgage if, after abolition, 
there were plantations on which an adequate number of slaves had not 
been established. Such a government-supported loan fund would also 
increase the security of the creditors—the old creditors would not 
only retain their former guarantee, but would see it improved in the 
future. Finally, would it  be possible to make it  easier to export 
sugar in exchange for slaves and the provisions required for them? J  
Schimmelmann's concluding statement urged adoption of a plan 
for abolition based on his proposals: 
If a plan based on the ideas sketched here were to be put 
into execution, so that the present slave population would not 
only be maintained but would on the contrary after a certain 
number of years be increased, thereby putting an end to the 
need for further importation of slaves, I should then imagine 
that the cause [Vorschriften] of humanity could not in this 
regard be in opposition [Widerspruch] to the political and 
economic interests [VortheilenJ of the state. During the period 
while the slave trade continued to be necessary, all of its 
benefits for the commerce and shipping of private subjects would 
^Ibid. t  pp. 15-19. 
exist. The wealth of the West Indian islands would be increased, 
and the increased production of the islands would enlarge the 
profits of the mother country. If the time were to come when 
the importation of slaves into the West Indies were to be 
discontinued, then the considerable sums which presently must 
be spent on the slave trade each year by Denmark and her colonies 
could be saved, and the forts on the African coast would no 
longer be needed for that purpose." 
The committee created to consider the future of the slave 
OO 
trade was established on August 5, 1791. It was given the 
disarming title of the Committee for Improving the Organization 
of the Slave Trade in the West Indian Islands and the Coast of 
Guinea (Kommissionen til Negerhandelens bedre Indretning paa de 
Vestindiske Ejlande og Kysten Guinea), better known as the Great 
Committee on the Slave Trade (den store Negerhandels Kommission). 
Schimmelmann was the dominant figure on the committee. In 
addition to him, the committee consisted of Jtfrgen Erik Skeel, head 
of the General Customs Department; Fr. Carl Trant and Niels Tender 
Lund, high-ranking members of the department; Chr. Brandt, former 
head of the department and Chancery President (Kancelli-praesident); 
and Carl Wendt, a member of the Finance Department. Schimmelmann's 
private secretary, Ernst Philip Kirstein, was the committee's 
secretary. All of these high-ranking bureaucrats brought with them 
special experience in colonial administration and finances that 
qualified them to serve on the committee. Skeel had a good reputation 
as an administrator who was particularly sympathetic with the poor; 
37Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
38 
A royal edict of August 5, 1791, created the committee and 
appointed members to it,  beginning with Schimmelmann. 
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he had been made head of the General Customs Department, in charge 
OQ 
of the West Indian and African colonies, in 1789. 17  Trant had 
served with the West India Company for several years and had been 
appointed to the General Customs Department in 1790; he was considered 
an expert on educational reform, having published a book on that 
subject in 1789 (Uber Schulen und Schulanstalten in Dclnemark), and 
was capable of assisting the committee in its deliberations on the 
education of slave children.4^ T0nder Lund had experience in colonial 
41 
administration going back to 1778. Brandt had been head of the 
General Customs Department from 1784 to 1789.42  Wendt had been 
Christian Ditlev Reventlow's tutor and had remained a close advisor 
to Reventlow. He was highly respected in financial matters and had 
43 
been a member of the Finance Department since 1784. 
There was little publicity surrounding the creation of the 
Committee on the Slave Trade. The committee's full title was, 
indeed, a smoke screen designed to avoid arousing untimely 
opposition. One journal which did comment on the committee was 
Politisches Journal, published in Altona (a Danish port on the Elbe 
near Hamburg) by G. B. von Schirach, who corresponded wi th Bernstorff54  
39Pansk Biografisk Lexikon, XVIII (1904), 32-33. 
40Ibid., XVII (1903), 478-79. 
41  Ibid., X (1896), 439-40. 
42Ibid., III (1889), 3-4. 
43Ibid., XVIII (1904), 384-385. 
44Ibid., XIV (1901), 145-46. 
An article datelined Copenhagen, September 14, 1791, said that the 
committee had met several times but, because it  had not had enough 
data, had as yet reached few decisions. The article noted that the 
purpose of the committee was "not . . .  to place without consideration 
a class of people in a condition of full freedom, for to do so would 
benefit neither the slaves nor their white masters [Gebietern]." 
It said: 
The committee will seek in part to remedy in an appropriate 
[zweckmassige] manner the shortage of slaves on the West Indian 
plantations, and in part to ameliorate the lot of the slaves as 
much as possible and to establish regular marital unions among 
them, whereby it  will be possible to hinder the monstrous 
debauchery [ungeheuern Ausschweifungen] and the dreadful 
pestilence [schrecklichen Seuchen] which prevail among the slaves, 
to put them . . .  in a thrifty frame of mind [hckislichere 
Verfassunq] and perhaps provide them with some land which they 
would be able to work for their own profit without, however, 
owning the land as private property. Happier results can be 
expected from such wise and suitable measures than from the 
chimerical projects of romantic-thinking friends of man 
[romanhaft denkender Menschenfreunde].45  
The committee's deliberations, which were secret, resulted 
in a report of 102 folio pages written in German by Kirstein and 
completed on December 28, 1791. The report began with a brief 
history of European involvement in the African slave trade, from its 
beginnings in the fifteenth century with "the depredations [Rflubereien] 
of a single Portuguese ship's captain," and attributed the start of 
the slave trade to America to the "mistaken zeal of a Spanish priest 
45 
Politisches Journal, Altona, September 1791, pp. 1019-20. 
The'dreadful pestilence" referred to was probably venereal disease. 
It is perhaps worth noting that Thorkild Hansen, in his Slavernes 0er, 
attributes the last line of the above article to Schimmelmann himself 
and gives no indication of the actual source of the statement. 
Hansen, Slavernes Per, p. 268. 
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[Las Casas] who without reflection found a yoke from which he wanted 
to free the inhabitants of America at the expense of the inhabitants 
of Africa." Critics of the trade such as Morgan Godwyn and, later, 
the American Quakers John Woolman and Anthony Benezet were mentioned, 
and the Quaker campaign against the slave trade and slavery resulting 
in "abolition of the slave trade by several provinces in North 
America and their [the Quakers'] declaring all Negroes in their 
province free."^6  
The slave trade, the report continued, has recently 
attracted the attention of various writers, especially in England 
and France, and the English Parliament has debated the issue 
of abolition "with the greatest animation." Though until now the 
party favoring continuation of the slave trade has kept the upper 
hand, the foremost proponent of abolition, William Wilberforce, will 
continue to pursue the issue with unremitting ardor, and the leaders 
of both parties in Parliament have declared themselves strongly in 
favor of abolition. Therefore, "It is highly probable that the 
previous rejection of the motion to abolish the slave trade should 
be regarded not as a fine7  decision but rather as merely a postpone­
ment." It is possible that the motion was rejected in order to 
46 
DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre 
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Allerunterthflnigste Vorstellung, pp. 1-2. 
This was in reference to Pennsylvania, which in 1780 passed a 
gradual emancipation law; there were still some slaves in Pennsylvania 
in 1800—see David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age 
of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 
pp. 87-88. 
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give more time to those who are involved financially in the trade 
to prepare themselves for a change "which, of course, if it occurred 
too quickly, would have to be detrimental to their interests. If 
this is the case, then the matter surely deserves .  .  .  the attention 
of all nations which have an interest in the slave trade, since it 
would, after all, be difficult not to follow closely such an example, 
once given [da es_ doch vielleicht schwer wtlrde einen einmal gegebenen 
Beispiel nicht nahzufolgen]. 
The report noted that a considerable number of studies of 
the slave trade had been made by Europeans in recent years, allowing 
one to arrive at a better-informed view of the trade in all its 
aspects: 
Because of the indifference with which the slave trade was until 
recently regarded, such doubts [Bedenklichkeiten] as might arise 
about the slave trade could be set at ease by the belief that 
all of the Negroes taken from Africa either were already slaves, 
whose situation, indeed, was not worsened by their removal from 
Africa, but might perhaps be improved; or that they were 
prisoners of war who by being sold into slavery were saved from 
an otherwise certain death; or that they were criminals who 
similarly were rescued from death by means of the milder punish­
ment of enslavement. '  By use of such presumptions rvoraussetzungen] 
one could easily convince oneself that the slave trade was 
perhaps even worthy of praise and actually redounded to the 
benefit of the slaves themselves [zum Gltlkke der Sclaven selbst 
gereiche]; it  is only more recent testimony by unbiased eye­
witnesses [unverdSchtigen Auqenzeugen] that has explained these 
circumstances in such a way that one is now compelled to adopt 
quite a different viewpoint, unless one prefers to avoid the 
truth by means of far-fetched illusions.48 
Europeans now are amply informed about the evils of the slave 
4^Allerunterth£lnigste Vorstellung, pp. 3-4. The similarity 
with Schimmelmann's Bedenken is striking. 
^Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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trade, and whites can no longer use ignorance as to the origins 
of the slaves they purchase as an excuse for continuing to support 
I 
the trade: "Exempt from immediate involvement with violence in 
Africa, the Europeans have found it all too easy to disregard the 
rapine which they have brought on indirectly." Yet in critically 
examining the slave trade and the harm it causes, it  is best to 
avoid "the simple declamations with which some writers have attacked 
the slave trade, and by which the writers have only harmed their 
own cause; only facts [Thatsachen] cannot be refuted." The facts 
can best be established by the testimony of credible witnesses, 
and an excellent source of such testimony is the report prepared 
by a committee of the English Parliament appointed to investigate 
49 
the slave trade. The report makes it  clear that the manner in 
which the slave traders acquire ownership of slaves on the African 
50 
coast "consists for the most part of a web of cruelty and injustice." 
The Danish committee argued that persons who were already 
slaves in Africa did not benefit from being sold as slaves in America, 
as defenders of the slave trade contended. One can safely assume 
"that the slaves' situation in Africa, where their labor is not 
devoted to the production of costly articles of trade but rather to 
49This report is in the Danish State Archives, Vestindisk-
guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, under the title heading "Det 
engelske Parlaments Forhandlinger ang. Slavers Transport til 
Vestindien," a detailed compilation of testimony on the slave trade 
taken in 1788 concerning the Dolben Bill and in 1788-89 before a 
committee of the Privy Council appointed to obtain data on the slave 
trade. 
^Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, p. 6. 
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the production of only the most necessary subsistence articles 
[Nahrungsbedurfnisse] in what is usually a very fertile soil, is 
hardly as exhausting [schwerlich so drtikkend ist] as in the colonies 
in America." African chieftains sometimes sell their own subjects 
into slavery in exchange for liquor, even going so far as to set 
fire to villages at night and seize the fleeing inhabitants for 
sale as slaves. "That the slave trade with the Europeans is 
responsible for a situation in Africa in which the seed of morality 
and humane behavior must be destroyed is difficult to deny."^ 
Many slaves purchased by Europeans in Africa are not slaves 
at all but prisoners of war. Though defenders of the trade argue 
that these prisoners would be executed if they were not sold as 
slaves on the coast, many witnesses acquainted with the practices 
of the African tribes state that wars are frequently started for 
the sole purpose of obtaining slaves for sale to the Europeans. 
"Thus we have another consequence of the trade which can have only 
a baleful influence on the destiny of Africa .  .  .  it is difficult 
to comprehend how the areas where such warfare is most common avoid 
becoming depopulated."^ 
Criminals are another source of slaves, and the sale of 
criminals as slaves to Europeans "perhaps .  .  .  provides the 
opportunity for the greatest cruelty and injustice. There is little 
doubt .  .  .  that transgressions which previously could be paid off 
51Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
52Ibid., p. 9. 
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CO 
with a small fine .  .  .  are now punished with enslavement. ° 
The committee concluded that the European presence on the 
coast of Africa had had only "the most evil consequences for Africa": 
Africans have learned of needs [Bedtlrfnisse] and luxuries of 
which they previously knew nothing; the Europeans have taught the 
Africans to satisfy these wants at the cost of every feeling 
of humanity and morality; we have taught them to use our weapons, 
so that they could make war with greater success and procure a 
great number of prisoners. On the other hand, we Europeans 
have kept the Africans in ignorance of all the things which 
could have been truly useful to them. We have done nothing 
with regard to exporting useful knowledge to these peoples—who 
are surely not unfit for a certain amount of civilization. The 
Europeans have not taught the Africans living in areas where 
the soil is extremely fertile to grow crops which would enable 
them to engage in a trade which would have to become incomparably 
more important for them than this trade in human beings, this 
slave trade which tears asunder their bonds of community and 
spreads mistrust and unrest [Unruhe] among tribes which, with 
their climate and soil, are so strongly favored by nature. With 
all of these disadvantages on the one side and absolutely 
nothing but the selfishness of the Europeans on the other, no 
more doubt can be allowed concerning the morality of the slave 
trade. For this reason one cannot possibly maintain that the 
slave trade is legitimate.54 
As for the European slave traders and those who buy slaves in America, 
they cannot plead their innocence by saying they know nothing of how 
the slaves they buy actually became slaves when, in fact, they are 
the ones who provide the motive for "the most unlawful, evil deeds" 
by which more Africans are e n s l a v e d .55 
The committee argued that Africa would clearly benefit if 
the slave trade were outlawed and quoted testimony by Alexander 
53Ibid., p. 10. 
5 /4bid., pp. 10-11. Again, the influence of Schimmelmann's 
Bedenken is clear. 
55Ibid., p. 12. 
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Falconbridge, who had found during his travels along the coast of 
Africa that the only Africans who suffered when the slave trade was 
interrupted were those engaged in the slave trade, and that peace 
and trust had returned when it  was interrupted. 
It is thus indisputable that the Europeans are the cause of 
the crimes of the Africans, crimes the latter commit on account 
of the slave trade. The crimes of the Africans would cease if 
the occasion [Gelegenheit] for the crimes were to cease; and 
when one .  .  .  applies the principles of religion and ethics 
to the slave trade, then probably no other conclusion can be 
drawn but that the slave trade .  .  .  is illicit [unerlaubt] 
and that no other benefit could be important enough to justify 
the continuation of the slave trade.5° 
Even more immoral than the purchase of slaves in Africa 
was the Middle Passage. In order to avoid exaggerating its evils, 
the committee's report cautioned, one had to "set aside all notions 
and feelings which, because of a refined upbringing .  .  .  would make 
another condition seem more terrible than if such feelings were 
absent." 
But whatever standard of human development [Ausbildung] one 
chooses to presuppose, i t  is undeniable that it  would be 
difficult to imagine a more miserable physical condition than 
that in which the Negro slaves find themselves during their 
transportation from Africa to America. Crowded together and 
chained in the narrow hold of a ship, they must often during 
stormy weather spend several days without any access to fresh 
air and endure an atmosphere which even the European crew 
members cannot approach without fainting. All day the healthy 
often remain chained together with the loathesomely ill,  the 
living beside the dead.57  
The slaves are given only the barest amounts of food and 
water because, on the slave ships, space is needed to place as many 
56Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
57Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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slaves as possible. There are many instances recorded where 
the slaves, driven by desperation, have sought to free themselves by 
force, but "even more frequent are the examples of their eagerly 
seeking an opportunity to throw themselves overboard . . . .  It is 
unnecessary to delve further into these revolting details . . . .  
What has already been said can suffice as proof that the transport 
C O  
of the slaves is not reconcilable with any feelings of humanity." 
Some argue that the Negro is inferior, but this has not 
been proven; even if it were true, it would not justify the 
wretched treatment of the slaves during the Middle Passage. The 
state could perhaps ease the lot of the slave during the journey 
by means of regulations, but enforcement would be difficult so long 
as such regulations were contrary to the interests of those 
conducting the slave trade. The high mortality rate for the slaves 
during the Middle Passage provides incontestable proof of the 
disastrous impact of the slave trade on the enslaved Africans: 
When one considers that the slave buyers on the African coast 
take pains to purchase only healthy persons; that all of these 
persons are in an age group which in normal circumstances has 
a mortality rate that is far lower than that of other age 
groups; and yet that the number of these persons who die in 
the brief time period of a few months is absolutely out of all 
proportion to what is normal in other circumstances, . . .  no 
cause for this unnaturally high mortality rate is possible other 
than the treatment to which the slaves are subjected during the 
journey to America.59  
The committee, without giving any source, stated that the 
^Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
59Ibid., pp. 16-18. 
"treatment of slaves on Danish ships is acknowledged to be better 
than on the ships of other nations," but then used data it had 
gathered to support its contention that slave ships were death 
traps. Of 17,113 slaves shipped from Africa to America from 1778 
through 1789, 2,706 died during the Middle Passage, or fifteen 
per cent of the total. During the subsequent "seasoning" in the 
islands, because of illnesses contracted on the ships or the change 
in climate and way of life, as many if not more died as on the 
ships: 
Facts such as those presented here require no further comment. 
They speak for themselves. It is hard to acknowledge, yet 
even more difficult to dispute, that the border line between 
such an inevitable sacrifice of human life [as is involved 
in the slave trade] and actual murder, if the line were to be 
drawn by an impartial hand, could only be very vague 
[schwankend].60 
As a result of their practice over a long period of time, 
however, abuses such as the slave trade can become so intimately 
connected with beneficial matters that eradicating the abuses 
risks destroying practices which are useful, and there is 
consequently a need for the most careful deliberation before any 
action is taken: 
This may well be the case with the slave trade and, as much 
as we, by dint of every moral and humane sentiment, might feel 
ourselves pressed to recommend most humbly that Your Royal 
Majesty abolish the slave trade unconditionally [die unbedingte 
Aufhebung des Neqerhandels allerunterthanigst anzurathenj, we 
still have the duty of not failing to investigate carefully 
the connection between the slave trade and other matters that 
are important for the state and for the subjects of Your Royal 
60Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
Majesty, and the consequences which might result from 
abolition. 
The committee therefore dealt in turn with the importance 
of the slave trade itself for Denmark in comparison with "other 
branches of commerce" and the influence of the slave trade on 
"the present and future cultivation of Your Majesty's West Indian 
colonies." The data indicated that from 1778 through 1789, a total 
of 17,113 slaves was purchased in Africa by Danish slavers, including 
12,062 at the Danish forts, for a yearly average of 1,426 (see 
Appendix III). The committee took care to note that those years 
included a war between England and France "which provided the Danish 
slave trade with an opportunity for expansion which normally is not 
available." During the; years when the slave trade was not affected 
by the war, Danish slavers carried an annual average of 894 slaves 
to America; and since the war ended, the Danish slave trade has 
"receded into its usual rut [Geleis]." 
The number of ships used in the trade was proportional 
to the number of slaves carried, and peaked during the war years 
and the two immediate post-war years (see Appendix III). Altogether, 
from 1778 through 1789, Danish slavers made 50 voyages from Africa 
to the West Indies; only one voyage was made in 1791. Spare slaves 
at the Danish forts in Africa had been sold recently to French 
slavers in accordance with agreements with French companies. The 
61  Ibid., p. 20. 
62Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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committee concluded "there is at present no likelihood that these 
Co 
numbers can be increased." 
The committee next analyzed the cargo list of a ship engaged 
in trade with the Guinea Coast in an attempt to describe the origin 
of goods used to purchase slaves. The total value of the cargo was 
58,336 riqsdaler, with articles valued at 21,415 rigsdaler probably 
produced in Denmark and the rest of the merchandise, valued at 
36,921 rigsdaler, produced abroad. Even if two such cargoes were 
sent to the Guinea Coast each year, only 42,830 rigsdaler worth of 
Danish products would be involved.6^ 
Experience, the committee noted, has shown that the slave 
trade itself has "nearly always produced more losses than profits." 
The royal committee appointed in 1786 to investigate means by which 
the Guinea trade could be made more profitable had found little 
hope for improving the situation. The committee had found that, in 
order to export 1,400 slaves annually, "four forts and three lodges 
had to be maintained on the Gold Coast with a not inconsiderable 
number of employees, so that it is easy to perceive that unusually 
high sales earnings are required in order to defray the extraordinary 
expenses." Prices for slaves in the Danish islands are low, and 
even the sale of slaves to the French islands has not brought 
63Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
M OHIbid., p. 24. The most valuable items in the cargo 
studied by the committee were gunpowder, muskets, and brandy, with 
gunpowder valued at 8,528 rigsdaler, muskets at 6,083 rigsdaler and 
brandy at 5,506 riqsdaler. 
particular benefit to Danish slavers; in fact, "the entrepreneurs of 
the slave trade are satisfied when they realize .  .  .  quite moderate 
profits or merely escape without losses."^ 
The committee argued that the effect of the slave trade on 
Danish shipping was of very slight significance: 
Employment of two or three ships and the sailors needed to man 
them is, in relation to the totality of Danish shipping, such a 
small matter that, if it is not to be regarded as quite 
unimportant, i t  could nevertheless scarcely be considered 
significant once a more noble and important interest made its 
abolition necessary. 
As an additional indictment of the slave trade, the 
committee used Thomas Clarkson's argument that the trade, rather 
than serving as a nursery for seamen, was actually a graveyard for 
them. For various reasons, including the long sojourn on the Guinea 
Coast and disease on the ships, "there are always far more deaths 
67 
among sailors on slave ships than . . .  in normal circumstances." 
No data from Danish slave ships were used to support this contention. 
The committee concluded: 
We can consequently, in view of the points we have examined 
here, be of no other opinion than that the slave trade in itself 
cannot be regarded as so important for the state, or for those 
of Your Majesty's subjects who are immediately involved in it,  
that its economic importance could be used as an important 
argument against abolition.68 
But though the slave trade itself was not important enough 
65Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
67Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
68Ibid., p. 28. 
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to provide an argument against abolition, the committee felt there 
was another matter which might be: 
We come now to the most important and most difficult point 
of this entire investigation, namely the relation of the slave 
trade to the West Indian colonies, and the question of whether 
with respect to the colonies it  would be possible and feasible 
to abolish the slave trade. 9  
The committee believed that, without recourse to the slave 
trade in the past, the West Indian islands would have been poorly 
developed and that slavery as it now existed had to be accepted as 
"the established and customary system of cultivation" which "cannot 
yet be abolished." 
No matter how desirable it would be to attain the goal of soon 
freeing the slaves [So wtlnschenswerth es seyn wdrde den Zwek den 
Befreiung der Neqer bald zu erreichen]7U and as much as we are 
convinced that this distant but, at some future time, possible 
goal must not be lost from view in all arrangements which are 
made with regard to the slaves [und so sehr wir tlberzeugt sind, 
dass dieser entfernte aber dereinst mfigliche Zwek bei alien 
Veranstaltungen, die in Absicht der Neqer getroffen werden, 
nicht aus dem Gesicht verloren werden mtlsse^] .yet we are also 
fully convinced that emancipation is absolutely not a matter to 
be dealt with at present, and that each incautious regulation 
could bring on very dangerous consequences [so sind wir doch auch 
vttl1ig Uberzeugt, dass das durchaus keine Sache des Augenbliks 
seyn, und dass jede unvorsichtige Masregel sehr gefahrfiche 
Folqen veranlassen kOnne]./Z 
69Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
^°Ibid., pp. 29-30. The word "soon" [bald] was deleted from 
the Danish translation of the report published by Kirstein in Minerva, 
April 1792, p. 56. This was first noted by C.A. Trier in his article 
"Det dansk-vestindiske Negerinfdtfrselsforbud af 1792," Historisk 
Tidsskrift, 7th Series, V (1904), 430. 
^This statement also was deleted from the version published 
in Danish in Minerva. The committee apparently feared that the 
language used on the subject of emancipation in its original report 
was too strong and that, since emancipation was not deemed feasible 
anyway, broaching the subject would serve only to frighten persons who 
could accept abolition of the slave trade but not emancipation. 
72Allerunterthanigste Vorstellung, pp. 29-30. 
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The committee believed that a long period would be needed 
in which to prepare the slaves for freedom: 
Before a class of people which for so many years has lived in 
a state of unconditional slavery can be liberated from forcible 
subjection to their masters [gegen die Gewalthfltigkeiten ihrer 
Herren73] and placed under the protection of public laws, it  is 
absolutely necessary that they possess a certain level of 
knowledge [Kenntnisse] and morality which, among the Negro 
slaves, cannot be assumed to exist at the present time. The 
education of the slaves must precede their emancipation, for 
otherwise their own well-being and the well-being of their 
masters will be jeopardized [Ihre Erziehung muss ihrer Befreiung 
vorangehen, sonst wird ihr eigenes Mohl und das Mohl ihrer 
Herren aufs Spiel geseztlT A premature and rash measure could 
easily carry them to the point where they would choose to obtain 
by violent means that which must still be withheld from them; 
and with their numerical preponderance over the white inhabitants 
of the colonies, perhaps only a few bold and clever leaders 
would be required to put into execution such a plan and to bring 
it to fruition.74 
The committee thus postponed consideration of emancipation on grounds 
that the slaves were not yet ready for freedom and that talk of 
emancipation might spark a major slave revolt.75  
73This phrase too was left out of the Danish version 
published in Minerva, p. 56. 
^Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, pp. 30-31. The thinking 
of M. Frossard was probably of influence here, as his book was one 
of the sources used by the committee. After strongly condemning 
slavery as an odious tyranny that violated the rights of man 
("L'esclavage est 1'infraction la plus criminelle des droits de 
l 'homme et du citoyen, la tyrannie la plus odieuse, l 'attentat le 
plus reprehensible."), Frossard stated that "L'affranchissement 
gene'ral des negres est un projet sublime dans la theorie. Mais 
son execution n'est possible que graduellement . . . .  II faut 
un si^cle de bonnes actions pour corriger trois siecles de tyrannie." 
See his La Cause des esclaves negres et des habitants de la Guin^e 
(Lyon, 1789), pp. 20-21. 
75 
The slaves in the Danish West Indies were not emancipated 
until July 3, 1848, and then only when they threatened to destroy 
St. Croix. 
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But emancipation was not the real issue confronting the 
committee. Rather, its problem was to find a means to end the 
slave trade—a type of commerce that was both unprofitable and 
immoral—yet maintain an adequate slave labor force in the colonies 
so that sugar production would not suffer: 
If it  were possible to place the slaves who are presently in 
the islands, or who would be present there after the passage 
of a certain number of years, in a condition that would enable 
them--as other peoples living under civilized conditions 
[gesel 1 schaftlicher Verfassung]—not only to maintain their 
population but to increase it,  all new importations would 
become unnecessary and would cease spontaneously . . . .  
The careful examination of this possibility has had to be one of 
the principal objects of our investigation.'6  
The committee noted that, in Africa, Negroes reproduced as 
well if not better than people elsewhere. And "It is an indisputable 
truth that Negro females in the West Indies, when living in regular 
conjugal relationships [ordentlicher ehelicher Verbindung], are very 
fertile .  .  .  ."^7  Therefore, when one finds that "hitherto no 
regular and adequate propagation has occurred among the slaves in the 
West Indian colonies of all nations, one can seek the reason for this 
solely in their circumstances and condition in the colonies."78  
The Danish West Indies, the report stated, have been just as 
dependent on the slave trade as have other West Indian colonies, with 
the slave population declining whenever the slave trade has been 
76Allerunterth&nigste Vorstellung, pp. 31-32. 
77Ibid. Oldendorp, another source used by the committee, 
had written about the high fertility rate of the slaves. See his 
Geschichte der Mission der evangelischen Brtlder, I ,  407. 
78Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, pp. 32-33. 
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interrupted. The committee, after detailed study of the population 
problem, had concluded that a low birth rate rather than a high 
death rate was largely responsible for the natural decrease of the 
slave population. Having obtained from the General Customs 
Department a list of all slaves on St. Croix during eleven 
consecutive years, together with the number of births and deaths for 
each year, the coimrittee found that the average number of deaths 
- annually was 776, the average number of births 432. There was one 
death for every twenty-eight slaves and one birth for every fifty-
79 
one—a crude death rate of 35.7 and a crude birth rate of 19.6. 
The committee used data on birth and death rates in Europe 
to show that the death rate among the slaves on St. Croix was not 
abnormally high but that the birth rate was unusually low; it  said 
deaths could be reduced by better care of young children and sick 
persons, and by checking the spread of epidemics. The latter was 
especially important: in 1784 only 485 slaves died, but in 1782, 
1,118 died and in 1783, 983; each of these years saw epidemic out­
breaks of smallpox and measles. In 1789, another year in which there 
was an epidemic, 1,278 slaves died. During the eight years in which 
there were no epidemics, deaths averaged 644 per year, or one death 
for every thirty-four slaves (a crude death rate of 29.4).^ 
The committee suggested that it  was unlikely that three 
years out of every eleven would witness epidemics, but quite probable 
^Ibid., p. 33. See Appendix VII. 
80Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
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that there would be one or two such years per decade; therefore 
it combined the death rate which included the three years when there 
had been epidemics with the average death rate for the eight years 
in which no epidemics had occurred to obtain a rate judged to be 
more realistic, in this case one death for every thirty-one slaves 
(a crude death rate of 32.3).*^ 
The committee commented on the peculiar age structure of 
the slave population, with its low ratio of children to adults 
(a result of importing primarily adult slaves), and noted that the 
death rate for young children was in normal circumstances much higher 
than for adults. 
It appears therefore to follow that the mortality rate for adult 
slaves must be much greater than is normal and that, if the 
number of children were in the proper ratio to adults, the 
slaves' mortality rate in its entirety would prove to be more 
disadvantageous than the calculations above indicated. We 
believe it must be admitted that in fact such a high death rate 
among adult slaves does occur, but we believe also there is 
ample reason for believing that it is partly due to the high 
mortality rate among slaves recently imported from Africa. 
This notwithstanding, it  appears to us still possible to assume 
that the current mortality rate on St. Croix could, by means 
of some suitable arrangements, easily be lowered to the extent 
that it would not stand in the way of the goal of having the 
slave population become self-sustaining, thereby obviating the 
need for continued dependence on the slave trade.82 
A much more difficult problem than the death rate, according 
to the committee, was presented by the low birth rate among the slaves. 
In a normal society there would be an excess of births over deaths, 
^Ibid., p. 36. 
82Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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except during periods when extraordinary circumstances intervened, 
but the Negro slaves did not live under normal social conditions. 
Would it  be possible to improve their living standards so that, 
"except for the matter of their lack of personal freedom," they 
could "enjoy approximately the same advantages as mankind in 
general?" 
The slaves have always been regarded merely as tools [Werkzeuge]; 
people have even made the abominable computation [den abscheulichen 
Calcul] as to whether it  is more profitable to let the slaves 
work moderately hard and thereby maintain their lives and useful­
ness for a longer period, or to strain them to the utmost of their 
powers and, when they die from their suffering, to purchase new 
slaves. For so long as such a computation is possible, it  is 
difficult to imagine that anything can be done in order to bring 
about natural propagation and multiplication among the slaves. 
Experience also indicates that the planters in general have 
always had in view only their immediate benefit and have opposed 
everything which did not promote their immediate gain. Thus 
in purchasing slaves their chief aim has been to acquire male 
slaves because they could expect more work from them than from 
female slaves; this has resulted in a numerical imbalance 
between the sexes, wherein lies indisputably the principal reason 
for the small number of births.83  
The committee had secured lists of slaves on those St. Croix 
and St. Thomas plantations which were mortgaged to the Danish Crown 
and discovered that the ratio of male to female slaves on the St. 
Croix plantations was 100:86. On the plantations on St. Thomas, 
however, the ratio was 100:94.6.8^ 
83Ibid., pp. 37-39. 
84 
Ibid., p. 39. These differing ratios of male to female 
slaves surely derived from the fact that St. Croix was a much more 
recently developed island than St. Thomas, and therefore its slave 
population was more strongly influenced by the African slave trade, 
which supplied more male slaves than female. 
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The committee relied on very limited data in reaching its conclusion 
that there was a major imbalance between the sexes, a conclusion later 
shown to be without basis; its fear of involving the West Indian 
government, and thereby the planters through their burger councils, 
restricted its access to information on the slave population. It is 
indeed remarkable that Schimmelmann accepted this erroneous view of 
the ratio of male to female slaves; he should have known from the 
yearly reports sent to him from the islands that his plantations, 
La Princesse and LaGrange on St. Croix, Caroline on St. John, and 
Thomas on St. Thomas, possessed in 1792 a decided preponderance of 
female slaves among their adult population—309 females to 258 males, 
with the largest plantation, La Princesse, having 139 adult female 
slaves and only 99 adult male slaves.85  
In addition to the disproportionate number of males in the 
slave population, the committee believed there were other factors 
detrimental to a higher birth rate. One of these was the lack of 
attention given to promoting slave marriages: 
The indifference towards almost everything which could have 
influence on improving the living conditions of the slaves has 
been extended to include slave marriages. Slave marriages have 
in general not been hindered, but nothing has been done to 
encourage them, when one considers ,iow difficult it must be for 
people living as Negro slaves, in their suffering, to join 
together in marriage.8® 
85DSA, Grev Ernst Schimmelmanns Privatarkiv. Pk. 72. 
Fideikommisset vedkommende Papirer, 1782-1800, Vortrag zur 
Generalversammlung den 1 May, 1794, p. 4. Slave population of the 
Schimmelmann plantations as of October, 1792. 
8®Allerunterthanigste Vorstellung, p. 40. 
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The committee argued that planters, in breaking up slave 
marriages by selling one of the partners or in destroying slave 
families by separating children from their parents, actually 
discouraged the formation of slave marriages and thereby impeded 
the growth of the slave population.^ Because the slaves know 
that there is no guarantee the families they form will not be 
broken up by the masters, they tend to suppress their inclination 
toward forming stable family units and live promiscuously instead. 
The whites contribute to the slaves' promiscuous behavior when they 
"unscrupulously use slave women, without considering the personal 
situation of the women, for the satisfaction of their own (because 
of the warm climate) passionate needs, as they would use the women 
for any other service."8^ 
There were other factors, besides the low birth rate, which 
harmed the growth of the slave population: 
The constant, exclusive goal of immediate profits results in too 
little care being devoted to women during pregnancy and after 
delivery, as well as to the children in their earliest years. 
It is true that now on most plantations pregnant women, in the 
period immediately preceding delivery, are spared a certain 
amount of work, but this practice is still too arbitrary and 
imperfect to have much effect .  .  .  ,  especially when this 
better treatment is not extended to the c h i l d r e n .89 
87Ibid., p. 41. The committee told of a recent incident in 
which a slave boy had been taken from his mother and sold to another 
plantation; the woman had committed suicide. 
88 
Ibid., pp. 42-43. Promiscuity abetted the spread of venereal 
disease, which often left its victims sterile, and was thought to 
reduce the care and attention slave mothers gave to their infants by 
different or unknown fathers. 
89Ibid., p. 43. 
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When the mother is compelled to return to work in the 
fields a few months after giving birth, her baby is denied the care 
it needs at such an early age. The mother must take her child with 
her into the fields where, while she works, i t  lies "with a piece 
of sugar cane in its mouth" and is subjected to the bites of insects. 
If there should be an old slave woman available who cannot be used 
for any other kind of work, she is assigned the task of looking after 
the young children, though this is still not as effective as having 
the children's mothers look after them. "It is only natural that 
the health of the children suffers from such treatment and is often 
ruined for the rest of their lives."9® 
Another factor which the committee believed inhibited 
population growth was the large number of house slaves. These 
slaves had become a customary symbol of success for the planters, 
and some planters maintained as many as fifty of them. House slaves 
generally remained unmarried, and because there were so many of them the 
number of slave births was believed to be lower than it would other-
91 
wise have been. 
The committee believed the various hindrances to population 
growth mentioned above were correctable weaknesses in the slave 
system and could be solved, some immediately, others gradually, "if 
.  .  .  laws and morals were to lend a mutual helping hand to such a 
90Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
91  Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
) 
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noble and useful purpose [einem so edlen und ndzlichen Zwekke]." 
Data had been collected which, though rather incomplete, could 
nevertheless be of value. Two tables accompanying the committee's 
report provided a list of slaves on the four Schimmelmann family 
plantations for the years 1773-1782. (See Appendix VIII.) The 
tables showed that on these plantations the slave death rate was 
approximately the same as on St. Croix as a whole, namely one death 
a year for every twenty-seven slaves (a crude rate of 35.2 per 
1,000). But on the other hand the Schimmelmann plantations had a 
much higher rate of slave births—one for every thirty-five slaves, 
or a crude birth rate of 28.5 per 1,000. The ratio of male to female 
slaves was 100:90, a disproportion which the committee considered 
the primary reason for the excess of deaths over births. "In any 
case these facts provide a strong basis for the probability of our 
earlier proposition that the present small number of births is the 
result of adventitious circumstances," the removal of which would end 
Qp 
the natural decrease of the slave population. 
The committee had failed to obtain further examples of birth 
and death rates on the Danish islands, but believed data found in 
works describing the situation on other West Indian islands could be 
instructive. Clarkson had described more than half a dozen instances 
in which plantations on Jamaica had been able to increase their slave 
populations solely by humane treatment of the slaves and by encourage-
92 
Ibid., pp. 45-47. The ratio of male to female slaves on 
the Schimmelmann plantations had changed dramatically by 1792. See 
above, p. 106. 
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ment given the slaves to propagate. Clarkson had noted other 
islands, including St. Kitts, Antigua, Barbados, and St. Domingue, 
on which an excess of births over deaths had occurred on some 
plantations. Clarkson had also referred to plantations where the 
slave population declined dramatically when a new, harsh master 
took over. The conroittee also used examples provided by Frossard of 
how good treatment of slaves in the French West Indies had ended or 
almost ended dependence on the slave trade on some plantations there.^ 
The committee concluded that in the proper circumstances 
the slaves were capable of maintaining and even increasing their 
population by natural means. The task remained of determining the 
precise measures by which obstacles which hindered the natural 
increase of the slaves in the Danish West Indies could be removed in 
order to end the islands' dependence on the slave trade; normally one 
would first investigate how this might be accomplished before 
deciding that the slave trade should be abolished: 
But, since we consider abolition of the slave trade to be itself 
a means of promoting, of its own accord, the propagation of the 
s l a v e s ,  w e  m u s t  m o s t  h u m b l y  r e q u e s t  p e r m i s s i o n  h e r e  . . .  a t  
least to presume that Your Royal Majesty will deign most 
graciously to abolish the slave trade irrevocably and to tolerate 
the continuation of the slave trade only for a stipulated period 
of perhaps ten more years.94 
The committee believed it imperative that the Crown should 
announce its intent to abolish the trade: 
93 
Ibid., pp. 47-50. The committee was using Clarkson's 
Essay on the Impolicy of the Slave Trade (London, 1788), and Frossard1  s 
La cause des esclaves nSgres. 
QA 
Allerunterthflnigste Vorstellung, pp. 51-52. 
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As soon as such a law is made public, one can anticipate 
that the plantation owners will begin thinking spontaneously 
of the means they might use to enable themselves to preserve 
a plantation population which is an indispensable necessity for 
the benefit of the planters themselves, so that the success 
of the matter could well nigh be left to the planters; but this, 
however, we dare not do, since experience has often shown that 
people can also be insufficiently enlightened as to their own 
self-interest to be able to surmount antiquated prejudices 
[verjahrte Vorurtheile] and to proceed with a change in 
procedures to which they have been accustomed for a long time. 
Moreover, i t  might develop in this instance that the necessary 
arrangements require a cash advance which not all plantation 
owners could obtain; hence, financial aid for them might be 
found necessary and feasible.95 
The committee noted that the slave population on St. Croix 
from 1780 through 1790 ranged between 21,000 and just under 23,000 
(see Appendix VIII), and during the decade the slave population 
declined by 562. The planters had not appeared eager to buy more 
slaves and would probably content themselves with the smallest 
number needed to get by: 
We cannot accept the present slave population of St. Croix 
as a sufficient basis on which the completed population could 
be founded; even the disproportion between male and female 
slaves stands in the way of this. One must at least take into 
account the need to procure approximately as many slaves as are 
necessary to bring about a proper ratio of male to female slaves; 
and since there might be many individual plantation owners who 
are more than casually interested in stocking their plantations 
with new slaves, it  would be a hard blow to them if they were 
suddenly deprived of the hope of being able to save their 
fortunes from ruin by purchasing fresh slaves. There would also 
be complaints from the well-to-do planters if they were 
suddenly denied all opportunity for making improvements, which 
they had the intention and means of carrying out, to their 
property. On these grounds we have decided that, from the time 
when the irrevocable decision to abolish the slave trade is 
made, there ought to be a ten-year toleration of the trade. 
Such a policy .  .  .  would give the planters an opportunity, 
according to their circumstances and plans, of furnishing 
9 5Ibid.,  pp. 52-53. 
112 
themselves with as many slaves as they desire and are 
capable of obtaining. In order to provide the planters with 
every possible alleviation [Erleichterung], it  would in our 
most humble opinion be advisable during the proposed ten-year 
period [prior to abolition of the slave trade] to permit an 
unrestricted importation of slaves .  .  .  and also to allow 
foreign vessels, in exchange for each slave they sell in the 
Danish islands, to take out of the Danish colonies a certain 
amount of sugar. We maintain that such an unrestricted 
importation is all the more necessary, as even now the complaints 
of the West Indian planters over the small number of slaves 
supplied by the entrepreneurs of the Baltic Company [de Coninck's 
company] are very common.96 
The committee referred to the number of slaves sold in 
the Danish islands from 1778 through 1789 to indicate that the 
planters did have reason to complain. The number of slaves purchased 














9 6Ibid.,  pp. 53-56. 
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Low prices for slaves in the Danish islands were considered 
by the Baltic Company as the reason for the declining numbers of 
slaves sold there, for the planters were willing to pay only 
prices that were too low to allow for a profit. 
The conmrittee decided that unrestricted competition both 
for slave ships seeking to sell slaves in the Danish West Indies 
and for planters wishing to buy slaves was the best solution to the 
problem of supplying the islands with more slaves quickly. The 
planters who lacked the resources needed to purchase enough slaves 
for their plantations should be aided by the Crown in order to ensure 
the success of the plan for abolition; the planters should be 
"allowed to entertain hopes of receiving some benefit through the 
benevolence of Your Royal Majesty. 
The committee estimated that during the last ten years of 
the slave trade to the Danish West Indies, the Crown would have to 
assist needy planters in purchasing an average of 600 slaves a year. 
If each slave cost 200 rigsdaler, a yearly sum of 120,000 rigsdaler 
would have to be made available for that purpose, amounting to 
1,200,000 rigsdaler over the ten-year period. Detailed proposals for 
the loans to the planters should be drawn up in the West Indies under 
^Ibid., p. 57. Yet if the demand for slaves in the Danish 
West Indies really had been strong, the planters would have been 
willing to pay more for African slaves. The local planters wanted 
more slaves, but did not need them so badly that they were willing 
to pay competitive prices. 
no 
JOIbid., p. 58. Obviously, this would undercut any resistance 
to abolition by the planters, as would the ten-year postponement 
of abolition. 
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the supervision of the burger councils on each of the islands, 
and in Denmark direction of the loans should be entrusted to the 
Commission for the Liquidation of the West Indian Debt." Security 
for the loans would be provided first and foremost by a mortgage 
on those slaves bought with the loans and if necessary on other 
property owned by the planters. For planters who were unable to 
provide sufficient security for the loans they wanted, the committee 
believed that appropriate supervision could keep the risk at a low 
level. "And should it  prove impossible [for the Danish government] 
to avoid some losses, the noble and great purpose [of the loans] 
could probably justify a small sacrifice."^00  
Because the loans were intended to serve primarily as a 
means of improving the productive capacity of the plantations, the 
committee emphasized that the planters must not be allowed to 
neglect the slaves already present in the islands. Slaves bought with 
the loan should increase the population of the plantations, not 
merely maintain itJ0^ 
The committee also wanted the burger councils to see to it 
that those planters on whose plantations the male population was 
disproportionately large used the loan to purchase more female slaves 
"ibid., p. 59. This commission had been created in 1786 
to administer collection of the debts owed the Crown by various 
planters after the Crown had bought from Dutch bankers the mortgages 
they held on plantations in the Danish islands. 
100Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
101  Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
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in order to raise the birth rate. For those planters who did not 
need to use the loan fund to buy slaves, self-interest alone should 
dictate an emphasis on acquiring more female slaves. No law could 
force them to do so, but "We believe that an arrangement could be 
devised whereby the head tax [Kopfschatze] could be used in pursuit 
of the goal of increasing the proportion of female slaves." The 
committee recommended removing the head tax on adult female slaves 
and doubling the head tax on male slaves over twelve years of age. 
To allow the planters time to prepare for this change and to acquire 
more female slaves, a period of three years should elapse following 
publication of this regulation before it would be enforced. This 
measure would provide another motive for the planters to look after 
their own future interestsJ02  
The large number of house slaves was considered another 
hindrance to population growth which the committee believed could 
be dealt with by imposing a special head tax. Revenue from this tax 
should be set aside for distribution as bonuses to planters who did 
most to promote slave marriages and the growth of the slave popula­
tion.103  
The remaining serious obstacles to population growth, the 
committee thought, were based on the fact that the blacks were 
enslaved, totally at the mercy of their masters. This made it  
impossible for the slaves to do anything themselves to improve 
102Ibid., pp. 64-66. 
103Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
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their condition—for them "there remains nothing but blind 
obedience to the will of another." The slaves cannot be 
emancipated: "In the present set of circumstances [that] can only 
be prepared for, not actually brought about immediately by means 
of laws." Therefore the best way of improving the treatment of 
slaves was by appealing to the planters' self-interest: "This 
route to the goal [of helping the slaves] will have to be taken, 
for so long as the good-will of the planters is not involved in 
the matter, their unwillingness or even their insubordination will 
necessarily make everything precarious. 
Hitherto, the committee said, the planters have thought 
that every step towards improving the spiritual level of the 
slaves or bettering their condition would endanger the security 
of the white inhabitants of the islands. This fear, which has 
led the planters to refuse to accept proposals for improving the 
living conditions and moral standards of the slaves, was the result 
of the whites' being outnumbered ten to one. The recent rebellion 
on St. Domingue could only increase the fears and prejudices of 
the whites. Yet, the committee argued, the planters were mistaken 
in believing that harsh treatment was a deterrent to slave revolts: 
It is a principle derived from nature and the experiences of 
history that, the more harshly people are oppressed, the more 
active must be their desire to throw off their yoke and the 
more terrible the explosion when they undertake to accomplish 
this goal, which they will do as soon as they find an opportunity^ 
104Ibid., pp. 68-70. 
105Ibid.» pp. 70-71. 
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The proposition that it is less dangerous for the planters 
to treat their slaves well than to oppose measures that would help 
the slaves was also borne out by the events which usually occurred 
during a slave rising: 
Always during such rebellions the whites, and especially 
the slave masters, are persecuted with the greatest rage by 
the slaves, and only those whites who had been noted for 
treating their slaves particularly well are exempted [from 
harm], which fact also provides a curious proof that the slaves 
are by no means insensible to feelings of decency and humanity 
. . . .  The slave must be inclined to make use of every 
opportunity for a rising, so long as he has everything to gain 
by doing so and extremely little to lose. The bonds which tie 
the slave to the human community are . . .  so weak that their 
rending asunder can cost the slave's heart very little .  .  .  . '06 
Improving the treatment of slaves would help the planters 
combat the threat of revolt: 
When the external circumstances of the slave's existence 
are softened; when, at least for a start, the slave's marriage 
and his entire domestic life are protected; when the slave is 
given universal permission and opportunity to acquire something 
of his own; when the prospect is thereby opened to him of some 
day obtaining freedom for himself or his children; then all 
of those things will provide so many bonds that the slave's 
inclination to tear himself away from his situation will be 
resisted. The more he has to lose, the less willing he will be 
to risk rebel!ion.107 
Reforms which gave the slaves hope for the future were one 
106Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
107Ibid., pp. 72-73. Of course in practice the slaves were 
permitted to sell produce from their garden plots and acquire money 
to buy goods in the towns or to buy their freedom. Oldendorp wrote 
that he knew a Negro who had purchased his own freedom and that of 
his two wives, and mentioned the practice whereby a slave could 
make a down payment on his freedom and obtain conditional release, 
so that he could move to one of the towns to earn the money needed 
to purchase his full freedom. See his Geschichte der Mission der 
evangelischen Brtlder, I ,  402. 
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way of reducing the danger of insurrection, the committee stated. 
Another means of achieving the same goal was to abolish the slave 
trade: 
Without doubt the danger of slave rebellion would be very 
greatly reduced if, as a result of the abolition of the slave 
trade, the day should come when all the slaves in the West 
Indies have been born there and no more slaves arrive from 
Africa. Slaves from Africa, who have been snatched away from 
their fatherland and deprived of all their family connections, 
and then subjected to atrocious treatment during the Middle 
Passage, are certain to be much more inclined to attempt 
a desperate rising than those slaves born in the West Indies, 
living in a family unit which they value highly, and 
acquainted with no better living conditions from their own 
experience 
The committee was highly sensitive about the rights of 
property, including property in human beings, and was hesitant on 
the subject of having the Danish government enact laws that would 
interfere with the slaveholders' control of their slaves. The 
committee insisted again that by treating their slaves well, 
"the whites are bound to bring about a security of life for them­
selves based on love and trust, which is incomparably more productive 
than controlling the slaves only by force." The committee could 
either recommend attempting to persuade the planters to improve the 
treatment of their slaves or trying to compel the planters to do 
^ AllerunterthSnigste Vorstellung, p. 73. An undated 
document in Kirstein's handwriting, obviously used during the 
committee's deliberations, stated that the general opinion of writers 
acquainted with the West Indies was that slaves born in the islands 
"were a better race of people than those brought from Africa [eine 
bessere Race von Menschen sind als die aus Africa gekommen]." 
Oldendorp, Frossard, and E. Long, History of Jamaica (3 vols; London, 
1774) were used as sources. Kirstein added that slaves from Africa 
were described as "filled with hate for the whites" and the prime 
agents of insurrection, while creole slaves frequently assisted their 
masters in uncovering plots and quelling revolts. 
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so by means of legal restrictions. After urging that the Crown 
issue ordinances which, though not legally binding, would admonish 
the planters to adopt a policy of amelioration, the committee 
suggested that perhaps "regulations having the force of law 
[geseztliche Anordnungen]" would have to be issued to provide some 
protection for the slaves. Yet the committee tried to avoid giving 
the impression that it wanted to interfere with the property rights 
of the slaveholders: 
Of course we have not, in considering the need for regulations, 
lost sight of the fundamental principle that the slaves are 
still to be regarded as the lawful property of their masters, 
and therefore anything that appears to be an attack on the 
p l a n t e r s '  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  m u s t  b e  a v o i d e d ;  b u t ,  . . .  a s  i t  i s  
incontestably within the realm of the legislating power to 
direct every use of property in such a manner that no detriment 
for society as a whole [das qanze der Gesellschaft] arises 
therefrom, .  .  .  there can be even less dispute about adopting 
regulations which serve the common good and do not interfere 
with the legitimate use of property J 09 
The committee proceeded to discuss the various areas in 
which, for the good of society, the state might decide to interfere 
with the property rights of the planters. In keeping with the 
committee's deep concern for population growth, the matter of 
improving the moral behavior of the slaves (that is, reducing 
promiscuity) was dealt with first: 
In order to liberate the slaves from this lack of morality 
and to accustom them to a regular and proper life, we believe 
that nothing could be as effective as general instruction 
[allgemeiner Unterricht] in the Christian religion. If this 
instruction is done properly and makes an impression, the 
consequences, even for the daily life of the slaves, could be 
^09Allerunterthanigste Vorstellung, pp. 74-75. 
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nothing other than extremely beneficial. For that reason it 
would be very desirable that the islands be divided into 
districts which would constitute slave congregations, with a 
house, in which religious instruction and services could be 
held, built for each congregation, to which a man would be 
appointed who, either as a minister or schoolmaster, would 
a t t e n d  t o  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  s l a v e s  J ' 0  
The committee recommended assisting the Moravian Brothers, 
partly as a means of reducing the costs of the instructional 
program, and partly because "their doctrine is perhaps the most 
suitable and comforting for the slaves in the Negroes' present 
condition [ihr Lehre ist vielleicht die passendste und 
trflstlichste fiir die jetzigen Zustand der Neger]." Indeed, the 
teachings of the Moravians could be of positive benefit in controlling 
the slaves and making them content with their present circumstances: 
The indifference towards all earthly tribulations, the constant 
references to a better situation in the future and to the purity 
of the heart which the Moravians inculcate in the slaves are 
direct moral precepts. The slaves are led to feel less 
dissatisfied with their fate and thereby adjust better to the 
course of their lives. 
The strong emphasis on the role of the Moravians as agents of 
control over the slaves suggests that the committee's interest in an 
obedient labor force was perhaps as great as its desire to reduce 
immorality among the pagan blacks. 
The Moravians have given ample proof of the efficacy of 
their instructions, overcoming all obstacles, including those for 
which the slaveholders were responsible, and have had several 
11^Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
111  Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
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thousand slaves in their congregations for years. "The masters 
have at last had to acknowledge that their Christian slaves are 
their best slaves, so that in recent years the obstacles placed 
in the way of the Moravians by the masters have been fewer." 
The slaves were very receptive to the appeal of Christianity: 
they often sought instruction in religion when their day's work was 
done and were willing to travel considerable distances to attend 
their classes. The Moravians dealt with the slaves in a sincere, 
brotherly manner which apparently made an excellent impression on 
the slaves; "it is worth noting here that this quite brotherly 
association [of white Moravians and slaves] .  .  .  has never had any 
evil consequences, which says much about the argument that the 
slaves must be kept constantly at a great distance from the 
112 
whites." 
The committee proceeded to make a bold suggestion, one 
which if carried out would involve government interference with the 
operation of the plantations: the slaves' teachers, it  proposed, 
might serve as protectors of the slaves. The slaves could confide 
their grievances to the teachers, who would then convey the complaints 
to the planters in an attempt to resolve them. Most importantly, 
the teachers would have authority to decide on the best manner of 
instructing the slaves, and the planters would be forbidden from 
interfering with the teachers. Another recommendation of the 
112Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
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committee which involved interfering with the power of the planters 
over their slaves was a proposal that all slave children under six 
years of age and all new-born babies be baptized and reared in the 
Christian religion, without regard to whether their parents were 
113 
Christian or pagan. 
In an attempt to regularize the sexual unions of the slaves, 
the committee urged that slave marriages be registered in a book to 
be kept by the teacher to whose congregation the slaves belonged. 
But the marriages would be registered only after the planters had 
given permission to the slaves to marry. Divorce could be obtained 
if one partner demanded it ,  and divorces, too, were to be registered, 
so that "no abrogation of a marriage could occur without the prior 
knowledge of the master or the overseer of the plantation and the 
teacher of the congregation." The committee insisted that the 
planter or overseer on each plantation had the duty of watching 
closely to see that no male slave lived with a female in a 
"permanent, intimate association [bestclndigen vertrauten Umqange]" 
without a formal registration of their union, and that no marriage 
was ended without the slaves' giving proper notice.^ The committee's 
grasp of plantation realities was clearly deficient. The committee 
consisted of persons well read on the slave trade and slavery, but 
no member of the committee had ever visited the West Indies. 
113Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
114Ibid., pp. 79-81. 
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The committee believed that once the slave trade was 
abolished, the planters would have every reason to promote slave 
marriages and would certainly do nothing to restrain regular marital 
unions among their slaves. The committee, even so, favored 
providing legal protection for slave marriages "to the extent that 
an entirely arbitrary separation of married slaves by their master 
would not be permitted." The masters at present, the report 
continued, readily accepted slave marriages, and Christian slaves 
were taught that such unions were inviolable: 
How then is this concept supposed to be reconciled with the 
fact that a Christian slave master, thinking only of his own 
gain, can separate his married slaves and sell them as he 
chooses? A law banning the separation of married couples 
seems to us, therefore, to be a natural consequence of 
permission to marry, and we are of the opinion that, with 
regard to slaves who live on the same plantation under the 
same master, slave marriages could be guaranteed unconditionally. 
The matter becomes more difficult with regard to married slaves 
living on different plantations. Nevertheless, since these 
unions too can occur only with the permission of the masters, 
it  appears to us that it would not be unfair if these married 
partners too were guaranteed against being arbitrarily 
separated by their masters, at least for so long as the 
masters, whose permission they obtained to get married, .  .  .  
remained alive and in ownership of the plantations.^ 
In cases where bankruptcies make it  difficult to keep married 
slaves together on the same plantation, the problem of avoiding the 
separation of married slaves could perhaps be overcome by granting 
the planter who purchases one of the married slaves the first chance 
to buy the slave's marital partner. "But it  would be much better if 
^5Ibid., pp. 81-82. To enact such a law, of course, would 
represent interference with the property rights of the planters, and 
its enforcement, accordingly, would be difficult. 
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it were decreed that the owner of the wife .  .  .  would always have 
to buy the male partner at his appraised value [Taxations-Preise]. 
The committee noted that the slaves, according to all 
reports, were very fond of their children and said the threat that 
they would be separated from their children probably acted as a 
deterrent to marriages. Therefore, the committee proposed that slave 
children be allowed to stay with their parents until they were at 
least six years old and, local conditions permitting, the age limit 
could perhaps be raised. 
The harshness involved in removing a very young [unerzoqenes] 
child from the care of his parents is so striking that it would 
be difficult for anyone to deny the justice of a law which at 
least guaranteed the slaves the possession of their children 
to a certain age.117 
With regard to the feeding and clothing of slaves, the 
committee believed no laws to help the slaves were feasible. "We 
believe these matters must be counted among those for which, 
because of the difficulties of control, legal regulations are 
virtually impossible.The committee thus admitted that so long 
^6Ibid., p. 83. Evidence of just how common it  was for 
married slaves to live on separate plantations is provided by the 
lists of married slaves attending the Moravian missions at 
Friedensthal and Fridensburg on St. Croix. See Appendix IX. 
That slaves frequently traveled from one plantation to another at 
night is attested to by Governor-General Walterstorff in a report of 
September 21, 1792, pp. 7-8: "Such night visits [Natte Bes0q] are 
the slaves' greatest desire . . . .  The planter who tried to keep 
his slaves (if it were possible, which it  is not) from visiting their 
wives and husbands at night would make himself more hated than the 
worst tyrant." 
^Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, pp. 83-84. 
^Ibid., p. 85. 
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as the planters exercised unrestricted property rights over their 
slaves, amelioration would depend on the cooperation of the slave­
holders. In view of this, it seems peculiar that the committee 
believed that the Crown could compel the planters to allow teachers 
to go onto the plantations to listen to the slaves' grievances and 
serve as mediators between the slaves and the planters, and that it  
felt laws against the separate sale of married slaves and the 
separation of young children from their parents could be enforced. 
In its deliberations, the committee said, it  had been 
necessary to assume that the slaves were totally subjected to their 
masters, "but we have at the same time pointed out that we have not 
excluded the possibility of a future change in a situation which 
deserves more detailed discussion." The committee then asked the 
Crown to confine the activities of another committee, which had been 
given the task of preparing a slave code for the Danish islands, 
to criminal law only and "to leave to us all matters relating to the 
s t a t e  [ V e r f a s s u n g ]  o f  t h e  s l a v e s  a n d  t h e  f r e e  c o l o r e d . E v i d e n t l y  
the committee feared that if a stringent slave code were drawn up, 
opportunities for improving the slaves' treatment and preparing them 
for eventual emancipation would be restricted. In fact no slave code 
was ever finished. 
The committee next considered the ways in which the slave 
trade was connected with the cultivation of the West Indies in an 
119Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
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effort to determine the benefits the planters derived from the 
importation of slaves and whether such benefits were so important 
that heavy losses to the planters would result from abolition of 
the slave trade. After calculating the cost of buying slaves and 
the returns that could be expected from such investments, the 
committee argued that "the benefit the planters derive from newly 
purchased slaves is very slight or perhaps nonexistent."^ 
It would be much more advantageous for the planters, the 
committee said, if the slave population on the plantations could 
be maintained by natural means. The cost of providing for slave 
children in their earliest years was small; and as the children 
grew older„ they could be used for a variety of tasks, such as 
gathering hay by the time they were six, so that the planter got 
some material benefit from feeding and clothing them. Though 
the committee said it was impossible to discover precisely how 
much it  cost to raise a slave on a plantation, "We feel certain that 
such a slave will be .  .  .  considerably cheaper than one purchased 
by means of the slave trade.As the price of new slaves continued 
to increase, it  would become ever more important for the planters 
to obtain much of their labor force from births on the plantation 
itself. 
The committee then began to summarize its argument in favor 
120Ibid., pp. 88-91 
121  Ibid.a  pp. 92-93. 
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of abolition. It spoke of "the injustices and cruelties which the 
slave trade directly and necessarily brings on"; the minimal 
importance of the slave trade itself as a branch of commerce; the 
possibility of using only slaves born in the islands to cultivate 
the plantations, since 1t appeared certain that the slaves were 
capable of reproducing enough to maintain their numbers; the greater 
safety which would ensue for the whites if Creole slaves populated 
the islands; the small profits derived from using imported slaves; 
and the financial benefits to the planters of using only slaves born 
on the plantations. The committee therefore recommended that the 
Crown permit the slave trade to continue for another ten years. This 
would give the planters time to prepare for abolition of the trade 
by purchasing more slaves and to carry out the measures suggested 
in the report for improving the living conditions of the slaves in 
199  
order to make the slave population self-perpetuating. 
Another reason for delaying abolition was that "the 
disturbances fGflhrungen] among the slaves in the French islands could 
make it  risky at the present time to proceed with any change concern­
ing the slaves." But the committee noted that the future abolition 
of the slave trade was not to be officially publicized among the 
slaves in the Danish islands, and the other proposed changes affecting 
the treatment of the slaves "contain nothing which in any way could 
provide a cause for them to demand more immediately."^23  
^22Ibid., pp. 93-95. 
123Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
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The committee proposed that the ten-year period of preparation 
for abolition should begin January 1, 1793, since there would be 
so little time in 1792 to begin implementing the measures it  had 
recommendedJ24  
Arguing that, for the sake of consistency, the Crown should 
not be content with abolishing the importation of slaves into the 
Danish West Indies, the committee urged that "no commerce in Negro 
slaves should be allowed to be conducted under the Danish flag." 
The committee pointed out that the Crown, in the contract signed 
with de Coninck's company, had reserved the right to reclaim 
authority over the forts in Guinea after giving a year's notice of 
its intention. Since the company had shown little enthusiasm for 
continuing the Guinea trade, it  would probably offer no objections. 
It is therefore our opinion that nothing .  .  .  stands in the 
way of forbidding the slave trade [for Danish subjects] every­
where and in so doing of setting an example, the importance of 
which we would allege as sufficient grounds [for abolition], 
if the issue did not already have so many arguments in its favor. 
It might nevertheless be worth mentioning that Your Royal 
Majesty's decision [in favor of abolition] will, beyond any 
doubt, create a strong sensation in other nations which find 
themselves in similar circumstances with regard to the slave 
trade, and perhaps will produce effects which would be glorious 
for your Royal Majesty and a blessing for entire peoples 
[ganze Vtilker]. '25  
The committee recommended postponing any decision on the 
future of Danish Guinea, saying that retention of the forts would 
depend entirely on the possibility of establishing colonies there 
124Ibid., p. 97. 
125Ibid., pp. 98-100. 
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that would produce the same products presently grown in the West 
Indies. The progress of the English colony at Sierra Leone was 
deserving of attention and might provide an indication of the 
I Of. 
feasibility of a similar Danish endeavor. ° 
The committee concluded its report by saying that its 
"most humble presentation" was now to be entrusted to the Crown for 
approval. If the main points advocated in the report were accepted, 
the committee requested that it  be allowed to send the resulting 
royal resolution immediately to the General Customs Department so 
that any changes needed could be made and the whole matter expedited .^7 
The committee's report bore a strong resemblance to 
Schimmelmann's Bedenken on the slave trade, combining humanitarian 
concern for the slaves with a pragmatic appraisal of the economics 
of abolition.^® Despite the statements in the report that the 
immorality of the slave trade alone was sufficient grounds for a 
policy of abolition, it  is evident that this was not quite the case 
so far as Schimmelmann and the committee were concerned. Their 
humanitarianism was genuine, as is evident from the language they 
used in condemning the trade as well as their thoughts on the 
desirability of emancipation (thoughts which were toned down 
126 
Ibid., p. 101. 
127Ibid., p. 102. 
^Schimmelmann's wife, in a letter to Countess Louise 
Stolberg on February 13, 1792, said of the report that "the style 
is Kirstein's, but the ideas to a great extent are Ernst's [le 
stil est de Kirstein, les idees en grand partie de Ernst]." See 
Bobe', Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, p. 133. 
130 
considerably in the shortened public version of their report later 
printed in Minerva). Yet they were not prepared to advocate 
abolition if it appeared to pose a danger to sugar production in 
the islands. Having assured themselves that there was no such 
danger, they then sought to minimize the impact of abolition on 
the colonies by recommending a ten-year period of preparation which, 
along with the loans made available to the planters, would also 
serve to weaken opposition to abolition. The report offered 
something to everyone: the Crown would win international acclaim 
for its morality; Schimmelmann and the rest of the committee similarly 
would enjoy praise from their friends in Denmark; an unprofitable 
branch of commerce would be eliminated, though it would be stimulated 
in its final years; the planters with help from the state would be 
able to expand their labor force and thereby their sugar production; 
and if abolition stirred misgivings among them, the date set for 
ending the trade was distant enough to cause them little immediate 
anxiety. Now it  remained for the Council of State to approve the 
committee's recommendations and for the General Customs Department 
to give its suggestions before the royal edict on abolition could 
be issued. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Abolition Edict 
The Council of State approved the main recommendations of 
the Committee on the Slave Trade in a royal resolution on February 24, 
1792. Charlotte Schimmelmann, for one, had known earlier of the 
Crown's acceptance of her husband's ideas J But the public knew 
nothing of the matter, as the Council of State's deliberations 
were kept secret and, furthermore, were not recorded. 
The fourteen-page resolution stated that, in accordance with 
the recommendations made by the comittee, the Crown found itself 
"compelled to abolish entirely the slave trade on the coast of 
Africa and in all other regions where the same might be conducted." 
The slave trade would, however, be allowed to continue until 
January 1, 1803, after which "no Negro slave may be purchased by our 
subjects, transported in Danish ships, or imported into our islands 
2 
in the West Indies and offered for sale there." 
The resolution said that in order to avoid harming the 
^Bobe", Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, 133. 
2DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, Om 
Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Royal Resolution, February 24, 1792, p. 1. 
Page 1 of the resolution is reprinted as Appendix X. 
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economic well-being of persons dependent on the slave trade, the 
decision in favor of abolition should be made public immediately 
to allow everyone adequate time to prepare for its impact. The 
resolution approved the committee's proposal that planters who 
wished to purchase additional slaves in the years prior to the date 
set for abolition be granted government-guaranteed loans, provided 
they gave sufficient security, submitted to government ordinances 
to enforce improved treatment of slaves, and attempted to maintain 
or increase the size of the slave population on their plantations 
by reproduction alone. The plan for the loans should be drawn up 
in the West Indies by a committee consisting of the governor-general, 
the government, and the citizens in accordance with general guidelines 
set by the Committee on the Slave Trade. Final approval of the loan 
proposals would be given by the Council of State, and interest rates 
should range from four-and-a-half to five per cent. The Commission 
for the Liquidation of the West Indian Debt would be in charge of 
•5 
administering the loans. 
The Crown clearly considered an increase in the size of 
the island's labor force a crucial prelude to successful abolition 
of the slave trade. To make the acquisition of new slaves as easy 
as possible prior to 1803, the resolution said the slave trade to 
the Danish West Indies would henceforth be open to ships from all 
countries, with foreign vessels allowed to exchange slaves for sugar 
3Ibid., pp. 2-6. 
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and sell the sugar anywhere they wished, after paying the usual 
customs duty. As a means of encouraging the long-range growth of 
the field-labor force, the Crown adopted the committee's belief 
that the percentage of female slaves should be increased and said 
that, beginning in 1795, the head tax on female slaves used in 
field labor would be abolished and the tax on male slaves would be 
increased enough to avoid any loss of revenue. The Crown said that 
the head tax should be increased on those house slaves in any home 
whose numbers exceed a certain necessary minimum, indicating its 
acceptance of the committee's argument that house slaves were often 
unproductive status symbols and, because they were more likely to 
be single, failed to have as many offspring as did field slaves.^ 
The resolution also supported the committee's view that 
slave marriages had to be encouraged and said a ceremony should be 
held at each marriage, whether the slaves involved were Christian or 
heathen; slave marriages were to be dissolved when one of the partners 
demanded a divorce, but there was to be a ceremony marking the 
solemnity of the parting. The Crown then took a step which, if carried 
through, would have placed important restrictions over the slave­
holders' power to dispose of their slaves as they chose: it  said 
planters could not separate married slave couples, nor could they 
take a slave child under six years old from its mother against her will. 
All slave children under six were to be taught Christianity and 
^Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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baptized, though no child would be baptized without the permission 
of its mother.5  
With regard to the teachers whom the committee wanted to 
have sent onto the plantations to teach Christianity to the slaves 
and serve as mediators between the slaves and their masters, the 
Crown said that the teachers should also keep records of slave births, 
deaths, marriages, and divorces, as well as informing the overseer 
or planter about instances of adultery and fornication among the 
slaves. The teachers should also warn the masters when slave children 
were not being properly instructed. The Crown agreed with the 
committee that Moravian missionaries were best suited to serve as 
the slaves' instructors in religion, with tb®~g£)vernment covering 
the costs incurred by the missionaries.6  
The Council of State concluded the resolution by stating 
that no slaves in the Danish islands were to be sold to foreign 
colonies, and deportation of slaves guilty of criminal offenses was 
to occur only with the permission of the governor-general. The 
General Customs Department was instructed to study the resolution 
and present its own report on the contents of the resolution and 
on arrangements needed to comply with the orders of the Council of 
State. A decision on the future of the Danish forts and factories 
on the Guinea coast was postponed.' '  
^Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
6Ibid., pp. 11-13. 
^Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
135 
The committee asked the General Customs Department to 
study the royal resolution and suggest adjustments which could be 
embodied in the edict proclaiming an end to the Danish slave trade. 
The committee wanted a prompt response from the department so that 
the edict could be published as soon as possible and sent to the 
O 
West Indies "with the first ship sailing there from Copenhagen.' 
The General Customs Department sent its thirty-two page 
Forestillinq on the resolution to the Council of State on March 13. 
The department decided that matters such as slave marriages, 
education, and the loans for purchase of new slaves from Africa did 
not come under its jurisdiction, and concentrated its remarks on 
the proposals for opening the slave trade to ships of all nations, 
outlawing the exportation of slaves from the islands, and changing 
the head tax to try to increase the number of female slaves and 
thereby help bring about a higher birth rate. The department 
insisted that it  had long sought to ameliorate slave treatment in 
the Danish West Indies and to supply the islands with the number 
of slaves needed for maximum production. It added that the slaves 
could never be properly educated so long as new slaves from Africa 
were needed and available; and encouragement of slave marriages and 
milder treatment of female slaves was unlikely to become widespread 
®DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til Negerhandelens bedre 
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from Committee on the Slave 
Trade to General Customs Department, February 29, 1792. 
136 
because of the very existence of the Atlantic slave trade. Also, 
the best interests of the Guinea Trade often failed to coincide with 
those of the Danish West Indies, the result being a significant 
reduction in the advantages Denmark obtained from its Caribbean 
colonies. Therefore, in order'to overcome the difficulties, avoid 
financial losses for Crown and colonies, and improve the treatment 
of the slaves," the department said it was convinced that the 
decision to abolish the slave trade was wise.® 
Also, in another regard, and even if the cruelty connected 
with this trade were lost sight of, the abolition of this 
trade would still be advisable. For .  .  .  the ferment which now 
exists among the blacks in the West Indies might spread to the 
Danish colonies, which islands have not always been secure and 
free from slave revolts [Neger Opstande]. And the seeds of revolt 
will, if the slave trade continues, always be brought in from 
Guinea, as the slaves, abducted in a violent and cruel manner, 
will, no matter how well they are treated in the West Indies, 
continue to miss their homeland, their friends, their freedom 
and their previous effortless existence. 
But from those slaves who are born in the islands, raised 
there, accustomed from childhood to the labor expected of them, 
and acquainted with no other persons than those with whom they 
are raised, there is little to fear. 
From this point of view, the nation which first abolishes the slave 
trade is the nation which will act most wiselyJ0  
The department agreed with the committee's conclusions in the 
latter's report of December 28, 1791, that the slave population of 
q 
DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, 
General to!dkamrets Allerunderdanigst Forestilling concerning 
abolition of the slave trade, March 13, 1792, pp. 1-6. 
^Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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the islands could become self-sustaining once the needed reforms in 
slave treatment were made, the proper ratio of female to male slaves 
established, and the planters, knowing they could no longer buy new 
slaves from Africa, found it to their own advantage to "promote 
marriages and provide for the preservation and care of the newborn." 
The department added, in a passage suggesting little in the way of 
humanitarian concern for the slaves, that with better care and food 
the slave population would surely increase, for this was the case 
with "domestic animals everywhere [Husd.yrene overalt]."^ 
The department noted that all of its members (three of whom--
Scheel, head of the department, and Trant and Tender Lund— were 
members of the committee on the Slave Trade) except Justitsraad 
Hansteen agreed that the slave trade could be abolished as proposed 
without harming Denmark and the Danish West Indies. Hansteen, in a 
separate Forestilling, conceded that "the idea of abolition .  .  .  
is for every right-thinking person magnificent and excellent." But 
he did not think it could be carried out in the time allowed. The 
risk posed by epidemics of smallpox and other diseases was too great. 
Also, most planters were already deeply in debt, their property 
mortgaged, their yearly income dependent on a climate in which 
droughts were frequent. Wealthy planters such as Schimmelmann, whose 
plantations had enough slaves already, could manage despite abolition 
of the slave trade. But poorer planters would be ruined, Hansteen 
argued. These planters would seek to escape their creditors by 
^Ibid., p. 8. 
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fleeing the Danish islands at night, taking their slaves with them, 
and leaving the colonies with a serious labor shortage. He also 
warned that the slaves might become dangerously restless if they 
learned that the laws hitherto enforced by the government were no 
longer supported by, "in the language of the slaves, the so-called 
European King." Hansteen therefore urged (1) that publication of 
the abolition edict be delayed, (2) that changes directly affecting 
the slaves be announced in the islands by the governor-general and 
the colonial government so that the slaves could more easily be 
kept obedient to local authorities and respectful of the latter's 
authority, (3) that the planters be exhorted to grant their slaves 
better treatment, for without the planters' voluntary cooperation 
little could be accomplished, and (4) that planters who undertook 
reforms as urged by the Crown through the colonial government be 
rewarded by the Crown J 2 
The department countered Hansteen's views by expressing doubt 
about the extent of the threat of epidemic diseases, especially 
smallpox as a killer of children, for "The intelligent slave master 
will look after his slave children by having them inoculated." 
And the potential losses to epidemics had been included in projections 
made of the probable growth of the slave population under improved 
^DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, 
Justitsraads Hansteen's Forestilling concerning abolition of the slave 
trade, March 14, 1792, pp. 1-6. 
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circumstances. Hansteen's fears that the planters faced financial 
ruin were without basis, for new slaves could be purchased during 
the next ten years by means of the proposed program of state-guaranteed 
loans. Without the loans, the department believed, abolition would 
fail, for the required number of new slaves could never be purchased 
by the planters if the latter had to rely entirely on their own 
resources; and without the loans, the planters might not be inclined 
to cooperate with the government and accept abolition. Concerning 
Hansteen's fear that the authority of the West Indian regime would be 
dangerously diminished in the eyes of the slaves if it appeared the 
royal government in Copenhagen reached decisions without consulting 
with local authorities, the department said the slaves knew nothing 
about how or by whom decisions affecting them were reached, and would 
hardly trouble themselves about the matter even if they did know.^ 
In order to encourage the sale of female slaves in the Danish 
islands, the department recommended that an equal amount of sugar 
be made available for export in return for both male and female 
slaves, setting the amount at 2,000 pounds for healthy adults, 1,000 
15 
pounds for adolescents, and nothing for children. The West Indian 
government in 1787 had urged, in an effort to open the slave trade 
to ships of all nations and increase the supply and lower the price 
136eneralto1dkamrets Forestilling concerning abolition of 
the slave trade, pp. 11-12. 
^4Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
15Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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of slaves in the Danish islands, that 2,000 pounds be set as the 
amount of sugar that could be exchanged for an adult male slave, 
with only 1,000 allowed for a female slave, a policy which if 
followed now that the Danish government had decided to open the 
trade would encourage slave ships to deliver only male slaves 
rather than female ones to the Danish West Indies, thereby under­
mining the goal of creating an equilibrium between the sexes in the 
interests of a higher birth rateJ^ The trading of sugar to foreign 
slavers in payment for slaves would indeed remove some sugar from 
the home market, a violation of traditional policy, but this would 
be compensated for by the increase in sugar production in the islands 
that would soon result from the efforts of the growing labor force.^ 
Regarding the duty on imported slaves, which since 1764 had 
stood at four rigsdaler for an adult, two for an adolescent, and one 
for a child, the department discussed the possibility of doubling the 
duty on male slaves while removing it  from female slaves, but said 
perhaps the tax should be levied on the sugar exported in exchange 
for the slaves, "in order to avoid the unpleasantness of levying a 
tax on people." Yet each of these possibilities seemed to militate 
against the Crown's goal of encouraging slave ships to supply the 
Danish islands with as many slaves as possible prior to 1803. The 
^6DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Bemaerkninger .  .  .  angaaende Slave-
Handel en, report from government of Danish West Indies to General 
Customs Department, October 15, 1787, p. 13. 
^General to! dkamrets Forestilling, pp. 23-24. 
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department therefore recommended that all slaves be imported into 
the Danish colonies duty free or, as an alternative, that the duty 
on female slaves be abolished, with that on male slaves remaining 
unchanged or being doubled to compensate for the loss of revenue 
caused by ending the duty on female slaves J 8 
The Crown wanted to end by January 1, 1795, the head tax 
paid by planters on female field slaves, while raising the head tax 
on male slaves by an amount sufficient to avoid a loss of revenue. 
The department recommended that this increase in the head tax on 
male slaves be set at twice the current tax. The department, while 
not disagreeing with the Crown that an increase in the head tax 
on "excessive foverfl0diqe]" house slaves was needed, stressed that 
no action should be taken in that regard until the colonial govern­
ment had been given a chance to study the situation and recommend 
how many house slaves were needed by a white family, how many of 
them were actually artisans who should perhaps not be considered as 
house slaves, and how much in extra taxes a family should pay for 
keeping excessive numbers of house slaves.^ The Crown approved all 
of the department's recommendations for inclusion in the abolition 
edict, except that no import duty would be levied on female slaves, 
while the export duty on sugar exchanged for slaves would be 
increased by one-half per cent to replace revenue lost by revoking 
18Ibid., pp. 24-28. 
19Ibid., pp. 29-31. 
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the duty on female slaves.20  
The edict announcing abolition was issued on March 16 
and stated that the Crown, after having all aspects of the slave 
trade studied carefully, had concluded that it  would be "beneficial 
and profitable" [velqi^rende og qavnligt] if the need to import 
slaves from Africa could be suspended and cultivation of the islands 
left to "workers who, born and raised on the islands, were from an 
early age accustomed to the work, the local environment [Himmelegnen], 
and the people under whom they are to labor." The report of the 
Committee on the Slave Trade had clearly shown "that is is possible 
to end the slave trade and that it would be of advantage to our West 
Indian islands to do without the purchase of new slaves, once the 
plantations have been supplied with enough slaves to maintain the 
population by reproduction alone.To help attain the goal of a 
self-sustaining slave population, the Crown would provide assistance 
for plantation owners who needed to purchase more slaves, and slave 
marriages, education and improved moral conduct were to be encouraged. 
No mention was made of the suffering caused by the slave trade; indeed^ 
abolition was depicted as a favor which the Crown was performing for 
the colonies, as the edict stated that immediate publication of the 
Crown's plans concerning the slave trade was necessary "in order to 
20DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Vestindisk Journal, No. 80, 1792, p. 1. 
21 
DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, Om 
Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Forordning om Negerhandelen, March 16, 
1792, p. 1. See Appendix XI. 
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free our West Indian possessions from their dependence on the slave 
trade and eventually to make the slave trade unnecessary."^ 
The remainder of the edict consisted of six provisions 
dealing with different aspects of the slave trade. The first 
announced that abolition would take effect January 1, 1803. Danish 
subjects thenceforth could not participate in any aspect of the 
slave trade on the coast of Africa or anywhere else outside the 
Danish West Indies, but trade in slaves in the Danish islands them­
selves would be permitted. Prior to the end of 1802, the slave trade 
to the Danish islands was tobe open to ships of all nations, in 
order to encourage competition, lower prices, and defuse long-standing 
objections by planters that they could not purchase enough healthy 
slaves from Danish slavers. Another measure designed to increase the 
sale of slaves in the Danish islands was the permission given to 
foreign slavers to take raw sugar out of the islands for sale in 
foreign countries—2,000 pounds of sugar for an adult slave, 1,000 
for an adolescent, but nothing for a child. The import duty on female 
slaves was to be remitted, the loss in revenue to be made up by a .5 
per cent increase in the duty on sugar exported to foreign countries 
in exchange for slaves. The head tax on female field slaves was to 
end on January 1, 1795, but the tax on male slaves was to be doubled. 
The head tax would remain in effect for female house slaves. Export 
of slaves from the islands was banned; and only in cases where the 
2^Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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government believed i t  absolutely necessary could slaves convicted 
oo 
of crimes be deported. 
The response in Denmark to the abolition edict was muted, 
for the public had been kept ignorant of the government's deliberations 
on the slave trade, probably in part from fear of an adverse response 
to the possibility of abolition from those who might feel their 
interests threatened. Doubts were expressed to Schimmelmann by one 
of his secretaries, who wrote, in an apparent reference to the plan 
for abolition, that i t  would surely receive widespread acclaim, and 
was an "honor for mankind and for the Schimmelmann name [Ehre ftlr die 
Menscheit und f(lr den Schimmelmannschen Nahmen]." Yet i t  was a 
delicate undertaking which could "be accompanied by very grievous 
consequences [mit sehr betrubte Folgen begleitet werden], not only 
for the Count's own property but also for the entire island."24 
Such fears, as well as untimely rumors circulating in Denmark or, 
worse, the islands, could only cause problems. There was considerable 
confusion among those Danes who took note of the abolition decree, 
and many apparently thought all trade in slaves, including that within 
2 3Ibid.,  pp. 2-3. 
2 4DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
hereafter abbreviated VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende kommissionen t il  
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, fragment of a letter, 
undated, in the margin of which is written "Schmidt von Ldbeck, 
Privatsekretaer hos Grev E. Schimmelmann, Udkast t i l  Forordningen 
om Negerhandelens Ophaevelse, Fragment fra Lindenborg." Lindenborg 
was one of Schimmelmann's estates. 
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the Danish West Indies, was to be outlawed.25 Belief was widespread 
that slavery itself was to end.2^ The poet P. A. Heiberg praised 
27 
Crown Prince Frederik for freeing the peasants and the slaves. 
Three journals commented on the abolition edict,  all 
favorably. In Altona, Schirach wrote in his Politisches Journal 
that the abolition edict had brought honor to Denmark as the first 
country to end i ts slave trade.2 8  The most important journal in 
Denmark was the pro-reform monthly Minerva; i t  had been founded in 
1785 by Christen Pram and K. L. Rahbek, both prominent literary 
figures enjoying good connections with the governing elite.2 9  
The April 1792 issue of Minerva contained a slightly 
abbreviated Danish translation of the original report of the committee 
on the Slave Trade with a forward by Kirstein, Schimmelmann's private 
secretary and secretary to the committee, which provides his and 
2 5H. Lawaetz, Peter von Scholten (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 
1940), p. 137. 
2 6A.S. 0rsted, Af mit Livs og min Tids Historie (2 vols.;  
Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandling, 1852), II,  94. 
2^Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 181. 
2 8Politisches Journal, Altona, April 1792, p. 443. 
2 9Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t ,  p. 188. Rahbek was primarily 
interested in the theater, but Pram was concerned with politics and 
humanitarian reform. See Hans Peter Kyrre, Kund L.yne Rahbek, Kamma 
Rahbek og Liyet paa Bakkehuset (2nd ed.; Copenhagen: H. Hagerups 
Forlag, 1929), p. 112. Pram had written the poem inscribed on the 
monument Schimmelmann built in honor of his first wife following her 
death, and he and Rahbek were frequent visitors at Schimmelmann's 
palace. See Gustav Albeck and F. J.  Billeskov Jansen, Fra Runerne 
t il  Johannes Ewald, Vol. I  of Dansk Literatur Historie, ed. by P. H. 
Trausted (4 vols.; Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag, 1964-66), pp. 587-88. 
146 
presumably the committee's views on why the committee had favored 
abolition. Kirstein commented on the excitement which abolition had 
created in England and France and praised William Wilberforce for 
his "persistent firmness, which is nourished by his .  .  .  noble 
i n t e n t i o n s  a n d  w h i c h  s e l d o m  f a i l s  t o  a c h i e v e  i t s  p u r p o s e  . . . .  
The name of Wilberforce shall live forever in history."^® Kirstein 
mistakenly assumed that the vote in the House of Commons in favor 
of gradual abolition meant that England had decided to stop 
participating in the slave trade. He wrote that, because of the 
revolution in France and the slave revolt on St. Domingue, i t  was 
impossible to predict what would happen to abolitionism in France. 
He said i t  was a mistake to blame the St. Domingue revolt on measures 
suggested in France to help the slaves, for recent information 
indicated clearly that the revolt was the outgrowth of disputes among 
the whites and between the whites and the free gens de couleur. 
The slaves were tools used by others. Kirstein thereby dealt with 
potential arguments against helping the slaves in the Danish islands, 
implying that improving the living conditions of the slaves there 
would not lead to revolt.  Kirstein pointed out that though the 
Danish slave trade was small in comparison with that of England and 
France, i t  was important enough to Denmark to require the full 
attention of the government. The committee had concluded that the 
3 0Ernst Philip Kirstein, "Udtog af Forestillingen til  
Kongen angaaende Negerhandelens Afskaffelse," Minerva, April 1792, 
p. 43. 
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trade was so barbarous that abolition was the only possible action. 
Thus Kirstein made the immorality of the slave trade appear to be 
the prime factor motivating the committee. He ignored economic 
arguments against the slave trade which held that the trade was a 
burden to the state and could not be made profitable. Having 
decided that the slave trade should be abolished on moral grounds, 
the committee, he wrote, had then sought a way of ending the trade 
without being unfair to the planters—of "combining humaneness 
with .  .  .  fairness toward the planters." 
The result,  according to Kirstein, was a study made to 
determine wehther the slave population could become self-sustaining. 
The committee concluded that this was possible, unanimously approved 
the report,  and sent i t  to the Council of State; the latter in its 
turn unanimously endorsed the report,  resulting in the edict of 
March 16 abolishing the slave trade. The committee had assumed the 
planters would cooperate, because the slave trade would be ended in 
a way beneficial to their interests and because such a noble cause 
as abolition would surely appeal to the planters'  sense of justice, 
once they had been shown how the goal could be reached.^ 
Borgervennen, a weekly, was the third Danish journal to 
respond to the abolition edict.  Borgervennen showed interest in 
slavery prior to the abolition edict of March 16: on March 2, an 
31 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
32Ibid., p. 46. 
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editorial comment on slavery asked, "When will the time come 
when all human beings will become humane and once more t ie the bonds 
of holy brotherly love?"3 3  In the next issue, Borgervennen praised 
"our good prince" for taking an interest in abolition and for 
appointing men, "from whose ideas and competence one can expect so 
much, to investigate the condition of the slaves on the Danish 
islands in the West Indies."3 4  After publication of the abolition 
edict,  Borgervennen said the Danish government was wise to compromise 
in its approach to abolition and to allow ten years before banning 
the slave trade: "In this intervening period much can be done to 
overcome the difficulties [posed by abolition]."3 5  
Borgervennen's interest in the slave trade and slavery was 
probably stimulated by i ts co-editor, Johan Philip Rosenstand-Goiske 
(1754-1815), a former theology student who worked in the General 
Customs Department from 1781 to 1813.3 6  From 1792 to 1795 he was 
co-editor of Borgervennen; throughout his career he championed 
humanitarian reform in his many speeches and writings. In 1790 he 
wrote Fors0g t il  en Laerebog i  Religionen, which he intended for use 
3 3Borgervennen, March 2, 1792, p. 207. 
3 4Ibid.,  March 9, 1792, p. 220. 
3 5Ibid.,  April 27, 1792, p. 282. 
36 
Rosenstand-Goiske's father was a noted theologian who had 
been a professor at the University of Copenhagen and had helped 
popularize in Denmark the belief that reason and religion could never 
conflict.  See Dansk Biografisk Lexikon, VI (1892), 222 ff.  Rosenstand-
Goiske' s brother, Peder, began modern Danish drama criticism in the 
1770s. See Albeck and Billeskov, Dansk Litteratur Historie, I ,  473ff. 
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in teaching the slaves in the Danish West Indies about Christianity. 
Rosenstand-Goiske was later to play a major role in the struggle to 
get the Crown to stand by i ts decision on abolition. 
There was no public opposition in Denmark to the abolition 
edict.  The Times (London) published a report from Copenhagen dated 
March 30, which stated that the edict "does not seem to have caused 
any stir in Denmark among the West India merchants, and i t  is not 
OO 
thought i t  will cause any in the islands. '  
A letter in the papers of the Committee on the Slave Trade 
indicates that at least one former West India bureaucrat opposed 
abolition, however: he was U.W. Rtiepstorff, former Kommandant 
of St. Thomas and St. John and governor of the Danish West Indies 
during Struensee's a s c e n d a n c y . ^  R5epstroff wrote that, though 
he sympathized with the "pure intentions" of the edict,  the slave 
trade could not be ended entirely because an epidemic might at 
any time destroy a large part of the slave labor force, a view that 
would be repeated in later years when opponents of abolition made 
a powerful attempt to have the edict revoked. Rflepstorff also feared 
that the slaves would become progressively "whiter" as a result of 
"mixing with the whites" (blandninq med de Blancke), until they were 
as light-skinned as the Europeans and were no longer able to work 
^Dansk Biografisk Lexikon, VI (1892), 221-22. 
3 8The Times (London), April 19, 1792, p. 3. 
39 
David P. Henige, Colonial Governors From the Fifteenth 
Century to the Present (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1970), p. 10. 
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"in the fields in the excessive heat of the sun" without dying. 
Finally, "in order to keep 30,000 white Negroes under control .  .  .  
40 
the presence of 10,000 soldiers would be required." 
Though rather bizarre in formulation, Rdepstorff 's fears 
that abolition would lead to economic catastrophe and slave revolt 
were fundamental tenets held by most European and West Indian 
opponents of abolition; in response to such doubts that the slave 
trade could be ended, Rosenstand-Goiske wrote an article entitled 
"Letter From the Country" (Brev fra Landet) in Borqervennen in 
support of the edict.  Though no written, public criticism of the 
edict had appeared, opposition had surely been expressed orally, 
and Rosenstand-Goiske was probably aware of Rdepstorff 's letter 
as well as Hansteen's Forestillinq of March 14. Rosenstand-Goiske 
wrote that critics of the abolition edict were using the same 
arguments that had been advanced against the agrarian reforms a few 
years earlier; he predicted that, just as the agrarian reforms had 
been followed by several years of excellent harvests, abolition of 
the slave trade would lead to bountiful harvests in the West Indies 
as a sign that "enforcement of humanitarianism and the ennobling of 
man are blessed."^ But in addition to his conviction that a noble 
act was certain to be rewarded, Rosenstand-Goiske believed there 
^DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l  Negerhandelens bedre 
Indretning og Ophaevelse, unaddressed letter from U.W. Rtiepstorff, 
March 25, 1792. 
^Johan Philip Rosenstand-Goiske, "Brev fra Landet, 
Borqervennen, June 15, 1792, pp. 331-34. 
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were other, more concrete, reasons for assuming that abolition 
would prove beneficial to all.  He asked: 
Can anything be more unnatural, both politically and economically, 
than to fetch workers, at great cost, from other parts of the 
world, in order to cultivate the soil? Can this arrangement 
continue to exist in the face of enlightenment [kan denne 
Indretning bestaae med Oplysninq]? Isn't  i t  more natural for 
the islands to produce their own workers? .  .  .  Is i t  not more 
reasonable for plantations to be operated in Africa by African 
natives, instead of having Africans work in chains in such ^ 
far-away places [as America] for the benefit of a few persons? 
As for the contention that the West Indian planters would be 
ruined and cultivation of sugar would cease in the event of abolition, 
Rosenstand-Goiske answered that the report of the Committee on the 
Slave Trade had provided ample evidence that the islands' economy 
would not suffer. He added that English debates on abolition had 
shown that the planters could prosper without constantly buying new 
slaves; consequently, there should be no doubt as to the ability 
of planters in the Danish West Indies to do the same. His own 
optimistic calculations, which he admitted were not based on hard 
evidence, were used to show, at least to his own satisfaction, that 
the slave population would more than reproduce itself once the 
imbalance between the sexes was ended and slave labor conditions 
improved.4 3  
As expected, the Danish edict attracted attention abroad, 
especially in England, where Wilberforce's campaign for abolition was 
being waged in the House of Commons. English abolitionists favored 
4 2Ibid.,  p. 335. 
43 
Ibid.,  pp. 335-37. 
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immediate abolition; however, the Danish edict posed a problem for 
them, as i t  suggested the best approach to the slave trade was to 
avoid immediate abolition in favor of a less disruptive, long-range 
44 
approach. The Danish ambassador in London kept Copenhagen informed 
of the progress of Wilberforce's abolition bill  in the spring of 
1792 and provided some information on how the Danish edict was 
received in England. He noted on March 27 that he was pleased to 
learn of the Danish edict,  "dictee par des principes d'  humani te. 
The edict was praised for being fair to all interests and for 
displaying "the circumspection necessary in order to prevent false 
interpretations resulting from either ignorance or bad intentions. ° 
Further insight into how the Danish edict was viewed in England is 
provided by Fredrik Sneedorff, a prominent Danish historian who was 
in London in the spring of 1792 as part of a lengthy tour of western 
Europe.47 Sneedorff expressed his joy at learning of the Danish 
government's plans to abolish the slave trade and added that he was 
proud "that my fatherland has given Europe an example in this important 
m a t t e r ."^8 Sneedorff wrote in a letter dated May 4, 1792, that the 
4^Sir Reqinald Coupland, Wilberforce (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1923), pp. 160-61. 
45 
DSA, Departement for udenrigske Anliggender, 1771-1848. 
England II.  Depecher 1792-93, No. 24, London, March 27, 1792, p. 1. 
4 6Ibid.,  No. 28, April 20, 1792, p. 1. 
^Dansk Biografisk Lexikon, XVI (1902), 135-37. 
^Frederik Sneedorffs Samlede Skrifter (Copenhagen: 
Gyldendalske Forlag, 1794), pp. 468-69. 
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Morning Post had published an abridged version of the Danish 
abolition decree on April 19 and had apparently misunderstood its 
provisions: 
The entire decree was twisted so badly that i t  was clear 
that a member of Wilberforce's group, which adovcates immediate 
abolition, had intentionally had i t  published in mutilated 
form. I gave my copy of the decree to Mr. Wolf, our Danish 
consul, and he promised to translate i t  and have i t  printed; 
but when I returned to see him the next day, the entire decree 
had already been translated word for word in the April 21 
issue of the Times.4 9  
Sneedorff suggested that Henry Dundas, whose amendment 
inserting the word "gradually" into Wilberforce's motion for abolition 
had been approved by the House of Commons on April 3, or someone else 
supporting gradual abolition might have been responsible.5 0  The Times 
i tself supported gradual abolition, describing immediate abolition 
as a way "to injure ourselves by precipitate annihilation."5^ Later, 
above the translation of the decree in the April 21 issue, the Times 
criticized the English abolitionists for misleading the public about 
the Danish decree, saying they had wrongly referred to i t  as "an 
Edict for the immediate abolition of the slave trade . . . .  How 
far they are warranted in putting such a construction on this Edict, 
we leave our Readers to judge, by laying before them a genuine 
4 9Ibid.,  pp. 490-91. This translation is the one used in 
Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave 
Trade to America, Vol. II,  The Eighteenth Century (4 vols.;  Washing-
ton, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1931), pp. 616-17. 
5 0Frederik Sneedorffs Samlede Skrifter, p. 491. 
5Vhe Times (London), April 12, 1792, p. 2. 
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Translation .  .  .  [in order to expose] their nefarious arts."5 2  
So, just as the Danes were careful observers of abolitionism in 
England, the English made use of the Danish decree in their own 
domestic debates. 
It  is possible that the Danish approach to the issue of 
abolition influenced Dundas' decision to favor "gradual" abolition. 
He certainly must have known of the ten-year delay in implementing 
abolition, which was the centerpiece of the Danish edict,  prior to 
the April 2 debate in the Commons, during which he successfully 
inserted the word "gradually" into Wi1berforce1s bill .  And the Danish 
ambassador noted in his report of April 20: "The considerations 
embodied in the Danish edict have already been strongly recommended 
by distinguished members of the English government [ont deja ete 
fortement recommande par des membres Distingues du governement 
Anglais]," and he added that he had every reason to believe the 
Danish edict would influence "future English deliberations on the 
subject. 
For the Danish government the problem was gaining acceptance 
for the edict in the Danish West Indies. The cooperation of both the 
colonial government and the planters was crucial.  On March 24, 1792, 
5 2Ibid.,  April 21, 1792, p. 3. In particular the Times 
admonished the abolitionists for having "artfully misrepresented" the 
third provision of the edict as requiring "a duty of 2000 lb. of 
sugar upon every slave imported" and added that the Danish government 
"has undertaken to lend money at 4 per cent to the Planters of 
St. Croix to enable them to purchase slaves." 
^Departement for udenrigske Anliggender, England, Depecher 
1792-93, No. 28, April 20, 1792, p. 2. 
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the General Customs Department sent a letter and 100 copies of 
the abolition edict to the government of the West Indies; the copies 
of the edict were to be distributed throughout the islands, but only 
after the planters, organized in their burger councils, had been 
told about the edict and of "his majesty's well-meaning intentions."5^ 
The letter contained an explanation of the Danish government's 
decision in favor of abolition and requested data on the islands' 
slave population so that planning for the reforms mentioned in the 
royal resolution of February 24 could proceed. The General Customs 
Department told the colonial government that the abolition edict 
expressed the same humanitarian spirit  as the colonial government's 
letter of October 15, 1787, to the department. (See pp. 55-56 above.) 
The department instructed the government to post signs throughout 
the islands to inform everyone that i t  was permissible for ships of 
all nations to sell slaves in the Danish islands in exchange for the 
amounts of sugar stipulated in the abolition edict.  But the letter 
was careful to note: 
The edict permits the importation of male and female slaves from 
the African coast only. In accordance with this i t  ought to be 
clear that no slaves or people of color [Folk af kouleur] 
can be brought into the Danish islands who have already spent a 
long time on other islands in the West Indies, and this is 
especially true regarding slaves from those islands where the 
slaves are in revolt,  because importing them could cause unrest 
[Uroeligheder] and tumult among the slaves in the Danish islands. 
5 4DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 0m 
Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from General Customs Department 
to government of Danish West Indies, March 24, 1792, p. 1. 
55Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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Concerning loans and financial aid for planters needing 
more slaves, the department said that the necessary arrangements 
would be made. It  pointed out that loans were available primarily 
for the purchase of field slaves; house slaves, when not also 
capable of serving as skilled artisans, were not important. To 
encourage a reduction in the number of house slaves, i t  had been 
decided that the head tax on house slaves would be increased in 
instances where a clearly excessive number of such slaves was 
maintained. Accordingly, the department asked the colonial govern­
ment to present a report detailing how many house slaves of each 
sex were needed by a family in the countryside and in the towns, and 
recommending how large the tax increase should be. Also, the 
department wanted to know whether house slaves who were also 
artisans ought to be exempted from this tax increase in cases where 
their ranks exceeded the number of house slaves deemed necessary for 
a rural or urban residence.56 
Concerning slave marriages and education, the department 
sent a letter to the Danish Chancery, which was in charge of the 
department, informing i t  of the measures being taken to fulfill  the 
reforms stipulated in the royal resolution of February 24. The 
department emphasized the importance of improving the morality of 
the slaves in order to give their marriages greater stability and 
security and to better the upbringing and education of their children. 
Slave marriages, whether the slaves involved were Christian or heathen, 
56lbid., pp. 3-4. 
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were to be entered into by means of "certain .  .  .  prescribed 
formalities," after which the couple was to be considered married. 
Such marriages were not to be disbanded except on demand of one or 
both of the partners; married couples were not to be separted 
against their will under any circumstances. Nor were children to 
be separated from their parents before the age of six; all slave 
children were to be educated and raised in the Christian religion, 
and to that end all slaves were to be gathered into Christian 
congregations, each of which would be under the direction of a 
specially appointed Christian teacher. Moravian missionaries, 
because of their successful experience, should be used in these 
positions.^ 
That the department was not solely motivated by a desire 
to help the slaves is shown by i ts comment on the close relationship 
between the reforms i t  wanted implemented and the economic well-being 
of both the islands and Denmark i tself.  In order to bring the 
colonies to full prosperity and obtain for the Crown's subjects in 
Europe the maximum benefit of owning colonies, the common welfare 
of both the Mother country and the colonies had to be considered. 
It  was essential to the welfare of all that the planters be supplied 
with enough slaves "who have attained, for their condition, a 
suitable degree of morality." 
They [the slaves] must be able to maintain and increase their 
numbers in the islands by procreation alone [De maae kunne ved 
57 
DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, Om 
Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from General Customs Department 
to Danish Chancery, May 22, 1792, pp. 1-2. 
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den naturlige Forp'lantelse underholde og forme re deres Maengde 
paa 0erneT~This they have hitherto been unable to accomplish. 
But with proper and steady marriages, with education in religion 
and the morality acquired therefrom, with more lenient treatment 
[mere skaansomme Omqanq] by their masters, i t  is thought that 
the number of working slaves in the islands can be maintained 
and possibly increased . . . .  In that way the full prosperity 
of the islands will be attained .  .  .  and the Crown's goal 
[Hensigt] will be promoted, namely that the slave trade to the 
Danish West Indies shall cease entirely after a short while.5° 
The department noted that i t  had requested that the West 
Indian government supply information on the number of Christian 
married couples among the slave population as well as on the number 
of heathen couples living together and the number of children under 
eight. Suggestions as to how many congregations the islands should 
be divided into and how many teachers would be required had also been 
sought from the colonial government. Since both the schools for 
the slaves and the protection needed for slave marriages were dependent 
on the cooperation of the colonists and closely bound up with the 
economy of the islands, i t  would be best to adopt a plan that was 
"adapted to local conditions [indrettet efter den lokale Forfatning] 
and suited to the special circumstances [of the islands]." In 
adopting this approach the department was in effect abandoning hopes 
for implementing the reforms, for "local conditions" would not permit 
an outside power, the state, to interfere with the relationship 
between master and slave. The department suggested that the 1,800 
rigsdaler vestindisk courant which the Crown had used to support 
Luthern missionary activity in the islands could help cover the cost 
^Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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of establishing the congregations and schools for the slaves.5^ 
After carefully deliberating on the various problems posed 
by abolition, the Danish government had made i ts decision, coupling 
abolition ten years hence with a wide-open slave trade and loans to 
planters to buy slaves in the meantime; i t  had also urged that 
reforms be made immediately with the dual purpose of alleviating 
the harsh lot of the slaves and of enabling the latter to reproduce 
in sufficient quantity so that, once abolition took effect, no 
more slaves from outside would be needed. The question now was: 
How would the planters respond? 
e g  
^ Ibid.,  pp. 4-5. Rigsdaler vestindisk courant was a currency 
valued at twenty per cent less than dansk courant, which was used in 
Denmark. 
CHAPTER V 
The Colonial Response to the Abolition Edict, 1792-96 
The West Indian government moved cautiously after receiving 
on May 24 the General Customs Department's pro-memoria of March 24 
and 100 copies of the abolition edict.  The St. Croix Burger Council 
was given eight copies of the edict on July 4, at which time the 
colonial government informed the planters'  representatives of the 
financial support the Crown had pledged to aid the planters in 
purchasing more slaves "in order to guarantee that the island was 
cultivated sufficiently." Accordingly, the government asked the 
Burger Council to conduct a survey of the planters on the island to 
determine "how many slaves of each sex i t  was thought St. Croix 
might need."1  
The planters, had they not been offered the prospect of 
loans guaranteed by the Crown, might have resisted abolition; yet the 
abolition edict,  with i ts provision for a ten-year grace period 
before suspension of the slave trade, reduced any apprehensions the 
planters might have felt,  for ten years was a long time, especially 
^DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1793, No. 139. Letter from 
government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department, 
December 31, 1792, p. 1. 
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in the West Indies, where planters commonly sought quick profits 
and dreamed of a triumphant return to their European homeland, with 
their future financial status secure.^ Once the planters had been 
told of the Crown's decision, the edict was made public, appearing 
in St. Thomas Tidende on August 18 in the Danish original and an 
English translation.-^ 
The loan to the planters was a cornerstone of the abolition 
plan, serving both to overcome the planters opposition and to 
encourage a rapid increase in the slave population prior to 1803. 
Governor Walterstorff wrote the Committee on the Slave Trade that 
he hoped abolition would succeed, for "who could be so insensitive 
that he did not want to give a willing hand to clear away those 
difficulties which could halt or oppose that most noble of all goals--
to promote the welfare of an oppressed people [at befordre et 
undertr.ykket Slaegts Vel]?" The Committee on the Slave Trade, which 
had been given the task of overseeing arrangements for the loan to 
the planters by the royal resolution of February 24, 1792, finished 
a preliminary proposal for administering the loans on March 19 and 
sent i t  to the West Indian government. The Committee wanted the 
loans to be used only for buying slaves to work land already under 
cultivation, and i t  requested an estimate of how many more slaves 
p 
Hans West complained bitterly of the tendency of St. Croix 
planters to leave the island and return to England as soon as they 
had made what they considered was enough money. See his Plan t il  
ved et enkelt ForsiSg at befordre Mark-Negernes Oplysning og Formildelse 
i  Kaar m. v. paa Eilandet St. Croix, p. 2. 
3 
St. Thomas Tidende, August 18, 1792, p. 1. 
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would be needed to attain maximum production and to maintain the 
size of the slave labor force after 1802.4 Walterstorff, the 
governor of the Danish West Indies, responded that this provision 
was acceptable if he understood the committee's meaning correctly--
that no plantations established in the future were to be permitted 
access to the loan fund, but those plantations presently in existence 
and suffering a labor shortage would be able to expand production by 
using the loans to acquire new slaves.^ 
The committee wanted agreements reached with the planters 
on how many additional slaves were to be purchased by means of 
the loan for each plantation; i t  also wanted each planter to be 
obliged to maintain a certain number of slaves on his plantation. 
The mortgage which the planters provided for the loans should cover 
the entire sum granted them.^ Walterstorff agreed that the planters 
should tell the government how many slaves they wished to purchase 
by means of the loan in the next ten years and added that i t  would 
be necessary to allow the planters to use the slaves acquired each 
year as security for the loans, something Schimmelmann had hoped to 
avoid. But after considerable repayments had been made by the 
planters, the loan committee in the islands should be.authorized to 
^DSA, VGRGT, Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung of the Committee 
on the Slave Trade concerning the proposed loans to planters for 
buying more slaves, Copenhagen, March 19, 1792, p. 1. 
5DSA, VGRGT, Response of the government of Danish West Indies 
to proposal of Committee on Slave Trade for loans to planters, 
September 21, 1792, p. 1. 
^Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, p. 1. 
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allow a certain number of slaves obtained by means of the loan to be 
written off so that their owners could use them to obtain new loans 
elsewhere. Walterstorff agreed that the planters should not receive 
loans larger than the sum they could offer as security for the loans, 
but he said nothing about the committee's proposal that each 
planter participating in the loan plan be required to maintain a 
stipulated number of slaves, for this must have seemed unrealistic 
to him, as an epidemic or a drought could at any time decimate the 
slave population on a plantation.^ 
The committee wanted the loans to be available to both less 
well-to-do planters and wealthy ones (Die Vorschusse werden nicht 
bios ganz unvermbgender sondern auch vermflgenderen zugestanden), 
so long as all applicants for the loan intended to buy slaves to 
improve production on their plantations.^ Walterstorff 's response 
was to caution against making loans to poor planters who lacked the 
wherewithal to care adequately for their slaves. 
That which more than anything else makes the slaves' 
conditions harsh and their fate so varied, is that they some­
times become the property of a poor man who can barely provide 
food for himself and is plagued by his creditors, so that he in 
turn is forced to plague his slaves with overwork and, what is 
worse, to let them go without adequate food and clothing. 
Politically as well as morally, in so far as one seeks to 
promote an increase in cultivation and to improve the 
^Response of government of Danish West Indies to proposal 
of Committee on Slave Trade for loan to planters, September 21, 1792, 
p. 1. 
^DSA, VGRGT, A1 lerunterthctnigste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, 
p. 1. 
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circumstances of the slaves, i t  seems advisable to give 
p r e f e r e n c e  t o  a s s i s t i n g  p r o s p e r o u s  a n d  w e l l - t o - d o  p l a n t e r s  . . . .  
Politically considered, i t  is not wise to encourage poor 
persons to become planters or to parcel out plantations. 
At the very least one ought to use great care in supporting 
the purchase of slaves by poor persons; one should be convinced 
not only that such a poor man's land could be improved if he 
obtained more slaves, but also that he was a man who would treat 
his slaves well and had the means to provide them with the 
necessities.9 
Walterstorff 's favoritism toward wealthy planters was 
understandable, as he had become one of them since arriving as a 
government official,  and the big planters were the group which had 
to be induced to accept the Crown's decision in favor of abolition. 
Only they, or the slaves, could cause trouble. Walterstorff 's 
statement that i t  was "politically" unwise to help poor whites buy 
slaves was probably motivated by fear of the dangerous situation that 
might arise from mistreatment of a large number of new African slaves. 
The committee suggested that the average loan for buying a 
slave should be 200 rigsdaler (oder auf einzeine Neger vielleicht 
i  dieser Proportion: 260-210-180-150). No distinction would be made 
between rich and poor planters in deciding on the sumJ^ Walterstorff, 
however, suggested that the average loans should be slightly higher 
than suggested by the committee. Arguing that the loan sum must be 
adjusted to the "quality [beskaffenhed]" of the slave in question, 
he recommended as a general guideline that 250 rigsdaler vestindisk 
Response of government of Danish West Indies to proposal of 
Committee on the Slave Trade for loan to planters, September 21, 1792, 
p. 2. 
l 0Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, p. 1. 
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courant be set as the average sum loaned for purchase of an adult 
female slave from 14 to 22 years of age; 225 rigsdaler for an adult 
male not more than 32 years old; 200 rigsdaler for an adolescent 
woman [halvvoxen Qvinde] or for older women [Koner] from 25 to 35; 
180 rigsdaler for an adolescent male from 12 to 18; and 150 rigsdaler 
for children of both sexes from 7 to 12. These sums would not cover 
the entire purchase price of slaves in the various categories, but 
planters who were unable to pay part of the price themselves should 
not be encouraged to buy slaves, for their credit was probably poor, 
and "the Crown would be exposed to a rather certain loss." 
Walterstorff added: "It is universally of greater advantage for the 
colonies and cultivation that a wealthy rather than a poor man 
increases his plantation's labor force [Overalt er det t il  stflrre 
Nytte for Landet oq Culturen at en velhavende end at en fattiq Mand 
forager sin Plantages Besaetning.]"^ 
The committee instructed the colonial government to recommend 
the most appropriate ratio of male to female slaves on the plantations 
and to try to purchase new slaves, in so far as possible, so that this 
ideal ratio would be reached, in line with the long-term goal of a 
19 
population capable of sustaining itself.  Walterstorff foresaw a 
serious problem, however, in obtaining a larger number of female slaves 
^Response of government of Danish West Indies to proposal 
of Committee on the Slave Trade for loan to planters, September 21, 
1792, p. 3. 
^Allerunterth&nigste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, p. 2. 
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than males; male slaves were more readily available on the Guinea 
Coast because of a number of factors, including their more frequent 
enslavement for crimes and debts and their being captured in war.^ 
Walterstorff suggested that the loan provided an opportunity 
to give special encouragement to planters to induce them to treat 
their slaves better: By raising the interest rate charged the 
planters for loans from four and a half to five per cent, enough 
money could be obtained to allow the colonial government to offer 
an award of 200 rigsdaler for the best sketch of a hospital and 
nursery (Barselstue), with the winning sketch to be selected by 
local government officials. Planters who modeled their hospitals 
and nurseries after the award-winner would in turn be granted 50 to 
300 rigsdaler. Furthermore, female slaves could be given two 
rigsdaler when their children were six weeks, six months, and twelve 
months old, in order to encourage slave mothers to take better care 
of their infants J4  Walterstorff believed 1 ,000 slaves would have 
to be purchased each year prior to abolition. He calculated that, 
over the ten-year period, the Crown would have to loan the planters 
1 ,305,658 rigsdaler vestindisk courant.^ This sum was later 
reduced by the colonial government to 1,302,644 rigsdaler vestindisk 
^Response of colonial government, p. 4. According to 
J.D. Fage, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Context of African 
History," Journal of African History,, X (1969), 400, only one-third 
of slaves exported were women. 
^Response of colonial government, p. 4. 




The committee insisted that slaves obtained by means of 
the loan were not in turn to be used as security for obtaining the 
loans, and, furthermore, were not to be used as security when 
borrowing from any other source. In computing the number of slaves 
on a plantation, house slaves and others not engaged in productive 
labor were to be excluded [alle.Neger die als Huusneqer oder sonst 
der Plantagen Arbeit entzogen werden, sind als Abgang zu rechnen 
.  • .) .1 7  
Though Walterstorff had suggested a need for 1,000 new slaves 
each year until 1803, the Committee on the Slave Trade wanted an 
accurate census of the slave population as well as surveys made of 
the needs of each planter in order to determine as precisely as 
possible how many more slaves were needed. The final plan for loans 
to the planters obviously was dependent upon the number of new slaves 
needed. 
Peter Lotharius Oxholm, Stadshauptmand on St. Croix, had 
arrived as a royal official in 1779 and had married into the planter 
class, acquiring two plantations J8  He did most of the work involved 
l^DSA, V6R6T, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l  
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Bemaerkninger i  
Anledning af den t il  Negerhandelens Ophaevelse nedsatte Commissions 
Grundsaetninger t i l  en Laane Plan for de vestindiske Plantere, from 
government of Danish West indies to Committee on the Slave Trade, 
St. Croix, December 29, 1792, p. 6. 
^Allerunterthflngiste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, p. 2. 
^Dansk Biografisk Leksikon, XII (1898), 507-08. 
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in gathering census data on the slave population of the islands. 
On August 1, 1792, he sent the committee a twenty-four page preliminary 
report on the slave population and the loan. He wrote that the only 
way of obtaining a reliable census of the slaves was to demand of 
each planter an accurate l ist of his slaves broken down by sex and 
age and an estimate of how many more slaves were needed of each sex. 
The l ists used for purposes of the head tax were not helpful, because 
they did not differentiate between men and women and because the 
persons who compiled most of the lists often didn't bother to mention 
the yearly change in the age of the slaves. A new census was there­
fore essential before anything definitive could be said about the 
19 
slave population. 
Oxholm argued that i t  was essential that the planters be 
allowed to use the slaves purchased with the loans as security for 
the loans, because most of the planters'  property was already 
mortgaged, and there was no alternative to using the slaves, distaste­
ful as this was to the committee. He added that the loan committee 
in the West Indies should be left free to reach agreement with each 
of the planters concerning the schedule for repaying the loan, and 
that i t  was impossible for a planter to guarantee he would maintain 
the number of slaves on his plantation—"he can only do his best."20 
^DSA, VGRGT, Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger 
ved den kongelige Commissions t i l  Negerhandelens bedre Indretning 
paa de vestindiske Ejlande og Kysten Guinea, dens Pro Memoria af 
7 April,  1792, efter ordere, August 1, 1792, p. 1. 
2 0Ibid.,  pp. 3-7. 
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Oxholm said trie planters could not be expected to maintain 
a balance between births and deaths among their slaves, though they 
might achieve such a goal in the future. In the previous ten years, 
he noted, 4,694 slaves had been born, but 8,770 had died; the excess 
of 4,076 deaths over births meant that, on the average, more than 
400 more slaves died each year than were born. Only in 1784 did 
births exceed deaths, and then merely by thirty-three. A two-per-cent 
excess of deaths over births, which seemed unavoidable "under present 
circumstances [efter nuvaerende Indretning]meant that this excess 
would amount to four or five thousand slaves during the next ten 
years. So, he argued, at least ten or twelve thousand more slaves 
had to be brought into the islands; 1,500,000 rigsdaler in loans 
21 
would, Oxholm felt,  be sufficient. 
The loans should be repaid within five to ten years, 
depending on the financial status of the buyer, because the slaves, 
whom Oxholm considered the only possible security for the loans, 
were such an "uncertain form of property [uvis Ejendom]." Only very 
special circumstances might require terms of repayment that would 
99 
exceed ten years. 
The St. Croix Burger Council agreed with Oxholm that, until 
reliable data had been collected from the planters, i t  was impossible 
to make a final decision as to how many more slaves would be needed 
^Ibid.,  pp. 7, 18, and 8. 
2 2Ibid.» p. 19. 
170 
before 1803. "However, until this information is gathered, we 
think, according to a rough calculation [en 10s Calcul], that ten 
thousand slaves .  .  .  ,  or approximately one thousand per year 
during the next ten years, would be sufficient for attaining his 
majesty's intended purpose."2^ The sum required for this would be 
300,000 rigsdaler a year. The Burger Council believed this estimate 
of the needed number of new slaves was not exaggerated because so 
many of the new slaves "will be lost,  in spite of the best care, 
before they are seasoned," and there will be "the normal population 
decrease among those already seasoned [den naturlige Afganq i  
Antallet imellem de Saisonnerede], 
The burger councils of St. Thomas and St. John were 
consulted by the royal council on St. Thomas under Commandant 
Thomas Malleville, who then sent his report to St. Croix. Each 
planter has been asked how many more slaves he needed, and the 
total was 3,471 more slaves for St. Thomas and St. John at a cost of 
about 694,200 rigsdaler. Malleville argued, as had Oxholm, that 
the newly purchased slaves themselves were the only security the 
planters could offer in return for the loans, as nearly all the 
plantations on St. Thomas and St. John were mortgaged at least once.2 5  
2 3DSA, V6RGT, Pro Memoria from St. Croix Burger Council 
to government of Danish West Indies, September 5, 1792, pp. 1-2. 
2 4Ibid.,  p. 2. 
25 
DSA, V6R6T, Erindringer ved Laan Planen, from Raadet paa 
St. Thomas to government of Danish West Indies, November 19, 1792. 
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Mailevilie feared that the price of African slaves, then averaging 
325 to 358 rigsdaler vestindisk courant, might increase dramatically 
because of the planters'  need to obtain as many slaves as possible 
prior to abolition, "cost what they w i l l ."26 
Oxholm, once the new population lists for St. Croix had 
been received from the planters, calculated that there were in the 
three Danish islands 15,403 field slaves engaged in cultivating 
sugar and 1,673 in cotton. "With these we have, though with 
difficulty, mastered the work; but both cultivation and population 
have suffered because of the labor shortage." It  would have been 
impossible "to have reached our goal, if  we had not allowed our cane 
to grow without replanting for six to seven years as a rule [have 
naaet vores Maal, var det ikke fordi vi lade vore R0r ratunne fra 6_ 
t i l  7 Aar i  Almindelighed]." But in the future the sugar plants 
would have to be replaced more often as the soil lost its fertility, 
and more fertilizing would be needed. More slaves, therefore, would 
?7 
soon be required to work the fields presently under cultivation. 
Because of the high mortality rate among new slaves (Bosaler), 
from 10,000 to 12,000 slaves would have to be imported if 8,000 
were to be added to the population by 1803. Indeed, he continued, 
i t  would be best to import 1,500 slaves a year for the first five 
2 6Ibid.,  p. 3. 
27 
DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l  
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Bemaerkninger ved 
hosftflgende Tabellen over St. Croixs Dyrkning og Besaetning, from 
P. L. Oxholm to government of Danish West Indies, St. Croix, 
December 27, 1792, p. 2. 
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years and 1,200 a year for the last five during which the slave 
trade was permitted, which would bring 13,500 new slaves to the Danish 
islands.2 8  The more thought Oxholm gave to the matter, the greater 
the number of slaves he felt were needed. 
The l ists submitted by the St. Croix planters indicated a 
need for 6,309 additional slaves.2 9  Oxholm believed this figure was 
too low, for he was certain "there were many planters who had the 
means and the will to buy slaves, but whose pride would not allow 
them to admit they needed more slaves .  .  .  ." This pride had, he 
felt,  led them to deny that their plantations suffered a labor 
shortage. Others had, perhaps because of a "somewhat stingy 
disposition," failed to indicate their real needs. Oxholm concluded: 
"One can, I believe, assume that 8,000 slaves are needed for the most 
profitable cultivation of the island [Landets fordeelagtiqste 
Dyrkelse]."3^ 
The colonial government, in turn, believed Oxholm's estimate 
of 8,000 was too low. The government said i t  found Oxholm's argument 
that the planters'  pride had led them to underestimate their need 
for slaves very convincing, and then noted that the St. Croix Burger 
2 8Ibid.,  pp. 2-7. 
29 
DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l  
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, P. L. Oxholms General 
Extract af 0en St. Croixs Bebyggelse og Besaetning af Creaturer og 
Negre, December 21, 1792, p. 3. The planters said they needed 
1,554 adult male slaves' 1,774 adult females, 1,346 boys* and 1,635 
girls. 
30Ibid., p. 2. 
173 
Council wanted 10,000 more slaves brought to the island.3^ The 
colonial government insisted that repayments on the loans should be 
ten per cent a year rather than seven-and-a-half per cent, as 
suggested by the committee. The planters should not be given too 
much time to repay the loan, for they "never pay more than they are 
32 
forced to pay, and, besides, they generally die in debt." 
The colonial government reflected the opposition of the 
planter class to the Danish slave trade company, Pingel, Meyer, and 
Praetorius, which had held a monopoly on the sale of slaves in the 
Danish islands prior to the abolition edict,  by arguing against any 
kind of contract between the company and the Crown for the delivery 
of slaves from Africa. The planters must not be bound in any way 
to purchase slaves from a particular company, for "reasonable and 
reliable [fornuftige og vederhaeftigel" planters would insist on 
seeing what they purchase and on selecting their new slaves according 
to the sex and age group most needed on their plantations. One 
clause in Pingel, Meyer, and Praetorius's contract was singled out 
as particularly odious. It  read: "That the emaciation [Maqerhed] 
or the poor appearance [of the slaves] which is a result of their 
transportation on the ship can not serve as an excuse for rejecting 
or refusing to buy a slave." This, said the colonial government, 
3^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l  
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Bemaerkninger i  
Anledning af den t il  Negerhandelens Ophaevelse nedsatte 
Commissions Grundsaetninger t i l  en Laane Plan for de vestindiske 
Plantere, from government of Danish West Indies to Committee on the 
Slave Trade, St. Croix, December 29, 1792, p. 1. 
32Ibid., p. 9. 
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demonstrated the difficulties involved for the planters in their 
relationship with the company: 
Anyone who has ever purchased or owned a slave knows that 
emaciation or poor appearance in every instance must be 
considered, not only because there is always a risk that a 
slave whose health has been severely undermined during the 
journey from Africa will never recover fully in America, 
where climate and food are different from Africa, but also 
because the buyer will have to pay for extra food [for an 
emaciated slave] and will lose several months' work from the 
slave before the latter has recovered his strength.33  
The government complained also that Pingel, Meyer, and 
Praetorius kept slaves several months on the company's ships along 
the Guinea Coast, waiting until a full cargo was on board before 
sailing to the West Indies, and thereby undermined the health of 
the slaves. Furthermore, the ships used were not properly outfitted 
for carrying slaves and the provisions on board were insufficient 
for the long voyage. The government praised English slave ships for 
supplying healthier slaves than their Danish counterparts, "especially 
since the improvements in the slave trade by the English Parliament," 
a reference to Dolben's Act.3^ Ships "have arrived in the English 
islands with 400 to 500 slaves without losing a single one during the 
33Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
3^Dolben's Act of 1788 sought to ameliorate the existence of 
slaves on board the ships by providing limitations on the number of 
slaves that could be carried per ton and paying premiums to the 
captain and ship's doctor when the mortality rate was below three 
per cent. It reduced the death rate on English slave ships by more 
than half. See Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British 




The government feared that the Crown might give special 
advantages to Pingel, Meyer, and Praetorius, putting the planters at 
a disadvantage. After all, Schimmelmann was a secret investor in 
the company, the report on abolition by the Committee on the Slave 
Trade had suggested the possibility of a contract which would help 
the company continue to sell slaves in the islands, and the 
committee had mentioned such a contract in its preliminary proposal 
on the loans for buying slaves.3® The colonial government insisted 
that any arrangement with a Danish company be accompanied by safe­
guards which would assist the Danish West Indies and would provide 
benefits to the planters there comparable to those enjoyed in the 
English islands when it  came to buying healthy slaves at fair 
37 prices. 
The Committee on the Slave Trade, having studied the reports 
sent to it from the West Indies, finished its proposal for the loan 
plan and sent it  to the Council of State on April 16, 1793. The 
committee said that the reports it  had received from the colonial 
35Bemaerkninger i Anledning af den til Negerhandelens 
Ophaevelse nedsatte Commissions Grundsaetninger til en Laane Plan 
for de vestindiske Plantere, p. 15. 
3®DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Allerunter-
th&nigste Vorstellung of Committee on the Slave Trade, in its report 
on abolition of the slave trade, December 28, 1791, p. 62; Allerunter-
thSnigste Vorstellung of Committee on Slave Trade, concerning loans 
to planters for purchase of new slaves, March 19, 1792, p. 3. 
"^Bemaerkninger i  Anledning af den til Negerhandelens 
Ophaevelse nedsatte Commissions Grundsaetninger til en Laane Plan 
for de vestindiske Plantere, pp. 16-17. 
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government, the burger councils on St. Thomas, St. John, and St. 
Croix, and from Oxholm were in agreement with the committee's 
own principles. The committee had "after further reflection found 
several of the points made in the reports to be of such quality 
that there was no alternative but to approve them."38 
The committee said its hope to avoid letting the planters 
mortgage their newly purchased slaves to the Crown as security for 
the loans had been shown to be impossible to carry out, as the 
planters' current indebtedness meant there was no alternative. The 
colonial government had convinced the committee that the yearly loan 
repayments by the planters should be ten per cent rather than the 
seven-and-one-half per cent suggested by the committee, for this 
would allow more of the loan fund to be used again for more loans. 
The sum allotted for the loans was that requested by the colonial 
government—1,302,644 rigsdaler vestindisk courant (or 1,042,116 
rigsdaler dansk courant.) The committee also agreed with the 
colonial government's proposal that the interest rate on the loans 
should be raised from four-and-a-half per cent to five per cent so 
that the extra half per cent "could be used for some useful measures 
O Q  
connected with the loan plan. 
The loan committee in the West Indies was a combination of 
OQ 
DSA, V6RGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Allerunderdanigst 
Forestilling on loans to planters by Committee on the Slave Trade, 
April 16, 1793, p. 2. 
39Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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all the members of the government and the Stadshauptmand on St. 
Croix and of the royal council and the Stadshauptmand for St. Thomas 
and St. John. The loan committee was to determine the number of 
slaves purchased on each island and by each planter. The Committee 
on the Slave Trade agreed with Walterstorff's interpretation of its 
own rather vague proposal in the March 19, 1792, preliminary draft 
r f  the loan plan sent to St. Croix, in that it said slaves could 
be purchased for the purpose of expanding production on plantations 
where a labor shortage had retarded cultivation of the available 
acreage, but not for extending cultivation to "land previously 
uncultivated which is still covered with woods and bushes [hidindtil 
udyrkede Straekninqer, som endnu ligge i_ Skov og Busk]. 
The committee agreed with Walterstorff's proposal as to how 
much money should be loaned to planters for buying slaves in each 
of the five categories listed by him in his report of September 21, 
1792 (see above, pp. 164-165). But the committee did not accede to 
his suggestion that wealthy planters should enjoy preference over 
poor ones in the granting of loans, insisting instead that no 
distinction was to be drawn among those seeking loans. Yet 
Walterstorff, as governor of the Danish West Indies, had been placed 
^°DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Plan hvorefter de til 
endeel Negeres Anskaffelse gitfrende Laan i Vestindien skal indrettes, 
April 16, 1793, p. 2. Obviously the land not yet cultivated on 
three such densely populated islands was land that was unlikely to 
ever be cultivated profitably. In 1792, out of 51,873 acres on St. 
Croix, 3,168 1/2 were listed as unused (i Skov og Busk). See Oxholm's 
General Extract of December 21, 1792, p. 2. 
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in charge of making the on-the-spot decisions as to which planters 
were to receive loans, so he would in effect be able to favor 
wealthy planters, provided he avoided arousing enough opposition to 
call his actions to the attention of the Committee on the Slave 
Trade. And the committee did include a sentence in the loan plan 
which said the loan committee in the islands could make exceptions to 
the rule that all planters should be treated equally if such 
exceptions were warranted by special circumstances.^ 
The committee continued to insist that planters who 
obtained loans for buying slaves should pledge that they would 
maintain the slave population of their plantations for as long 
as the slave trade remained open. Those planters who failed to 
do this would not be eligible for new loans. The committee hoped 
thereby to force the planters to improve the treatment of slaves 
in general and the newborn in particular, for children henceforth 
born on the plantations could be used to offset the expected high 
first-year death rate of the new slaves from Africa.^ 
Though it  endorsed Walterstorff's suggestion that premiums 
be awarded for the best sketches of plantation hospitals and 
nurseries, the committee made no mention of Walterstorff's proposal 
to award premiums to slave mothers for successfully caring for their 
babies. But i t  did note that the income derived from raising the 
^Plan hvorefter de til endeel Negeres anskaffelse gitfrende 
Laan i Vestindien skal indrettes, p. 3. 
42 
Jbid., p. 4. 
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interest rate on the loans from four-and-a-half to five per cent 
could also be used for those "projects which appear best able to 
promote the growth and maintenance of the slave population [Gienstande, 
som s.ynes bedst at kunde be ford re Negernes Formeerelse og 
Vedligeholdelse]. 
Oxholm had cautioned that "Those who bring slaves [to the 
Danish islands] will be Englishmen or Americans who can have no use 
for Danish currency, but will require produce or Sterling."44  The 
committee accordingly made available bills of exchange which could 
be drawn on banks in Amsterdam, London, and Hamburg, though the 
planter's debt to the Crown for the loans would be counted in 
rigsdaler at the prevailing exchange rate.45  
The committee wanted the West Indian loan committee to 
send yearly reports from St. Croix on the loans granted during each 
year and to specify the security obtained in return. It also wanted 
accurate data on births and deaths on those plantations whose owners 
46 
had obtained loans. 
The royal resolution approving the loan plan and the 
creation of a loan committee in the West Indies was issued the day 
after the plan was sent to the Council of State. The resolution said 
4^Ibid., p. 5. 
44DSA, VGRGT, Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, 
August 1, 1792, p. 21. 
45Plan .  .  .  til endeel Negeres anskaffelse, pp. 7-8. 
46Ibid., p. 8. 
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that one per cent of the interest paid on the loans by the planters 
would be divided so as to provide half a per cent for covering costs 
of administering the loan, with the other half per cent allotted 
equally to the royal treasury in the West Indies and for premiums for 
47 
the projects proposed by the committee to help the slaves. 
The plan was sent to the West Indies a few days later, and 
the colonial government had it  published in the St. Croix Gazette. 
A bookkeeper and a secretary were hired to help administer the loan, 
A Q  
and the loan committee proceeded to accept requests for loans. By 
October 1, 1793, the loan committee had received requests from 
planters for loans to buy 790 slaves and had, "after careful 
investigation of each applicant's request, .  .  .  and the results 
that could be expected from granting each loan," approved loans 
A Q  
for the purchase of 623 slaves. 
The loan plan was greeted enthusiastically in the West Indies, 
with the only reservations expressed about it  focusing on the risks 
of bringing in so many Africans in a short period of time. Oxholm 
^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Royal Resolution 
approving loan plan for the purchase of new slaves, April 17, 1793, 
p. 11. 
48 
DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria to 
Committee on the Slave Trade from Commissionen paa St. Croix for de 
til Planternes Understate!se bestemte Laan, St. Croix, August 31, 
1793, pp. 1-2. 
49DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from 
Commissionen paa St. Croix for det til Planternes Understate!se 
bestemte Laan, to Directionen for den vestindiske Gields Liquidation, 
St. Croix, October 14, 1793, p. 1. 
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in his report of August 1, 1792, had noted that "no planter wants 
to obtain too many new slaves at once, as that involves too many 
difficulties, including getting them adjusted to their labor, the 
climate and food."50  Commandant Malleville on St. Thomas in a 
report on the proposed loan plan wrote: "Experience has taught 
that, in general, buying a large number of African slaves [Bosal 
Negere] at one time involves much danger."5^ 
The loan was not the only "reform" connected with preparation 
for abolition and mentioned in the royal resolution of February 24, 
1792, and the abolition edict of March 16, 1792. One approach to 
enlarging the field labor force which had been urged by the Committee 
on the Slave Trade in its December 28, 1791, report on the slave 
trade and by the Council of State in the royal resolution of 
February 24, 1792, was a reduction in the number of house slaves, who 
were considered unproductive adornments which the planters maintained 
for purposes of social status. Both the committee and the Council 
of State had favored a special tax on house slaves, the abolition 
edict had set a date for removing the head tax on female field 
slaves but had not altered the tax on female house slaves, and the 
General Customs Department's letter of instructions to the West 
Indian government had requested a report on house slaves and 
50DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Vice Stadshauptmand 
Oxholms Anmaerkninger, St. Croix, August 1, 1792, p. 4. 
51 
DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkonmende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Report from Raadet 
paa St. Thomas to colonial government on St. Croix, St. Thomas, 
November 19, 1792, p. 2. 
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recommendations for an extra tax on them, in hopes of prodding the 
planters to make more efficient use of their labor force. 
Oxholm believed that instances where planters took slaves 
from the fields to work as house slaves were few. He said the 
planters were too mindful of their own interests to do that and 
added that during the harvest season, when as many hands as could 
be found were needed, planters often "chased their house slaves 
out" to help in the fields and at the sugar mill. He added that, 
unfortunately, there would always be some waste in manpower allocation 
C O  
which the government would remain powerless to correct. 
Walterstorff countered the concern in Copenhagen about the 
high number of house slaves by arguing that large numbers were needed 
in order to keep the planters' homes clean, for unlike Europe, 
"here reigns the greatest conceivable cleanliness." Since doors 
and windows were left open to let cooling breezes through, dust 
accumulated quickly, and many hands were required for dusting and 
polishing the furniture. Slaves also were required to look after 
the master's children. Furthermore, no slave would perform more 
than one specific duty: "The slaves are universally lazy and three 
servants here accomplish less than one in Europe [Overalt ere Neqerne 
meget lade oq tre Domestiquer her forretter ikke saa meget som een i_ 
53 
Europa]." Walterstorff admitted a tendency for the number of house 
52Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, pp. 19-20. 
^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Report by Walterstorff, 
St. Croix, September 21, 1792, pp. 9-10. In the United States, too, 
house slaves were considered, rightly or wrongly, by their masters 
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slaves to grow as female house slaves kept their children in the 
great house so that, after a few years, "one can find oneself 
encircled by a multitude of useless persons [en Hoben un.ytiqe 
Mennesker] who cost no small amount to feed and clothe." But he did 
not believe a higher head tax on "excessive [overfl0diqe]" house 
slaves would have much influence in reducing their ranks, for the 
masters could easily find ways of avoiding the tax.5^ 
The St. Croix Burger Council believed four or five house 
slaves, not including children under twelve, were needed by a single 
white person: one to do the wash, one to cook, one to serve as man 
servant, one as "a woman in the house [en Negerinde i Huuset]," and 
5c 
one to care for the master s horse. The royal council on St. 
Thomas, expressing its own views as well as those of the burger 
councils on St. Thomas and St. John, argued that it was almost 
impossible to determine the number of house slaves a family needed, 
as the number of children in the family, the income of the family, 
and its place of residence could change from year to year. "We 
have, therefore, for the time being been unable . . .  to determine 
the number of house slaves needed." Perhaps, the council added, 
it  would be possible to conduct a survey of house slaves in January, 
to be "insufferably lazy, incompetent, dishonest, and impudent." 
See Eugene D. Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll; The World the Slaves Made 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 334ff. 
54Report by Walterstorff, p. 11. 
5^Pro Memoria from St. Croix Burger Council, September 5, 
1792, p. 2. 
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when the tax rolls were prepared.56 
In his study of the slave population of St. Croix in 1792, 
Oxholm found there were 1,320 house slaves, 877 of them women and 
girls. He thought it  appropriate for a small family to have six 
house slaves or for there to be two house slaves for each white 
person on St. Croix. Oxholm supported his belief by providing an 
elaborate list of the tasks allotted to house slaves and emphasizing 
the need for greater cleanliness in the warm West Indian climate 
than was necessary and prevalent in Denmark.Since there were 
approximately 4,000 whites on St. Croix, there was no excess of 
house slaves. In fact, it  seemed that more were needed, as many 
of the free colored kept house slaves, and as the latter were included 
in the above total of 1,320 for the island, the number of house slaves 
available for the white population was even lower than it appeared 
C O  
in the census. 
The colonial government concluded that the head tax should 
be doubled on excessive house slaves, with five slaves allowed for 
each home; slaves under 6 or over 50 should not be counted. Mulatto 
women kept as house slaves should also be taxed double, for "they 
56DSA, VGR6T, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from 
Royal Council on St. Thomas, November 9, 1792, pp. 4-5. 
57p. L. Oxholm, Bemaerkninger ved hosftflgende Tabeller over 
St. Croixs Dyrkning og Besaetning, St. Croix, December 27, 1792, 
pp. 5-6. 
58 
P. L. Oxholm, General Extract af 0en St. Croixs Bebyggelse 
og Besaetning af Creaturer og Negere, St. Croix, December 21, 1792, 
pp. 1-2. 
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serve vanity more than any useful or necessary purpose." The 
government also advised against any tax on slaves who were hired 
out to work as artisans, for these were "useful people for the 
colony who in respect to their condition hardly feel that they are 
slaves.The colonial government obviously did not relish the 
idea of extra taxes on house slaves, but it  did not, as C. A. Trier 
indicated, deliberately misinterpret its instructions from Copenhagen 
when it  concluded that higher taxes on house slaves were to be imposed 
only on "excessive" house slaves, for the Crown had stipulated 
clearly that taxes were not to be raised on house slaves that were 
necessary for the operation of a household.60 Yet the colonial 
government did, by placing each white family's basic need for house 
slaves at a level so high that only a few very wealthy families would 
be subject to additional taxes, seek to ward off bothersome inter­
ference from the home government, interference motivated by the hope 
of improving the productivity of the slave labor force. 
The General Customs Department insisted, however, that the 
colonial government prepare a more detailed proposal for taxing 
house slaves, as it  was unsatisfied with the government's previous 
efforts.*^ The government protested that such a task was "very 
59DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1793, No. 139, Pro Memoria 
from government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department, 
December 31, 1792, p. 3. 
fiO 
See C. A. Trier, "Det dansk-vestindiske Negerindftfrselsforubd 
of 1792," Historisk Tidskrift, 7th Series, V (1904-05), 460. 
^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from 
General Customs Department to government of Danish West Indies, May 11, 
1793, p. 1. 
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difficult" and that it was "quite impossible" to produce a proposal 
which was based on convincing evidence. It was extremely difficult 
to distinguish between the number of house slaves that was necessary 
and that which was excessive for each family. To its proposal of 
December 31, 1792, the colonial government now added a plan dividing 
the number of house slaves into five classes, with the head tax 
remaining unchanged in the first group, consisting of homes with 
from one to four slaves, and increasing until, for slaves in homes 
with twenty or more house slaves, the head tax would be more than 
two-and-a-half times the normal one.6^ This was the last report on 
house slaves, and the General Customs Department allowed the issue 
of extra taxes on house slaves to fade. 
In addition to trying to improve the productivity of the 
slave labor force by reducing the number of house slaves, the 
Conmittee on the Slave Trade and subsequently the Council of State 
wanted to increase the birth rate and lower the death rate among the 
slaves, for unless a balance between births and deaths could be 
achieved, abolition would lead to a steadily diminishing number of 
workers after January 1, 1803, with prenicious consequences for the 
colonial economy and the Danish sugar industry. Closely connected 
6^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Pro Memoria 
from government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department, 
September 4, 1793, pp. 1-4. The government provided a list of house 
slaves in Christiansted which showed there were: 238 homes with 1-4 
slaves; 93 homes with 5-9 slaves; 36 homes with 10-14 slaves; 18 
homes with 15-19 slaves; 12 homes with 20-29 slaves; 6 homes with 
30-39 slaves; 1 home with 48 slaves; 1 with 51 slaves and 1 with 81 
slaves. 
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with the goal of increasing the birth rate was the need to increase 
the number of female slaves, to improve the stability of slave 
marriages, and to discourage fornication and adultery by using the 
Moravian Brethren to provide more widespread instruction in religion. 
The colonial government, the burger councils, and the Moravians 
responded with detailed suggestions as to how the goals of the Crown 
could be achieved or, in some cases, why they could not. 
Regarding improved treatment of slaves in order to lower 
the death rate, Oxholm wrote that "a truly humane planter will never 
lose sight" of the need to supply his slaves with sufficient food 
and clothing, to provide them with proper care when they are ill,  
and to maintain enough slaves to guarantee that they will not be 
overworked. "Self-interest, habit, and charity, the latter made 
generally prevalent by the influence of the climate, are guarantees 
[against mistreatment]."63 
Walterstorff pointed to the difficulties posed by the 
vagaries of weather and the problems faced by new slaves from Africa 
in adjusting to a new climate. During dry years the slaves' provision 
grounds provided little if any food, and there was a shortage of 
good water. Though there was not much hope for improvement when a 
drought struck, he believed there was a strong likelihood that the 
mortality rate would decline once the slave trade was abolished, 
because the population would then increasingly become one that was 
63Vice Stadshauptmands Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1, 1792, 
p. 8. 
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used to living and working in the West Indies, and thereafter the 
"number of deaths would fall, coming into a more suitable proportion 
with the number of births and eventually falling below the latter."^ 
Neither Walterstorff nor Oxholm believed mistreatment of the slaves 
by the planters was a problem; they were themselves Danish government 
officials who had become planters after arriving on St. Croix and 
considered, not surprisingly, the death rate of the slaves to be 
largely unaffected by the behavior of the masters. 
Using the tax rolls for St. Croix, Oxholm provided informa­
tion on slave deaths which indicated a lower mortality rate for 
slaves living in and near the towns, Christiansted and Frederiksted, 
with the highest death rate found in those parts of the island where 
the soil was most fertile and, therefore, where sugar cultivation 
was most intensive. In Dronningens Qvarteer, one slave out of every 
fourteen and a half had died in the previous year; in Kongens 
Qvarteer, one out of every thirteen. In Christiansted, on the other 
hand, there was only one slave death for every seventy-seven slaves. 
Oxholm was struck by the contrast between population growth in the 
islands and growth in Europe, for in Europe a surplus of births 
generally occurred in the countryside rather than in the cities. He 
wrote that, on St. Croix, slaves in the cities had less work to do, 
and young children were better cared for than on the plantations. 
Slaves on plantations near the towns benefited from being able to 
improve their living standards by selling eggs, peas, chickens, and 
^Report by Walterstorff, September 21, 1792, p. 13. 
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65 
hay for clothing and a greater variety of food. 
The low ratio of female to male slaves was a problem which 
had concerned the Committee on the Slave Trade and led it to recommend 
that planters be encouraged to purchase female slaves; the abolition 
edict sought to accomplish this by granting various tax incentives 
to those buying females. The attitude of the committee had been 
based on a study of the slave population on plantations mortgaged 
to the Crown, a study which led to an exaggerated view of the 
shortage of slave women because the plantations studied were not 
representative of the plantations as a whole. Fearing a long delay 
and the risk of arousing unwelcome curiosity if it sought extensive 
data on the slave population before reaching a decision on abolition, 
the committee had been forced to rely on incomplete data in reaching 
some of its conclusions. Only after deciding to abolish the slave 
trade did the Danish government, through the General Customs 
Department, request of the colonial government data on the ratio of 
female to male slaves and a report on the ratio considered most 
desirable by the planters and most conducive to increasing the birth 
rate. 
Oxholm argued in favor of importing as many female slaves as 
possible in order to accomplish an immediate and dramatic increase 
in births. He obviously gave little consideration to the Crown's 
emphasis on the need to improve family life among the slaves as a 
65Vice Stadshauptmands Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1, 1792, 
pp. 13-15. 
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means of improving the birth rate: he believed that, by providing 
the plantations with an excess of females, population growth "will 
probably benefit from an increased desire in the male slaves 
occasioned by the presence of different objects to arouse their 
passions to a greater degree [formodentliq vilde vinde ved den 
for0qede l.yst j_ Maendene, naar forandrede Objekter opvakte deres 
Lidenskaber til en hgijere Grad]."66  
The royal council on St. Thomas pointed out the contradiction 
implicit in the Crown's goal of fostering stable slave marriages 
while at the same time stimulating the importation of many more 
female than male slaves. It argued that the planters should be 
allowed to buy the slaves they felt they needed for the successful 
operation of their plantations without the government imposing taxes 
that penalized them for buying male slaves. Slave marriages, the 
council felt, would benefit from having an approximately equal 
number of males and females on the plantations, though having a few 
more males than females on each plantation, as was the case at 
present, should not prove harmful. The council warned that "if 
there were many more women than men [on the plantations], a natural 
result would be that a man would have more than one wife," a situation 
in direct conflict with the goal of promoting morality and improving 
family life among the slaves.67 
66Ibid., p. 17. 
^Report of Raadet paa St. Thomas to government of Danish 
West Indies, November 19, 1792, pp. 7-8. 
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Oxholm concluded after the slave census had been taken in 
the fall of 1792 that the proper ratio of the sexes on the plantations 
ought to be two women for every man. He proceeded to praise the 
female field slaves, whom he described as "the steadiest and most 
faithful workers." Certain tasks, such as skilled work at the sugar 
mills, were best done by men, but labor in the fields, involving 
planting and cutting the cane and carrying it to the mill, could 
be done by women just as well as by men. He urged that female 
slaves comprise from two-thirds to three-fourths of the slaves 
imported.68  His insistence on the need to import many more women 
than men was not in accordance with the reported needs of the 
St. Croix planters, however. (See p. 172, footnote 29.) 
The Committee on the Slave Trade in its report of 
December 28, 1791, had concluded that the low birth rate among the 
slaves was a greater hindrance to population growth than the death 
rate, which it  had concluded was not abnormally high, except for 
new slaves during their year of seasoning. The royal resolution of 
February 24, 1792, had emphasized strengthening family life among 
the slaves, an act which, it  was assumed, would result in the birth 
of more slave children and, more importantly, in a higher rate of 
survival among the newborn. But in order to encourage slaves to 
marry and build stable family units, the Crown had taken the 
seemingly necessary step of banning the separation of married slaves 
68Bemaerkninger ved hosftflgende Tabeller over St. Croixs 
Dyrkning og Besaetning, December 27, 1792, pp. 1-2 and p. 6. 
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or of a child under six from its mother. This prohibition, if 
carried out, would involve interfering with the planters' property 
rights. The teachers who were to move freely about the plantations 
to listen to the grievances of the slaves and to instruct them in 
religion posed an equally serious threat to the planters' control 
over the slaves. It was indicative of the Crown's hesitant approach 
to such dramatic reform that neither the ban on separating married 
slaves nor the role of the teachers was mentioned in the abolition 
edict, but only in the resolution, which was a formal statement of 
the Crown's opinion but did not have the legal force of an edict. 
Oxholm, in discussing the low birth rate among the slaves, 
mentioned venereal disease as a serious problem among slave women. 
He added that many slave women, using knowledge that was common on 
the Guinea coast, induced abortions by using certain roots and 
herbs. They did this, according to Oxholm, "only in order to 
indulge their unrestrained passions, without being hindered by 
children [alleene for at f01ge deres 10sagtige Passioner, uden 
Forhindringer ved B0rn]." Another factor responsible for retarding 
the growth of the slave population was the ignorance of the midwives, 
which resulted in the death of many children in the first nine days 
after birth. "To overcome all of these difficulties will involve the 
challenge of transforming the entire Negro race and its nature; even 
if this were possible, it  would take a very long time [at overvinde 
alle disse Vanskeligheder vil udfordre at omdanne heele Neger Arten 
og deres Natur; er dette end gi0rliqt, vil det dog tage en megen lang 
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Tiid]."69  Oxholm doubted that it would be possible to increase the 
slaves' birth rate to the point where it  would at least offset their 
death rate, though he was convinced that the gap could be closed.^ 
Walterstorff believed that secure slave marriages offered 
the greatest promise of increasing the birth rate. But he believed, 
as Oxholm did, that creating stable marriages among the slaves 
would require time and "a change in the slaves' way of thinking": 
The climate and irritability of the nerves, the violence of 
the slaves' propensities and mental disorders [Tilbriielighedernes 
og Sindslidelsemes Heftiqhed hos NegerslaegtenJ, along with 
opportunity and habit have brought about and will for a long 
time maintain unrestrained passions and a type of polygamy. 
It is not unusual to find a male slave, especially among the 
drivers, sugar boilers, or artisans, who has three or four or 
perhaps as many as seven wives, usually on different 
plantations.71 
Oxholm cautioned that the excess of deaths over births among the 
slaves was not the fault of the planters: "The cause [for the 
failure] should be sought in local contingencies, both physical and 
j 2  
moral, and not in the planters' reluctance or opposition." 
Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1, 1792, 
pp. 11-12. See Michael Craton, "Jamaican Slavery," and Richard B. 
Sheridan, "Mortality and Medical Treatment of Slaves in the British 
West Indies," in Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere, ed. by 
Stanley L. Engerman and Eugene D. Genovese (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), pp. 267-69 and pp. 285-90 for a discussion 
of promiscuity and the slaves' birth rate. 
7°Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1, 1792, 
p. 17. 
•^Report by Walterstorff, September 21, 1792, p. 7. Such 
relatively unbiased sources as Oldendorp, writing more than twenty-
five years earlier, and A. B. Bentzon, in 1802, confirm that polygamy 
was common among the slaves on St. Croix. 
?2Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1, 1792, 
p. 24. 
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Regarding slave marriages, the West Indian government said 
it would be "useless to introduce legal marital relations." 
Either most marriages will have to be annuled or the masters' 
property rights will have to be limited, and this we dare not 
recommend [o£ hertil tflr vi ikke raade]. Each pianter wi11 
always find it in his own best interest to promote regular 
marital relations among his slaves, because such a policy will 
inhibit the widespread wandering around at night [which the 
slaves engage in] to visit their husbands or wives [on other 
plantations].73 
No mention was made of the royal resolution's stipulation that 
children under six not be separated from their mothers, but it  would 
obviously be just as unenforceable, in the view of the colonial 
government, as the prohibition on separating married slaves. 
Johan Gottlieb Miecke, supervisor of the Moravian missionaries 
in the Danish West Indies, having been asked for his thoughts on 
legal slave marriages, listed several factors which he thought would 
make the success of such unions unlikely. He said the greatest 
freedom the slaves had was that of engaging in relations without 
interference from their masters. They "knew no boundaries of human 
order" concerning fornication and frequently ruined their health 
unless "though the grace of God a complete change was brought about 
in their hearts [durch Gottes Gnade eine qflnzliche Ver3nderunq des 
Herzens in ihnen bewtlrkt wird]."^ Even in cases where such a 
73DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, No. 139, 1793, Pro Memoria 
from government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department, 
December 31, 1792, p. 6. 
^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, UnterthSnigst Pro 
Memoria from Johan Gottlieb Miecke to government of Danish West 
Indies, November 15, 1792, p. 5. 
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change of heart occurred, married slaves were still subject to being 
separated when the planters wanted to buy or sell a slave, give one 
to a friend or relative as a present, or to a creditor to pay a debt; 
there were cases where a planter sent a slave to one of his 
plantations on another island, keeping the mate behind because it 
served his purposes to do so. Under such circumstances it was 
difficult for the slaves to form stable marriages. One thing which 
Miecke thought could be done to encourage slave marriages was to make 
it  illegal for a slave simply to exchange his wife for another 
"according to his pleasure [nach seinem Belieben]." The state should 
do something to establish order among the slaves' sexual unions, 
perhaps by having slaves restrict their selection of a mate to 
another slave on the same plantation, with house slaves in the cities, 
whenever possible, also marrying a slave owned by the same master.^ 
The royal resolution of February 24, 1792, had also called 
for the creation of a group of teachers, drawn from the ranks of 
the Moravian Brethren, who would go onto the plantations to instruct 
the slaves and hear their complaints. This proposal could be 
opposed in the West Indies by arguing that the cost of carrying it 
out was too high and/or that the planters' property rights and 
authority over their slaves should not be tampered with. The royal 
council on St. Thomas used the former approach. After stating that 
the plan to put slaves into various Christian congregations, each 
headed by a Moravian, "is so benevolent and praiseworthy [velgi^rende 
75lbid., p. 7. 
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oq prise!iq] that one must strongly wish to see it carried out," 
the council added: "There is reason to believe the arrangement will 
involve greater costs for His Majesty's treasury than one perhaps 
thought when drawing up the plan."76  The council agreed that the 
Moravian Brethren were best suited to serve as teachers, but noted 
that more of the brethren would have to be sent from Europe, for those 
presently in the Danish islands were not sufficient to carry out the 
task. Added to the cost of transportation would be that of main­
taining the new teachers—providing them with homes, land to farm, 
and a salary of at least 300 rigsdaler a year. If the Crown decided 
to proceed with the plan, six teachers would be needed for St. Thomas 
and four for St. John. The council suggested that the expense of 
providing land and houses for the teachers could be avoided if the 
latter lived in the present Moravian missions and, using them as 
bases, traveled around the islands teaching religion to the slaves. 
The planters and overseers would have to allow the teachers to do 
their work without interference and encourage the slaves to 
attend church.77  
The Moravian leader on St. Croix, Johan Gottlieb Miecke, 
also criticized the costs of the Crown's proposal. He favored 
building only two additional missions on St. Croix, one in the center 
76|teport of Raadet paa St. Thomas to government of Danish 
West Indies, November 19, 1792, p. 1. 
77Ibid., pp. 2-4. Mallevilie, commandant of St. Thomas and 
the author of this report, was a Moravian convert. 
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of the island and the other at the eastern end, to improve the 
Moravians' access to the slave population. Rather than embracing 
what could have been an excellent opportunity to spread the 
religious message of his fellows to the very persons he and the other 
Moravians had come so far to serve, Miecke adopted a cautious 
approach, apparently seeking to avoid anything beyond a minimum of 
70 
effort by the Moravians. 
The colonial government emphasized the need to keep the 
teachers from in any way coming between the masters and the slaves. 
Having agreed that the" Moravian Brethren were best suited to 
instruct the slaves, the government added: 
That these [Moravian teachers] should go around on the 
plantations in order to conduct lessons will in several 
respects not be feasible [ej vaere gi^rliqt]. The plantation 
owners will regard it as interference with their property 
rights, if someone without their permission were allowed to 
live among their slaves and exercise any kind of authority 
over the same. Perhaps the slaves would become accustomed 
to regarding the teachers in certain ways as a new source of 
authority or at least as persons who would be inclined to take 
their side against their masters. Among the teachers themselves 
there might also be one or another scheming [intrigant] person. 
All of these things could cause an action [Gierninq], the 
results of which are easier to anticipate [forudse] than to 
suppress. We must therefore in a very positive manner declare 
ourselves against all instruction in religion for the slaves 
which does not take place in public and at appointed times.79 
The colonial government agreed with Miecke's proposal that 
two new Moravian churches be constructed on St. Croix so that the 
slaves will not have so far to go to "their devotional meetings 
78Unterthanigst Pro Memoria3  November 15, 1792, pp. 8-10. 
79 
Pro Memoria from government of Danish West Indies to 
General Customs Department, December 31, 1792, p. 4. 
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[deres gudelige Forsamlinger]." Though the ideal would be to 
establish special mission stations in each section [Qvarteer] 
of the islands, which would involve seven new churches on St. Croix, 
six on St. Thomas, and four on St. John, the costs of such an 
undertaking would be so great that it was best to start by following 
Miecke's suggestion. Money for the two new churches and the 
Moravians to be stationed there could be obtained by using the funds 
set aside for use by the Danish Lutheran mission, for the Danish 
clergy did no work outside the towns or among the plantation slaves. 
The best hours for instruction in religion for adult slaves were 
weekday evenings and Sundays. The government added that it assumed 
that slaves would not be forced to join Christian congregations if 
they preferred their "fatherland's religion," for such force exerted 
over their religious life would be "harsher than the force under 
which their physical labor is now expended."**0 
The colonial government, in particular Governor Walterstorff 
and Stadshauptmand Oxholm, in cooperation with the planters in the 
burger councils, had managed to divert the Crown's call for 
humanitarian reforms to ameliorate the condition of the slaves 
whenever such reform seemed to affect the vital interests of the 
planters. Furthermore, regarding religious instruction of the slaves, 
the Moravian Brethren had shown no enthusiasm for a significant 
expansion of their efforts. The only "reform" which was enthusias­
tically supported in the West Indies was the loan for buying slaves. 
80... . * i  Ibid., pp. 4-7. 
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The General Customs Department did not press the colonial govern­
ment towards implementing and enforcing reforms to help the slaves. 
Antagonizing the planters would endanger the continued loyalty of 
the islands to Denmark: the Crown could not hope to compel the 
planters to remain subject to Denmark if the planters, the great 
majority of whom were English-speaking, decided to switch their 
allegiance to another, more lenient European state. The highly 
volatile siutation in the West Indies in the early 1790s surely 
suggested to the Danish Crown that it  was wise not to push the 
planters too far. But in fact the planters were pushed hardly at 
all. 
The years passed and nothing was done to help the slaves; 
yet the General Customs Department in 1796 praised the planters for 
improving the treatment of their slaves, though there was no evidence 
that any improvement had occurred. The department evidently 
believed the self-interest of the planters had automatically led to 
better slave treatment; noting that four years had passed since 
publication of the abolition edict, the department wrote to the West 
Indian government: "It can in the meantime not be otherwise than 
that the way of thinking in the islands in regard to the slave 
matter has changed considerably, that the change has been of advantage 
to the slaves' living conditions, and that steps are being taken not 
only towards improving their physical upbringing but also toward 
improving their education, their marriages, etc.; similarly, their 
numbers must have been increased and the ratio between male and female 
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slaves have been improved by the purchase of new slaves."01  The 
department added that it was still waiting for data collected by 
the West Indian government since the latter's report of December 31, 
1792, in order to use the data as a basis for arrangements and 
legislation which would support "the education of the slaves, their 
morality, marriages, and the reduction of the distance between the 
slaves and their masters [Formindskelsen af Afstanden imellem dem og 
deres Herrer] .  .  .  without offending notions of ownership rights 
[uden at st0de an mod Bergreberne om Ejendomsretten].The state­
ment regarding a "reduction of the distance between the slaves and 
their masters" is somewhat surprising, as nothing was said about 
tampering with this "distance" in the royal resolution of February 24, 
1792, or in the abolition edict. The department requested a full 
report on the slave population, including a breakdown by sex, age, 
and marital status. The letter concluded with a request for 
suggestions which might "promote the refinement of the slaves 
[befordre Negrenes Foraedlinq]; this refinement, to which the 
planters' own benefit is very closely connected, will in all 
probability effectively enable most of the slaves to withstand the 
ferment among their brethren which is being spread by the current 
upheavals [Omvaeltninger]."8^ 
81DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Kopibog, 1796, No. 234. Letter from 
General Customs Department to government of Danish West Indies, 
August 20, 1796, p. 1. 
82Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
83Ibid., p. 2. 
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As expected by the Crown, the loans to the planters to buy 
slaves along with the opening of the slave trade to the Danish islands 
to ships of all countries led to a dramatic increase in the slave 
population, reversing the trend of the previous decade. From 1792 
through 1796, the number of slaves on St. Croix grew from 22,144 
to 24,352.This increase was accounted for by new slaves from 
Africa (Kyst-Negere) rather than by an excess of births over deaths; 
the slaves' death rate remained much higher than their birth rate, 
with a total of 907 more deaths than births during this period: 
Slave Births Slave Deaths 
1793 460 606 
1794 469 633 
1795 463 760 
1796 458 748, 
1,840 2,747 
The increase in deaths was a typical consequence of having more 
African slaves in the islands, for new slaves generally suffered a 
high death rate during their year of seasoning. The stable number 
of births was another indication that the planters were not yet 
reacting to the threat of abolition by improving the treatment of 
their slaves, something the Committee of the Slave Trade had assumed 
they would be compelled to do by their own self-interest. The 
8^DSA, VGR6T, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, population data 
from tax rolls (Matrikler) for 1793, 1794, 1795, and 1796. 
85 
Peter Lotharius Oxholm, De danske Vestindiske Oers 
Til stand i Henseende til Population, Cultur, og Finance-Forfatning 
(Copenhagen, 1797), p. 62. 
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traditional attitude of quick profits at the expense of long-range 
prosperity and stability apparently still dominated the thinking of 
the planters. 
On St. Thomas and St. John, the number of slaves increased 
from 6,162 in 1793 to 6,693 in 1796. On these islands, in sharp 
contrast to St. Croix, slave births apparently exceeded slave deaths: 
Slave Births Slave Deaths 
1793 128 38 
1794 82 49 
1795 89 50 
1796  -il 54 
392 19Pb  
The surplus of births over deaths reflects the fact that the slaves 
on St. Thomas and St. John, islands settled long before St. Croix, 
were better acclimated and contained in their ranks fewer new slaves 
from Africa. Yet new slaves mainly accounted for the increases. 
According to Oxholm, the loans to the planters for buying 
slaves had encouraged English slavers to compete with one another 
in selling their slaves in the Danish West Indies, and "the larger 
number of slaves available for purchase had driven the price [of 
the slaves] down to a level much lower than in the surrounding 
islands." Malleville's fears that Danish planters, trying to buy 
8®DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, population data 
from tax rolls of St. Thomas and St. John for 1793, 1794, 1795, and 
1796. The data on slave deaths are probably inaccurate, however, 
as the 54 deaths reported for St. Thomas and St. John in 1796 
represent a crude death rate of 8.07 per thousand, an unrealistically 
low figure. 
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as many slaves as possible prior to abolition, would bid up the 
price of slaves now appeared unfounded. The English slavers were 
attracted by the security provided by the bills of exchange backed 
by the Danish Crown and also preferred the Danish bills because they 
could be redeemed in Europe after only three months, instead of 
twelve or more months, as was common with the bills of exchange 
issued by private citizens in the British islands. Oxholm wrote 
that the desirability of the bills of exchange provided in the 
Danish islands also allowed planters there to select the healthiest 
and strongest slaves; the unhealthy, weak ones were then purchased 
by local merchants who took them to the "western colonies," where 
the slaves were exchanged for various articles of trade, to the 
benefit of the Danish islands.**? 
In the English islands, merchants normally paid from 
forty-five to forty-eight pounds sterling for an entire shipload 
of slaves, but on St. Croix a similar cargo sold for forty to forty-two 
pounds sterling. Yet this lower price attracted slavers to St. Croix, 
because half of the sum paid for slaves consisted of the bills of 
exchange given as a loan to the planters by the loan committee. (The 
rest of the money used to buy slaves was provided by bills of exchange 
backed by private merchants and redeemable after six, nine, or twelve 
months.) The average price of a healthy African slave, male or 
87 
Oxholm, De danske Vestindiske Oers Til stand, pp. 28-29. 
Thus local merchants openly sold slaves to other islands in violation 
of the ban on exporting slaves from the Danish islands contained in 
the abolition edict. 
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female, was 400 rigsdaler vestindisk courant, while in the English 
islands a similar slave sold for 450 to 500 rigsdaler vestindisk 
O O  
courant. 
The sums made available for loans had been used up each 
year. As of November 1, 1796, the loan fund had been used in the 
Danish West Indies to buy 2,567 slaves, and planters on the three 
islands had purchased 1,932 on their own, making the total number 
of slaves imported and kept 4,499. Approximately 854 slaves had 
been landed on St. Croix but, remaining unsold, later had been taken 
to other colonies. Others had obviously been re-exported from 
St. Thomas, for this would account for the failure of the slave 
population to increase as much as it  should have if all 4,499 slaves 
imported and sold in the islands had actually been retained. On 
November 2, 1796, there were 500 African slaves still unsold in the 
Danish islands.89  This was perhaps an indication that the islands 
had already absorbed about as many slaves as there was a demand for. 
Additional evidence in this regard is that in the four years from 
1793 through 1796, 687,800 rigsdaler vestindisk courant had been 
made available to the planters for buying slaves, but as of November 
1796, 116,890 rigsdaler had not been used. Though the land planted 
in sugar on St. Croix had increased from 26,604 acres in 1792 to 
27,655 acres in 1796, there wasn't much more available that was 
suitable for sugar cultivation, as the eastern end of the island was 
88Ibid., p. 29. 
89Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
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too dry arid mountains covered much of the northern part of St. 
Croix.9® 
The loan to the planters had encouraged an increase in the 
slave population and in sugar production; but the reforms to 
ameliorate the treatment of the slaves had been stymied by the 
colonial government. The General Customs Department had not made 
more than a perfunctory attempt at encouraging the colonial govern­
ment to support amelioration and had accepted the latter's view that 
the property rights of the planters over their slaves were not to 
be interfered with by the state. It was not clear whether the Crown 
would actually abolish the slave trade on January 1, 1803, in 
accordance with the abolition edict, if faced with strong resistance 
from the West Indies when the grace period expired. 
90Ibid., pp. 34-35, p. 38. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Abolition Edict Preserved 
The Danish abolition edict was promulgated at a time when 
the spirit of reform was dominant in Copenhagen under the influence 
of Counts Bernstroff, Reventlow, and Schimmelmann. Yet the reform 
era had ended by 1800. The power of the reform-minded ministers 
of state had weakened by then, and the stronger role of Crown Prince 
Frederik in policy-making exerted a conservative influence. 
Bernstorff died in June 1797, and none of the remaining ministers 
of state possessed the authority to replace him. As a result, 
Crown Prince Frederik, then 29, increasingly took control of the 
government, in keeping with his desire to rule on his ownJ 
The Crown Prince's authority continued, as it had since 
1784, to depend on his position as chairman of the Council of State, 
and on the provision that no royal command was valid unless signed 
by him. He also relied on the generally accepted view that as heir 
to the throne and as actual regent he should rightly exercise 
authority over the monarchy. By 1805 Frederik had undermined the 
authority of the Council of State to the point where it  was only a 
^Vibaek, Reform 03 Fall i t .  255ff. 
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shadow of its former self; his lengthy stays in the duchies in 
1803-04, motivated by fears for the southern border area, and his 
more or less permanent residence there in 1805 meant he could not 
consult as closely with the Council of State as before, and he 
2 
refused to allow the council to exercise authority on his behalf. 
But by his absence, bureaucrats in Copenhagen, knowing that the 
Crown Prince was far away and preoccupied with foreign policy and 
military matters, gained authority to act, or fail or act, as they 
pleased. 
The abolition edict had been predicated on the assumption 
that the slave population of the Danish West Indies could be main­
tained without further slave imports after January 1, 1803. Two 
leading West Indian figures, Walterstorff and Oxholm, returned 
to Copenhagen in the 1790s and argued for postponing abolition; 
Walterstorff became a confidant of Crown Prince Frederik, so that 
he was well placed to influence the thinking of Denmark's head of 
state. As it  turned out, a victory for the foes of abolition was 
only narrowly averted. 
The question of whether Denmark would actually enforce the 
abolition edict was first openly raised following a series of attacks 
on the Danish West Indian government published in Politisk og 
ph.ysisk Maqazin in the spring of 1797. The anonymous author of 
2 
Linvald, Kronprins Frederik og hans Reqerinq, 1797-1807, 
pp. 3-9. Christian VII continued to attend meetings of the Council 
of State and signed documents placed before him, though both mentally 
and physically his deterioration grew steadily worse. 
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"Letters from St. Croix" first described, tongue in cheek, how 
customs officials, in order to support their families, accepted 
bribes to allow smuggling, thereby contributing to the general 
welfare of the colonies. His language grew stronger as he referred 
to the planters as a corrupted and ungrateful class who avoided 
paying their debts to the Crown and sought to accumulate wealth so 
they could leave the islands as soon as possible. They realized 
the small, mountainous Lesser Antilles were doomed to declining 
productivity and eventual ruin in the face of competition from sugar 
producers on larger islands in the Greater Antilles, especially 
in Cuba ("the Spaniards are not as backward as many believe") and 
in mainland areas such as Surinam.^ The April edition of Politisk 
og ph.ysisk Magazin contained a second "Letter from St. Croix" 
criticizing the St. Croix planters' "pride and arrogance, which is 
usually a result of wealth," and their pro-English sympathies, which 
caused them to avoid learning the Danish language even though "they 
are born in a Danish colony." The author argued that their purchase 
of smuggled merchandise from the English islands, especially from 
nearby Tortola, meant that Danish consumer products could not be sold 
in the Danish West Indies.4  
In response to this criticism of the West Indian regime and 
the planter class Oxholm wrote his book, De danske vestindiske Oers 
Til stand, defending the colonial authorities and arguing that abolition 
^"Breve fra St. Croix; f0rste Brev, St. Croix den 16 Januari 
1796" Politisk og ph.ysisk Magazin, Copenhagen, March 1797, pp. 257-
274. 
4Ibid., April 1797, pp. 395-401. 
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of the slave trade ought to be delayed beyond 1803. He wrote that 
pregnant slaves worked in the fields and carried heavy objects on 
their heads; the result was a large number of accidental abortions. 
He concluded that the birth rate would continue to lag behind the 
death rate, necessitating "a longer period than ten years to attain 
5 
the goal of abolition." He believed the vitality of slavery as a 
system of production depended on a continuation of the slave trade; 
and slavery was a necessary evil. "Although it cannot be denied 
that slavery in itself is contrary to the basic principles of 
humanity, i t  would perhaps be impossible to end slavery, because 
of its long existence, without devastating consequences for the 
cultivation of the colonies." The best approach, he argued, was to 
ameliorate the slaves' condition and to regard slavery as a "moral 
evil which must be tolerated because it  cannot be abolished or 
corrected without bringing about consequences which would be much 
worse and more damaging for the state and its subjects." Oxholm 
concluded: "The colonial system is a stain on the constitution 
[Statsforfatning] of Europe which must out of necessity be permitted, 
50xholm, De danske vestindiske Oers Tilstand, pp. 57-58. 
Oxholm, unlike Walterstorff, preferred to blame abortions on the 
carelessness of the slaves rather than on their supposedly lascivious 
inclinations; the important thing for both men, of course, was to 
indicate that the planters were not at fault and that increasing 
the birth rate was not within their power. In the introduction to 
his book Oxholm wrote that he had sold all his property on St. Croix, 
so his opinion could be regarded as impartial (Da jeg har solgt 
alle mine Eiendomme i hiint Land, .  .  .  saa kan min Stemme mindre 
mistaenkes for Partiskhed). Yet the St. Croix slave census taken in 
1804-05 by Governor Mllhlenfels listed Oxholm as owner of two planta­
tions, Ruby and Diamond, with 235 slaves. 
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because its rash removal would have the most pernicious influence 
on the prosperity of entire nations and destroy many millions of 
persons who earn their livings in those industries and branches 
of commerce which are supported and maintained by the colonial 
trade. 
Oxholm's defense of slavery and his comments on the need to 
continue the slave trade beyond the deadline set for abolition led 
the pro-reform journal Laerde Efterretninger to express its fear 
that the abolition edict would never be implemented. In a review 
of Oxholm's book, the journal was critical of the continued excess 
of deaths over births among slaves in the islands during 1793-96. 
Laerde Efterretninger noted that the plan for abolition of the slave 
trade, once considered as the first step of a process leading to 
freedom for the slaves in the Danish islands, "seems (if only this 
reviewer is mistaken!) merely to have supplied our islands with 
more slaves and our poets, orators, and flatterers with a perfect 
opportunity for sonorous phrases [blot at have skaffet vore 0er 
flere Slaver og vore Digtere, Talere, Smigrere en ski0n Anledning 
til klingende Udtryk]." The reviewer then referred to P. A. Heiberg's 
poem, "Fred med Kongerne paa Jorden," stating that the poet's praise 
of Crown Prince Frederik for breaking the chains of the Negroes "would 
7 
perhaps be a .  .  .  mystery for posterity." 
^Ibid., p. 10. 
^Laerde Efterretninger, No. 10, 1798, p. 154. 
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The reviewer in Skandinavisk Museum agreed with Oxholm 
that "so long as the planters fail to discourage irregular sexual 
liaisons [avvaerge uordentlige Sammenleje] and to encourage 
legal marriages, to reduce the amount of work performed by pregnant 
women, to subsidize those slave families which have several 
children and by other means seek this benevolent goal [of increasing 
the number of births], all the government's efforts will be futile." 
But a time would come when the planters would finally realize that 
their own advantage provided a compelling reason for "granting the 
slaves fairer treatment and, eventually, full freedom [at tilstaae 
Negrene stflrre Billigheder og omsider deres fulde Frihed], and for 
seriously working to improve the culture and morality of these 
unhappy persons, because the planters would have to abandon sugar 
O 
cultivation if they continued their present approach. 
Despite pressures exerted in favor of continuing the slave 
trade, Schimmelmann was not likely to retreat from the position taken 
by the Committee on the Slave Trade in its report advocating abolition. 
For one thing, his sister, Countess Julie Reventlow, continued after 
promulgation of the abolition edict to urge her brother to pursue 
policies that would benefit the slaves and to prevent subversion of 
his good intentions by others who cared little for the welfare of 
the slaves. Thus in 1793 she wrote him: 
I have had neither rest nor peace [weder Rast noch Ruhe] 
during the past fourteen days . . . .  But I must move a heavy 
8Skandinavisk Museum, I (1798), 400. 
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burden from my soul. My dear, beloved Ernst! I can no 
longer keep silent about the most important matter of my life. 
Oh, I beseech you, let your noble zeal for our slaves, for 
our previously resolved upon plans, now blaze as much as ever. 
I fear that others, now when it  comes to a decision, though 
they may not be cold [towards helping the slaves], will yet 
behave in a very half-hearted manner. 
I cannot possibly let myself be turned back with the 
wretched statement that our slaves are well-off, well-fed, and 
well-clothed; and I become enraged in my soul when I have to 
listen to such statements. Without sacrifice from our side, 
of course, nothing can be attained . . . .  Let us nevertheless 
at least make some kind of a beginning. As yet no schools 
have been constructed! As yet no Moravians have been hired to 
instruct the young slaves in the Christian religion, which for 
me is by far the most important thing. Likewise, still more 
abuses will be permitted and put up with, which will have very 
dismal moral consequences [traurige sittliche Folgen]. Of 
course I understand fully that one in these terrible times of 
madness and insurrection [in diesen schreklichen Zeiten des 
Wahnsinns und Aufruhrs] can and may only take action with a 
gentle hand. I commit all of this to your wisdom and your 
inexhaustible love of mankind [unerschflpflischen Menschettliebe], 
which is always a truthful adviser. You would render me an 
inexpressible service of friendship [unaussprechliche 
Liebesdienst] if you were to keep me informed of the results of 
your deliberations concerning the slaves [Eurer Berathschlaqiingen 
tiber die Neger].9 
Julie Reventlow wrote to the Moravian headquarters in Herrnhut, 
Saxony, and got her brother Ernst to do the same, complaining of the 
reluctance of Moravian missionaries in the Danish islands to baptize 
all the slave children on the Moravians' own plantations. Schimmelmann 
himself urged the Moravians to give any surplus earnings on their 
plantations to the slavesJ0  Julie Reventlow surely exaggerated the 
Q /  
*Bobe, Efterladte papirer f ra  den Reventlowske Familiekreds, 
VIII, 342-44. Letter from Countess Julie Reventlow, from Emkendorf 
in Holstein, to Ernst Schimmelmann, November 28, 1793. 
l°Lawaetz, Br^dremenighedens Mission: Dansk Vestindien, 
1769-1849, pp. 212-13. The letters in the Moravian archives were 
destroyed during World War II. 
213 
Moravians' commitment to improving the treatment of the slaves. 
A leading Moravian convert, Governor Malleville, wrote the General 
Customs Department of the need to keep the slaves at a proper 
distance from the whites. He accordingly advised against a proposal 
from Copenhagen to allow slaves to participate, along with whites, 
in trials involving other slaves. Malleville added that slaves were 
better treated since promulgation of the abolition edict because of 
the planters' realization that their own interests lay in promoting 
the survival of their slaves rather than in destroying them by 
overwork and mistreatment.^ 
Schimmelmann had placed his reputation behind the proposal 
for abolition and had the support of pro-reform government officials. 
Ultimately, though, Schimmelmann's authority and the wishes of other 
abolitionists could be negated by Crown Prince Frederik, who was 
eager to rule on his own and did so increasingly after Bernstorff's 
death in 1797; but Frederik was also mindful of public opinion as 
expressed in the Copenhagen press and, not suprisingly, relished 
12 its praise. Most importantly, he had to rely on his bureaucracy 
l^DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, No. 458, 1798, Letter from 
Governor Malleville to General Customs Department, March 17, 1798, 
pp. 1-3. This was the view which the planter class wished to have 
accepted in Copenhagen, and it  is contradicted by data on birth and 
death rates and by testimony from an unbiased source reporting to 
Schimmelmann on the condition of the slaves in 1802. See below, 
A. B. Bentzon's report, pp. 220ff. 
1 ? 
Frederik s growing concern about press criticism of the 
church, the nobility, and absolutism itself led to a law of Septem­
ber 27, 1799, which required writers to submit their material to the 
police for examination prior to publication and required special 
permission for operating a printing press. The poet P. A. Heiberg 
was deported a few months later. See Vibaek, Reform Qg Fall i t .  
193-203. 
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for data and policy recommendations, and his intentions could be 
subverted by opposition from the bureaucracy, which is precisely 
what was to happen regarding abolition of the slave trade. 
Sugar production in the Danish islands benefited in the 
1790s both from additional workers and from rising sugar prices 
resulting from the upheaval on St. Domingue. Customs duties 
collected in Copenhagen from the West Indian trade increased from 
13,242 rigsdaler in 1792 to 176,011 riqsdaler in 1799.^3  Despite 
the increase in the labor force, however, sugar production on St. 
Croix actually declined from 1793 to 1796, because of poor weather, 
averaging 18.7 million pounds a year. But by 1800 sugar production 
reached 32.5 million p o u n d s . ^  
The Schimmelmann plantations prospered during the 1790s, 
earning profits of 171,132 riqsdaler in 1793, 85,442 riqsdaler in 
1795, and 108,190 riqsdaler in 1797J5  The price of brown sugar sold 
on St. Croix rose from 11.5 Skillinq per pound in 1792 to 18 Skilling 
in 1797.16  
l3Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandels oq 
Sukkerproduktions Historie, pp. 60-671 This included duties on goods 
from non-Danish islands as well, and duties were raised slightly in 1797. 
^Oxholm, De danske Vestindiske Oers Tilstand, p. 39, and 
Sveistrup, De dansk-vestindiske 0ers okonomiske Historie, p. 70. 
15DSA, Grev Ernst Schimmelmanns Privatarkiv, Pk. 72, 
Fideikommisset vedkommende Papirer, 1782-1800. See Vortrag zur 
Generalversammlung for, respectively, 1794, p. 4; 1796, p. 3; and 
1798, p. 3. 
^Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandels oq 
Sukkerproduktions Historie, p. 63. There were 96 Skillinq per 
riqsdaler. See Knud Erik Svendsen et aK, Dansk Penqehistorie 
(Odsnse: Danmarks National bank, 1968), I,  13. 
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The slave population on the Schimmelmann plantation grew 
as a result of the purchase of new slaves, not because of an excess 
of births over deaths, for the death rate continued to exceed the 
birth rate even on those supposedly model plantations. The population 
of the four Schimmelmann plantations increased from 886 in 1792 to 
982 in 1799. In 1792, adult female slaves exceeded males by 309 to 
258, a preponderance which declined slightly by 1799, when there were 
345 adult females and 319 adult males, indicating the purchase of 
more male than female slaves. This practice was contrary to the 
recommendations of the Committee on the Slave Trade. Data from the 
period September 1795 to September 1796 show that twenty slaves were 
born and twenty-nine died. In that year, four female mulattoes 
bought their freedom. But thirty-four new slaves were purchased at 
a cost of 10,080 rigsdaler dansk courant, an average price of 296 
rigsdaler. It is not unreasonable to assume that Schimmelmann was 
using government loans for at least part of these purchases, though 
there is no proof that he was. From September 1798 to September 1799, 
twenty-one slaves were born on the Schimmelmann plantations and 
thirty-two died. One mulatto woman bought her freedom, and an old 
mulatto male was freed. This loss of thirteen slaves was more than 
compensated for by the purchase of twenty-eight new slaves.^ Thus 
the Schimmelmann plantations continued to suffer an excess of deaths 
over births, with only the purchase of new slaves maintaining and, 
17 
DSA, Grev Ernst Schimmelmanns Privatarkiv, Pk. 72. See 
Vortrag zur Generalversammlung, 1792-1800. 
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in these years, increasing the population on them. If the population 
of the slaves on the Schimmelmann plantations could not be maintained, 
there was probably little likelihood that smaller and poorer 
plantations could achieve a balance of births and deaths. 
The government loans to planters for buying slaves apparently 
ceased in 1799. The Crown had concluded that the loans had been 
misused by at least three members of the loan committee in the 
islands, including Oxholm. An anonymous pamphlet published in 
Copenhagen had accused Oxholm of using the loans to buy large 
numbers of slaves and then reselling the slaves individually for a 
profitOxholm admitted that he had done so but defended his actions 
by arguing that he had merely helped planters acquire the slaves they 
needed, a practice which he felt justified and in keeping with the 
intention of the loan pi anJ9  
Probably prompted by the publicity about misuse of the loans 
and about Oxholm's admission of having profited from buying and 
selling slaves, the Committee on the Slave Trade wrote the General 
Customs Department on May 9, 1799, that "no member of the committee 
established in the Danish islands to administer loans to the planters 
may, either directly or indirectly, participate or take part in the 
sale of slaves." The committee requested that the department send 
^"Berigtigelser ved Hr. Major Oxholms Skrift over de danske 
vestindiske 0ers Tilstand," anonymous pamphlet, Copenhagen, 1798, 
p. 18. 
19 
Oxholm, "Urigtigheder i de saakaldte Berigtigelser," 
Copenhagen, 1798, pp. 19ff. 
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an order to that effect to the government of the Danish West Indies. 
Members of the loan committee, who were all government officials, 
were not accused of wrong-doing, as the Committee on the Slave Trade 
said it "had no official report on the matter," but believed the 
ban on slave trading for members of the loan committee was justified 
because "there seems to be reason enough for such an order from the 
very nature of the matter," in effect admitting that the temptation 
was too great and should therefore be eliminated.^ 
The Commission for the Liquidation of the West Indian Debt 
expressed concern in a letter to the Committee on the Slave Trade 
about the repayment of loans made to planters and the failure of 
the West Indian loan committee to send to Copenhagen data on how many 
of the slaves purchased by means of the loan were still alive; as 
the slaves were the security used to obtain the loans, there was ample 
reason for concern. The commission therefore urged acceptance of 
the plantations themselves as security, even if they were already 
mortgaged more than once. Furthermore, the loan committee had, in 
violation of the stipulations put forth in the final draft of the 
loan plan, loaned an average of 239 rigsdaler vestindisk courant 
to planters for the slaves they bought using the loan, though the 
highest sum to be granted for buying an adult male slave was 225 
rigsdaler. The loan plan did allow up to 250 rigsdaler for a female 
2°DSA, VGRGT, Kommissionen til Negerhandelens bedre Indretning 
og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from Committee on the Slave Trade to General 
Customs Department, May 9, 1799, p. 1. 
slave aged fourteen to twenty-five, but it  seemed proable to the 
commission that only a few women in this age group had been 
imported, as slaves in this category were seldom available for sale 
in Africa. As of March 1, 1799, 5,302 slaves had been bought in 
the islands with funds supplied by the Crown, with 1,267,000 riqsdaler 
vestindisk courant of the 1 ,302,644 riqsdaler vestindisk courant set 
aside for loans having already been allocated three years before 
21 
the loans were to end. 
The slave population of the Danish West Indies had continued 
to grow in the 1790s: in January 1792, the three islands contained 
27,604 slaves; by 1797, the slave population reached 32,851 an 
increase of 5,147 since publication of the abolition edict. The 
slaves on St. Croix had increased from 21,546 to 25,884; on St. Thomas 
from 4,214 to 4,837; and on St. John from 1,844 to 2,127.^ In 1802, 
St. Croix had 27,006 slaves, St. Thomas 5,813, and St. John 2,530. 
The slave population of the Danish colonies had reached 35,349; there 
were also 3,014 whites and 2,102 free colored. Though slave deaths 
in 1801 were 744 and births only 500, in 1802 594 slaves died while 
676 were born, suggesting the possibility of a self-sustaining slave 
2^DSA, V6R6T, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, undated letter from 
Directionen for den vestindiske Gaelds Likvidation to Committee on 
the slave trade, pp. 1-7. The colonial government on September 2, 
1802, wrote the General Customs Department that an epidemic, a crop 
failure and British occupation of the islands had kept planters 
from using the remainder of the loan fund. See p. 228 below. 
22DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Tax Rolls for 
1792 and 1797. These figures are probably too low, of course, as 
they were supplied by the planters. 
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population.^ It was during the first five years of the ten-year 
grace period prior to abolition that the number of slaves on St. 
Croix increased dramatically. The slow-down in the growth of the 
slave population after 1797 indicates that the island's need for 
additional slaves was diminishing. 
A basic assumption of Schimmelmann and the Committee on 
the Slave Trade had been that their plan for "gradual" abolition 
would give the planters time to prepare for the day when they could 
no longer replace their dead slaves by purchasing new ones from 
Africa. It was assumed that the planters would, in their own self-
interest, improve treatment of the slaves they presently owned. The 
committee had not taken into account the tendency of many planters 
to seek quick profits and abandon the islands for Europe as soon as 
possible. Civic pride was minimal in the Danish West Indies, as it  
was generally in the Caribbean sugar islands. So long as the planters 
could buy slaves, were indeed encouraged to do so with the help of 
loans provided by the Crown, they had little incentive to seek 
improvement in the birth rate or in the survival rate of their slaves, 
for slave children were a useless burden in the short run, and main­
taining elderly or crippled slaves, who were referred to as ud.yktige 
(inefficient or incapable), was similarly onerous. The continued 
excess of deaths over births on St. Croix was evidence that 
^3DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, population lists 
taken from the tax rolls and sent from St. Croix by Governor 
Balthazar Frederik Mtlhlenfels, St. Croix, September 28, 1803. 
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amelioration had not yet been widely adopted by local planters. 
Population data contained in the tax rolls bear out the 
contention that deaths continued to exceed births by an amount 
sufficient to insure the decline of the slave population once the 
abolition edict took effect, with predictable long-range consequences 
for sugar production. The crude birth rate and crude death rate of 
the slaves on St. Croix from 1792 through 1799 and for 1801-1802 
are as follows: 
Slave Births per Thousand Slave Deaths per 
1792 18.52 20.94 
1793 20.77 27.37 
1794 20.17 27.23 
1795 19.00 31.19 
1796 18.81 30.72 
1797 19.94 37.85 
1798 19.89 26.75 
1799 19.51 29.39 
1801 18.90 28.12 
1802 25.03 21.9924  
Average 20.05 Average 28.15 
(arithmetical mean) (arithmetical mean) 
An additional source concerning the plight of the slaves ten 
years after promulgation of the abolition edict is a forty-page report 
2^DSA, VGRGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Tax Rolls for 
St. Croix, 1792-1799, 1801-1802. 
221 
sent to Schimmelmann on July 24, 1802, by Reqerinqsraad A. B. Bentzon, 
who had arrived in the West Indies in 1799. The report, "Concerning 
the Slaves on the Danish West Indian Islands (Om Negerne paa de 
danske 0er i Vestindien)," gives a detailed discussion of current 
problems and demonstrates how little improvement, if any, there had 
been in the treatment of slaves since 1792. Bentzon, who later 
became governor-general of the Danish West Indies, was not a planter, 
and his account is free from the obvious pro-planter biases that 
affected the reports of Oxholm and Walterstorff. He warned 
Schimmelmann of the grave danger of slave revolt, for the recently 
arrived African slaves in particular showed growing signs of unrest 
(1^ cte trende sidste Maaneder har man bemaerket hos K.ystnegerne en 
Tilb^ielighed til Insubordination) which on one St. Croix plantation 
had resulted in the murder of a white overseer. He argued that only 
the loyalty of many creole slaves to their masters had prevented 
a general slave rising, "the worst of all calamities, a revolt of 
the Helots [den vaerste af alle Calamiteter, en Helotkriq]." Yet 
he admitted that creole slaves might secretly harbor rebellious 
instincts. 
Bentzon placed part of the blame for the restless behavior 
of the slaves on the activities of the British under General Fuller 
during the British occupation of the Danish West Indies from March 
25DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, A. B. Bentzon, "0m 
Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," St. Croix, July 24, 1802, 
pp. 1-3. 
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1801 to February 1802.26 Fuller's administration reduced the slaves' 
respect for and fear of the power of the Danish colonial authorities, 
according to Bentzon. Fuller had publicly urged the slaves to come 
to him with their complaints and promised them justice; and non-Danish 
overseers, usually drawn from the lower classes, displayed open 
contempt for Denmark and encouraged disrespect for Denmark among the 
slaves. Yet, Bentzon concluded, a slave revolt could probably be 
avoided if the slaves were not so badly overworked and starved that 
they saw no alternative to rebellion. He therefore proposed that 
reforms be implemented as soon as possible in order to save the 
colonies from destruction. The suggestions he made show the continued 
harshness of slave treatment and indicate the failure of gradual 
emancipation to bring about amelioration. Bentzon argued that 
(1) slave rations should be specified by law; (2) the slaves should 
be guaranteed garden plots of a specific size and at least one day 
every two weeks to work their gardens; (3) the length of the work day 
should be limited; (4) Sundays and four religious holidays should 
be set aside as days of rest; (5) after the third month of pregnancy, 
no slave woman should have to engage in heavy field work—such as 
cutting the cane or digging holes for planting cane—or suffer 
corporal punishment, especially whipping; (6) specific rations should 
be provided for each baby which survived for three months; (7) efforts 
should be made to encourage slaves on each plantation to establish 
stable sexual relationships with a partner on the same plantation so 
^For details see Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, 1755-1848, 
pp. 219-226. 
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that they would not have to walk one or two miles every evening 
after work to spend the night with a spouse on another plantation, 
for this traveling weakened the slaves and diminished their energy 
for work in the fields the next day. "It is obvious, moreover, that 
this movement during the night of perhaps half the slaves in the 
islands provides an occasion for disorder, dissipation, and sometimes 
for dangerous gatherings [Pet falder desuden i 0jene, at denne 
Bevaegelse ved Nattetid af maaskee Halvparten af Landets Negere giver 
Anledning til Uorden, Disipation, og undertiden til far!ige 
Sammenkomster]." He added that no law could compel the slaves to 
abandon their evening journeys, and he thereby agreed with the state­
ment of Miecke in 1792 (see above, p. 194) that it would be dangerous 
to attempt to restrict the slaves' sexual freedom. Bentzon wrote: 
"In compensation for all of the real rights which the slave has lost 
he demands with unbending firmness the right to seek out over the 
entire island as many wives as he pleases, and force in this matter 
will not only prove useless, but, perhaps especially among the 
Africans, might result in the most fatal occurrences [Tvang vilde 
her ej aleene vaere un.yttig, men endog maaskee isaer hos Afrikanerne 
fulgt af de fatal iste Tildragelser]. 
One assumption of the Committee on the Slave Trade was that 
encouragement of slave marriages would improve the birth rate, an 
^Bentzon, "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," 
pp. 6-14. Bentzon urged adoption of a policy implemented on Jamaica 
in 1792 which sought to keep plantation owners from giving a slave 
more than thirty-nine lashes and from repeating the punishment until 
the wounds had healed. 
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approach to the population problem that was considered particularly 
important in view of the fact that the low birth rate was blamed as 
the primary cause of the failure of the slave population to maintain 
OO 
itself. Bentzon wrote that he had seen successful slave marriages, 
whose salutary contributions to population growth and morality should 
suffice to convince every slave owner of the need to promote such 
unions whenever possible. Yet many owners failed to do so. More 
serious than the lack of support for slave marriages was another evil: 
the continued practice of selling slaves by planters to pay debts, 
which not only interfered with family life, but kept the slaves 
from becoming more attached to the plantation on which they worked 
pq 
and lived and from developing a greater sense of self-esteem. 3  
Even Walterstorff's proposals of monetary awards to persons who 
produced the best designs for ideal slave hospitals and nurseries, 
which planters would then be encouraged to adopt by special premiums 
from the government, came to nothing.30 
Bentzon's proposals for laws to help the slaves actually 
had a dual purpose. He wanted "to make slavery easier on the slave 
and safer for the planter [at qi0re Slaveriet lettere for Negeren og 
sikkrere for Planterenl", but he anticipated strong opposition to 
any legally binding ameliorative measures not only from "masters and 
28Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung of the Committee on the 
Slave Trade, December 28, 1791, pp. 33ff. 
2%entzon, "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," 
pp. 13-16. 
^Oxholm, De danske vestindiske 0ers Til stand, p. 32. 
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overseers whose savagery and stubborness [vildhed og egenraadighed]" 
the laws sought to restrain but also from "decent-minded, short­
sighted men [veltaenkende .  .  .  kortsynede Maend] who fail to realize 
that in the voluntary sacrifice of part of their authority lies the 
guarantee for the essential power which will remain theirs [at i 
Resignation af en Peel af deres Magt, ligger Guarantien for den 
O] 
vaesentlige som er tilbage]. 
The plans of 1792 for making instruction in the Christian 
religion more readily available to the slaves had come to little, as 
the Moravians resisted assuming responsibility for educating the 
slaves. Only one additional mission station was constructed on 
St. Croix.32  The Moravians' exclusive concern was with saving souls. 
Indeed, Bentzon thought "Their teaching . . .  is not poorly designed 
for a slave, who, in the notion of the enjoyment he can expect in 
Heaven, forgets the evil reality bestowed upon him on earth [Deres 
Laere .  .  .  er ikke ilde beregnet for Traellen, som i_ Ideen, om den 
Nydelse han haaber hisset, glemmer det onde Virkeligheden tildeelte 
ham her.]," and he described the Moravians as persons who taught 
the doctrine of "unlimited resignation [ubegraensede Resignation]."33 
Bentzon, "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," 
pp. 35 and 37. 
J  Lawaetz, Brfldremenighedens Mission: Dansk-Vestindien, 
1769-1848, pp. 133ff. 
33Bentzon, "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," 
pp. 34-35. A Danish Lutheran missionary on St. Thomas showed at 
least some humanitarian concern for the slaves by protesting against 
the practice of selling slaves at public auctions. See DSA, VGRGT, 
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til Negerhandelens bedre 
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In 1792 Walterstorff and Oxholm had warned the Committee 
on the Slave Trade that it would be difficult if not impossible to 
increase the slaves' birth rate and lower their death rate to achieve 
a preponderance of births over deaths. Oxholm had again expressed 
his doubts in 1797 in De danske Vestindiske 0ers Tilstand. As 
January 1, 1803, the date set for abolition, drew closer, others 
began to urge a continuation of the slave trade. The Commission 
for the Liquidation of the West Indian Debt pointed out to the 
Committee on the Slave Trade that the continued excess of slave 
deaths over births threatened to ruin the plan for establishing a 
self-sustaining labor force in the islands.34  A member of the debt 
committee who had spent twenty-two years in the Danish West Indies 
and also visited the Danish forts on the Gold Coast, Konferensraad 
J. F. Heinrich, urged the Committee on the Slave Trade to permit 
a continuation of the slave trade to the Danish islands. He argued 
that abolition would result in a declining and overworked slave 
population, for the planters would drive their slaves to maintain 
the higher levels of production achieved during the 1790s when there 
was a steadily growing labor force. After assuring the committee 
of his sympathy with the Crown's goal of improving slave treatment, 
he warned that abolition would lead to a deterioration of the slaves' 
Indretning og Ophaevelse, letter from General Customs Department 
to Committee on Slave Trade, June 9, 1798, p. 1. 
34DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, letter from Dikrektionen 
for den Vestindiske Gaelds Likvidation to Committee on Slave Trade, 
written sometime in 1800, pp. 3-4. 
I l l  
living standards. The planters, pressured by their creditors, 
would be compelled to work their slaves "without mercy," for the 
planters thought only of the next twelve to fifteen years, and "in 
that period they will seek to become wealthy enough to return to 
Europe."3^ Heinrich suggested that the Danish forts on the Gold 
Coast could be abandoned if their maintenance was too costly, and 
slaves for the Danish islands could be purchased elsewhere. One 
or two slave ships a year would suffice to supply the Danish 
islands.36  
Bentzon, too, urged continuation of the slave trade, as well 
as a resumption of the loans to planters to buy slaves, for he felt 
these measures would make the planters sympathetic to the laws he 
proposed to improve slave treatment and thereby make possible at 
some future date a labor force no longer in need of replenishment 
37 
from Africa. Ten years after the abolition edict he was using the 
argument that still more time was needed for the islands to prepare 
for abolition. 
In February 1802 a breach was made in the abolition edict's 
stipulation that participation by Danish subjects in all aspects of 
the slave trade outside the Danish West Indies was to cease with the 
35DSA, V6R6T, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, letter from 
Konferensraad J. F. Heinrich to Committee on the Slave Trade, 
Copenhagen, March 11, 1801, pp. 1-4. 
36Ibid., p. 6. 
37 
Bentzon, "0m Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," 
p. 38. 
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beginning of 1803. The General Customs Department at that time 
approved the request of two Danish slavers to purchase slaves on the 
Gold Coast later in 1802 and sell them in the Danish West Indies 
after January 1, 1803, so long as the ships' captains could prove 
that the slaves had been purchased in 1802.38  
On July 1, 1802, seventy-five planters, working through the 
St. Croix Burger Council, signed an appeal to the Crown urging 
continuation of the slave trade during 1803, 1804, and 1805 and 
39 
provision for further loans for purchasing slaves. In a letter 
accompanying the planters' appeal, the government of the Danish 
West Indies showed itself sympathetic with the planters. The colonial 
government said that the Danish islands had not yet obtained a 
sufficient number of slaves. The government agreed with the planters' 
contention that an epidemic in 1799 that killed many slaves, a crop 
failure in 1800, and confusion caused by the English occupation of 
the islands in 1801 had prevented the planters from purchasing as 
many slaves as they needed and from making use of the remainder of 
the Crown loan for buying slaves. The government concluded: "It 
would . . .  be of great help to the planters if their appeal were 
approved. 
38DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, letter from General 
Customs Department to Committee on the Slave Trade, February 15, 
1802, pp. 1-2. 
^DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1803, No. 740, "Til 
Kongen," St. Croix, July 1, 1802, p. 2. 
40 
DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1803, No. 140, letter 
from government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department, 
St. Croix, September 30, 1802, pp. 1-2. 
The planters praised the loan granted them by the Crown 
for buying slaves and said that because of it  the plantations had 
acquired the badly needed manpower they had hitherto lacked. 
Furthermore, they wrote, the increase in the number of slaves had 
lightened the labor of the blacks. This argument that additional 
numbers of slaves served to ease the burden of the slave population 
assumes that planters did not use those extra hands to expand 
production in order to pay the debts incurred in acquiring those 
extra slaves. Oxholm indicates, however, an increase in acreage 
planted in cane did occur between 1792-96 (see p. 204 above). The 
planters assured the Crown that "Most of Your Royal Majesty's 
intentions in granting the loans would have been realized, if only 
physical as well as political misfortunes, which were equally 
unavoidable and unpredictable, had not combined to place hindrances 
in the way of carrying out your Majesty's intentions and stopped 
progress on the plantations." The epidemic of 1799 had reduced the 
ranks of the plantation slaves, the crop failure of 1800 "prevented 
the planters from making up the losses by buying new slaves," and 
the English occupation of the islands and the resultant confusion 
in 1801 again kept the planters from fulfilling their intention of 
buying more slaves. Further aid from the Crown was therefore 
essential in order to make more improvements on the plantations and 
to prevent the destruction of those improvements already made. In 
what amounted to undisguised blackmail, the planters warned that if 
the Crown failed to provide them with aid, "The most harmful 
consequences will result not only for these colonics but also for 
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that part of the mother country's trade and shipping which depends 
on the prosperity of the colonies.Only by continuing the slave 
trade for three more years and providing the planters with loans to 
buy slaves during that time could the situation be saved. 
The planters' appeal and the colonial government's letter 
were delayed en route, and only in the spring of 1803 did they reach 
42 
the General Customs Department in Copenhagen. The department 
requested an opinion on the matter from the Committee on the Slave 
Trade. The department urged the committee to respond promptly, for 
it would take time to prepare slave ships for the journey to Africa 
if the planters' request were granted. One merchant had already 
asked permission to send a ship to the Gold Coast to buy slaves. 
The Committee on the Slave Trade, dominated by Schimmelmann, 
was thus given a chance to admit that its report of December 28, 
1791, endorsing a plan for gradual abolition, had been mistaken or 
at least premature. The committee could have conceded that 
unforeseen circumstances had made it  necessary to resume the slave 
trade. But if the committee abandoned abolition in 1803, would the 
Danish slave trade ever end? Would the planters ever feel secure 
^"Til Kongen," pp. 1-2. The epidemic of 1799 could not 
have been as serious as alleged, as the death rate for slaves on 
St. Croix that year was not unusually high. (See p. 220 above.) 
^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, General Customs 
Department's Allerunderdanigst Forestilling on the planters' appeal 
for continuing the slave trade, May 15, 1804, p. 2. 
AO 
DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning, Letter from General Customs Depart­
ment to Committee on the Slave Trade, March 31, 1803, pp. 1-2. 
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enough to accept abolition without vigorous protest? 
In the meantime, an important court decision in Copenhagen 
showed a lack of sympathy for the plight of slaves brought to 
Denmark from the West Indies. On May 31, 1802, a Copenhagen court 
[Mbenhavnske Hof-og Stadsret) issued a ruling in a case involving 
two runaway slaves who had been brought by their owners from St. 
Croix to Copenhagen and who had subsequently sought to avoid being 
sent back to the West Indies. The court ruled that, according to 
the law of the Danish West Indies, the slaves were the legal property 
of their owners and that their residenc-e in Denmark did not affect 
their status; therefore, their owners were free to send them back to 
the islands.^ This decision came thirty years after Lord Chief 
Knud Waaben, "A. S. 0rsted og negerslaverne i Ktfbenhavn," 
Juristen, 46 (1964), 321ff. One of the slaves was owned by Henriette 
Schimmelmann, widow of Ernst Schimmelmann's cousin Heinrich Ludwig 
Ernst Schimmelmann, who had managed the Schimmelmann plantations and 
served briefly as governor general of the Danish West Indies. Waaben 
estimates there were at least fifty Negro house slaves in Copenhagen, 
along with some free colored. August Hennings, a boyhood friend of 
Schimmelmann who visited Copenhagen for several months in 1802, 
complained that the presence in Copenhagen of about 400 slaves, 
presumably from a slave ship, was causing problems. They were 
constantly escaping, and some had reportedly broken into Schimmelmann's 
summer residence, S01yst. (Der Sclaven-Unfug dauert noch fort. Sie 
soil en in Seelust eingebrochen. Man rechnet, dass von 400 Sclaven, 
die hier in Eisen sind, wtichentlich zwei ausbrechen, so schlecht 
werden sie bewacht.). The streets of Copenhagen were not safe, he 
wrote, because of the presence of drunken slaves. A bureaucrat from 
a provincial town, Hennings probably exaggerated the danger posed by 
the slaves. He was obviously astounded by the presence of blacks in 
the homes of Danish West Indians. Though Hennings associated with 
top government figures, including Crown Prince Frederik and former 
West Indian officials, he never mentioned any discussion among them 
of the impending abolition of the slave trade. See L. Bobd\ ed., 
August Hennings Dagbog under hans Ophold i Mbenhavn 1802 (Copenhagen: 
Nordisk Forlag, 1934, pp. 153 and 155, entries for September 12 and 14, 
1802. 
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Justice Mansfield had ruled in the Somerset case that slaves could 
not be removed from England against their will.^ 
Schimmelmann refused to agree to a resumption of the slave 
trade. The trade had been abolished at the start of 1803 in accordance 
with the abolition edict, though, as mentioned above, the sale of 
African slaves brought to the Danish West Indies was permitted in 
1803, so long as the slaves had been purchased in Africa prior to the 
end of 1802. The committee wrote that it did not believe it was in 
a position to take a definite position regarding resumption of the 
slave trade, as neither the planters' appeal nor the colonial 
government's letter contained sufficient grounds for granting the 
request. In particular, there was not enough data available on the 
slave population of the Danish islands. The committee therefore 
recommended postponing a decision on the planters' request until 
detailed figures on the population of the Danish West Indies had been 
received in Copenhagen. When the population data were available, the 
committee promised to study the matter and give its opinion on 
whether the planters' appeal should be granted. At that time the 
committee would also reserve for itself the right to express its views 
regarding other items concerning the present condition of the 
slaves.46  Schimmelmann knew it would take at least a year to assemble 
^Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 
pp. 244-45. 
46DSA, V6RGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1803, No. 181, letter from 
Committee on the Slave Trade to General Customs Department, April 5, 
1803, pp. 1-2. 
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the requested population data and send the lists to Copenhagen, 
and in the meantime the abolition edict would remain in effect. 
On October 6, 1803, Governor Mtlhlenfels sent to Copenhagen 
the census figures for 1801 and 1802 obtained from the tax rolls, 
indicating St. Croix had only 27,006 slaves in 1802, a figure lower 
than the colonial government in 1792 had said was needed before 
abolition.^ But these figures were always suspect, as the planters 
were thought to consistently list fewer slaves than they actually 
held in order to pay lower taxes. 
The Committee on the Slave Trade, clearly in no hurry, 
finally prepared a report on the future of the slave trade and sent 
it  to the General Customs Department on April 9, 1804. This time the 
committee could not merely seek a delay but had to take a stand; 
it did so, strongly, against resumption of the slave trade and loans 
to planters for buying slaves. The committee said its unanimous 
opinion was that an extension of the period during which slaves 
could be imported into the Danish islands would "in no way be 
appropriate": 
It would no doubt only strengthen the unfortunately widespread 
belief noticeable among the public in the West Indies that the 
abolition edict can not or will not be implemented and that, as 
a result of repeated postponements, i t  will be completely 
forgotten [ved qientagne Udsaettelser aldeles skulle gaae i_ 
Glemme]; and instead of the time thus granted being used by the 
planters to prepare themselves for abolition, the result would 
perhaps be that they would no longer bother themselves [with 
preparing for abolition] but, on the contrary, would let 
47qsa,  VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Population data 
sent from St. Croix by Governor Mtlhlenfels to General Customs 
Department, October 6, 1803. 
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everything continue in its old course, contenting themselves 
with the hope that the command of the abolition edict would 
never be seriously observed [at Forordningens Bud aldrig 
alvorligen ville overholdes]. Experience during the ten years 
granted before the edict was to take effect can only confirm 
this conjecture [Erfaringen i_ cte ti_ Aar som have vaeret 
tilstaaet, fflrend Forordnmgen skulle traede Kraft, kan vel 
ikke andet end stadfaeste denne Formodning.] 
Thus, in the Committee's opinion, the only question is 
whether the abolition edict will be maintained or whether it  
will be repealed [Sp0rqsmaalet kan altsaa efter Commissionens 
Formeening allene vaere, om ForordnTngen skaT~vedliqeholdes 
eller om den ska! ophaevesj, and the committee, far from 
having altered its detailed, carefully reasoned opinion put 
forth twelve years ago regarding abolition of the slave trade 
[og Commissionen, langt fra at have forandret sin for tolv 
Aar siden over denne Gienstand fremsatte og udf^rligen 
motiverede Meening], considers that, in view of the recent 
events on St. Domingue, the abolition of the slave trade is 
now more important than ever before [finder for naevaerende 
Tid, efter de sidste Begivenheder paa St. Domingo, 
Negerhandelens Ophaevelse mere vigtig end nogensinde f0r].48  
Having given a forceful reaffirmation of its original 
endorsement of abolition and bolstered its belief in the urgent 
need for abolition by referring to the threat of slave revolt, a 
threat which had been emphasized by Bentzon less than two years 
before in his "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," the 
committee softened its tone somewhat and admitted that carrying out 
this highly important policy might involve serious difficulties 
and lead to a crisis for the Danish colonies. The problems inherent 
in so major an undertaking as abolition were exacerbated by the 
planters' prejudice and failure to cooperate with the Crown. In 
DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from 
Committee on Slave Trade to General Customs Department, April 9, 
1804, pp. 1-2. 
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order to avoid or minimize any difficulties arising from abolition, 
therefore, "I, Count Schimmelmann, have drawn up and sent to the 
committee a plan, which the committee has approved in full [har jeg, 
Grev Schimmelmann, udarbejdet og til Commissionen indeleveret en 
Plan, som denne aldeles har bifaldt]. 
Schimmelmann1s plan argued that if the West Indian 
colonies had not from the start been subjected to the short-sighted 
spirit of speculators, there would now be an oversupply of workers 
rather than the present supposed undersupply. He suggested that 
only a long-range approach could solve any labor shortage that might 
exist now or in the future, though he professed doubt that the 1802 
population figures indicated a shortage of slaves. The Crown, wrote 
Schimmelmann, should take over several plantations in the Danish 
West Indies and cultivate them with the goal of increasing the slave 
population on them by natural means and of improving the treatment 
and "civilization" of the slaves, without altering the workers' 
status as slaves bound to the plantations. This arrangement for what 
Schimmelmann called a colonial institute would have as its main 
purpose the creation of model plantations to show the planters how 
slaves ought to be treated in order to guide them to what was 
described as a more moral way of life, with greater emphasis on 
marriage and family ties and greater personal interest in the 
cultivation of the land. The colonial institute would also achieve 
a population growth which would eliminate the need to import any 
49Ibid., p. 3. 
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more slaves and would provide workers to help those planters who 
lacked a sufficient number of slaves to cultivate their plantations.5® 
The idea for creating a model plantation funded by the 
Crown had been the centerpiece of Hans West's "Plan til ved et 
enkelt Fors^q at befordre Mark-Negernes Vel" which West sent to 
Schimmelmann and the General Customs Department in 1791. In his 
own proposal West had urged that he be placed in charge of the model 
plantation. Yet, in a letter to Johan Billow, Crown Prince 
Frederik's advisor and former tutor, written shortly after sending 
his proposal to Copenhagen, West expressed doubts about the 
feasibility of his plan and said he would not be distressed if the 
plan were ignored (Jer er .  .  .  aldeles ikke aengsteliq, om min Plan 
ikke skulde finde approbation), as it  was for more than a decade. 
He admitted he had constructed his proposal "in part because I hope 
that the General Customs Department will soon free me from the 
difficulties that accompany a teaching position in this part of the 
world for a person with a weak chest [deels fordi jeq haaber, at 
Kammeret snart vil befrie mig for de Besvaerligheder, der f01qer med 
et Laere-Embede i_ denne Himmelegn for den, der har et svagt Br.yst] 
Though West had privately doubted the feasibility of his own 
Cf] 
Frederik Thaarup, ed., Udfflrlig Vejledninq til det danske 
Monarkies Statistik saaledes som samme var i Slutningen af Aar 1813 
(Part VII; Copenhagen, 1819), Summary of Schimmelmann's plan of 
April 1804 for a colonial institute, pp. 682-84. 
^Letter of August 26, 1791, from Hans West on St. Croix to 
Johan Billow in Denmark, printed in Niels Breitenstam, "Hans West," 
Kulturminder, Copenhagen, I (1955), 124-25. 
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proposal for a model plantation, Schimmelmann not only adopted 
West's basic idea in 1804 but carried it farther than West had. 
Concerned by the failure of the slaves' birth rate to exceed or 
even offset their death rate, he was looking for some means of 
avoiding a resumption of the slave trade and of staving off the 
critics of abolition who said more slaves were needed in the Danish 
islands. Schimmelmann therefore emphasized the role the model 
plantations should play in producing a surplus of slaves who could 
be hired out as day laborers to planters needing additional slaves. 
Marriages were to be encouraged, with female slaves freed from hard 
physical labor while they were pregnant and, after giving birth, for 
as long as they were nursing their babies. Married slaves should 
(1) be able to inherit their partner's property, (2) never be 
separated involuntarily unless one of them had committed a criminal 
offense, and (3) enjoy the presence and the respect of their 
children, with obedience to and deference for their parents being 
inculcated in slave children as part of the Tatter's education. 
Although he must have remembered the reluctance the Moravians had 
shown twelve years before to undertake a similar responsibility, 
Schimmelmann proposed that the slaves should be taught Christianity 
by the Moravian Brethren. Elderly slaves should perform only light 
tasks in keeping with their diminished strength, and adequate food, 
clothing, housing, and water should be available to all the slaves 
on the model plantations. 
The colonial institute would be managed by a royal bureau 
in Copenhagen, with an inspector stationed on each plantation to 
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guarantee proper treatment of the slaves. With the right care and 
with emphasis on marriage and family, the population of the 
institute would grow, or so Schimmelmann assumed. In the meantime, 
some of the slaves to work the institute's plantations would have to 
be brought from Africa under strict regulations which would ensure 
them against mistreatment on the ships. Schimmelmann's plan, if 
adopted, would thus involve a temporary reopening of the slave trade. 
Yet, he argued, the success of his plan would guarantee the long-range 
success of the abolition edict of 1792. Eventually those slaves 
brought from Africa to serve on the plantations of the colonial 
institute, having done their part for population growth in the 
island, would be allowed to return to Africa if they wished.^2  
It is impossible to judge whether Schirranelmann really believed in 
his proposal, far-fetched as it was. Perhaps he was simply using it 
to ward off those favoring resumption of an unrestricted slave 
trade, a slave trade over which there were no regulations to mitigate 
mistreatment of slaves during the Middle Passage. Yet i t  remains 
uncertain why the man primarily responsible for the abolition edict 
fourteen years earlier now proposed creating royal plantations and 
stocking them with new slaves from Africa who would breed, preferably 
within the bounds of matrimony, a surplus of slaves who would be used 
to alleviate labor shortages on the various plantations in the 
Danish islands. 
^Schimmelmann's plan, in Udf^rlig Vejledning til det danske 
Monarkies Statistik, pp. 684-92. 
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The Committee on the Slave Trade, seeking the testimony of 
an expert, sent Schimmelmann's plan to Walterstorff, who had 
returned to Copenhagen and become a close advisor to Crown Prince 
Frederik. Walterstorff finished his thirty-eight-page critique of 
the plan on April 21, 1804, and sent it  to the Committee on the 
Slave Trade. He still owned a plantation on St. Croix, so his views, 
not surprisingly, reflected the best interests of the planters. 
Walterstorff's need to show deference to Schimmelmann was now 
minimal, and after praising Schimmelmann's motives in drawing up 
the plan, Walterstorff began to criticize the proposal for a 
"colonial institute" as impractical and insufficient for the labor 
needs of the Danish islands. He argued that at least 6,000 
additional slaves were needed on St. Croix, both to secure the 
welfare of the planters and to promote Danish foreign trade. 
Schimmelmann's plan called for having the Crown purchase as many 
as eight plantations with about 1,600 slaves on them and for bringing 
in another 1,000 slaves from Africa so that the total number of 
slaves on the colonial institute would reach 2,600. But Walterstorff 
believed the institute would need at least 4,000 more African slaves 
in order to be successful, especially if slaves were hired out to 
planters as day laborers. New slaves required very special treat­
ment, however, and no plantation could care for more than fifty in 
one year. So, even if eight plantations comprised the institute, 
only 400 slaves could be imported each year, which meant ten years 
would be required to import the 4,000 African slaves he felt the 
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institute would need. 
Schimmelmann's plan had included a proposal that more land 
be devoted to growing food for the slaves, but Walterstorff argued 
against any reduction in the amount of land planted in sugar cane. 
He contended that sugar cane was the most profitable as well as the 
safest crop: "It is only as a sugar colony that St. Croix has any 
value for Denmark, and one therefore should not seek to curtail 
sugar cultivation but rather attempt to extend it [Pet er ikkun som 
en Sukker-Colonie, at St. Croix har noqen Vaerdie for Moderlandet, 
og at man desaarsag paa ingen Maade b#r indskraenke Sukker-Avlingen 
c a  
men snarere s#qe at udvide den].1  
Repeating the same arguments he had advanced twelve years 
earlier to explain the low birth rate among the slaves, Walterstorff 
placed the blame not on mistreatment by the masters but on self-induced 
abortions by slave women and the preponderance of males in the slave 
population. In effect, he believed that it  would be impossible to 
increase the birth rate and achieve a self-sustaining slave population. 
Only a continuation of the slave trade could offset the evil effects 
of the slaves' sexual immorality (Lflsagtighed), for the planters were 
powerless to compel the slaves to settle into those regular monogamous 
relationships which were most conducive to the production and survival 
%SA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Walterstorff's 
critique of Schimmelmann's plan for a colonial institute, Copenhagen, 
April 21, 1804, pp. 1-6. 
54Ibid., pp. 12-20. 
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of babies.55  Yet in a letter to the committee completed one 
day after his critique of Schimmelmann's proposal for a colonial 
institute, Walterstorff said he thought a natural increase of the 
slave population was attainable, but "One would have to be 
satisfied with a slow approach to that goal [Man maae vaere 
(ZC 
fornfrjet med lanqsomt at naerme siq Maalet]. 
Walterstorff undermined his argument that many more slaves 
were needed to cultivate the sugar plantations when he wrote that 
Schimmelmann was mistaken in believing that two slaves were needed 
for each acre planted in sugar. On his plantation he had 164 slaves, 
with only 130 of them capable of working the 300 acres planted in 
cane. He added: "And my slaves work without any strain [Oq mine 
Neqere arbeide uden nogen Anstrenqelse]." He then raised yet 
another point which weakened the view that more slaves were needed: 
he rejected Schimmelmann's assertion that married female slaves could 
do only half the work of other slaves. Even when pregnant, according 
to Walterstorff, female slaves could perform lighter tasks on the 
plantations; and a month after giving birth, a slave woman could be 
back in the fields cutting cane.5^ 
Despite his opposition to much of Schimmelmann's plan and 
551bid., pp. 12-20. 
56DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Letter from 
Walterstorff to the Committee on the Slave Trade, Copenhagen, 
April 12, 1804, p. 1. 
^Walterstorff's critique of Schimmelmann's plan for a 
colonial institute, pp. 24-25. 
his belief that, unless altered considerably, it  was not viable, 
Walterstorff admitted that the plan might work if combined with a 
temporary resumption of the slave trade, in accordance with the 
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desires of the St. Croix planters. What he really wanted was a 
resumption of the slave trade; Schimmelmann's plan was a nuisance 
that might divert attention from the real needs of the planters. 
Walterstorff warned of the risk to public order of having 
unemployed slaves on the plantations of the institute during times 
when the planters did not need them as day laborers. He added that 
it would be important to avoid improving the condition of the slaves 
on the institute's plantations to the point where slaves on other 
plantations became dissatisfied with their status (Ved at forbedre 
Negernes Kaar paa Institutets Plantager, bjflr haves Hensyn til,  
at man ikke gi0r Negerne paa andre Plantager misfornfrjede). He 
closed by politely conceding that Schimmelmann's plan, though in 
need of improvement, nevertheless bore the stamp of philanthropy 
/ \ 59 
and a gentle spirit (baerer Geniets og Philanthropiens Praeg). 
Walterstorff's letter of April 22 to the Committee on the 
Slave Trade urged resumption of the slave trade: "I am and have 
always been of the opinion that the slave trade of the European 
nations ought to be abolished, .  .  .  but this desire is naturally 
based on the assumption that the inhabitants of Africa would thereby 
58Walterstorff's letter to the Committee on the Slave Trade, 
April 22, 1804, p. 10. 
59Walterstorff's critique of Schimmelmann's plan for a 
colonial institute, pp. 37-38. 
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be made happier."60  Abolition of the Danish slave trade would not 
accomplish this, for only 1,000 to 1,200 new slaves were needed 
each year in the Danish West Indies, a small number in comparison 
with the total number of slaves taken from the Guinea Coast each 
year. The slave traders of Bristol and Liverpool, who had supplied 
slaves to the Danish islands in recent years, would continue to 
take slaves from Africa and sell them on other islands. When for 
any reason the Danish islands had been unable to buy slaves, the 
slave ships merely sailed on to Jamaica and Cuba, and this was 
unfortunate for the slaves: "I am totally convinced that the slaves 
on those ships would have been less unhappy if they had been sold 
on the Danish islands [Jeg siger med fuld Overbeviisning, at 
Negerne paa de Ski be vilde have vaeret mindre ulykkeliqe vare de 
blevne solgte paa de danske 0er]. 
Having traveled to all of the West Indian islands from 
Puerto Rico to Barbados, Walterstorff said he knew from experience 
that slaves received the best treatment on the Danish islands. 
Indeed, the only complaint he had ever heard about Governor Mtlhlenfels 
was that he was too concerned with the welfare of the slaves. 
Walterstorff, not satisfied with proclaiming the Danish West Indies 
the best Caribbean destination any slave could hope for, added that 
the slaves in the Danish islands would suffer if the trade were 
60Walterstorff's letter to the Committee on the Slave Trade, 
April 22, 1804, p. 1. 
61  Ibid., p. 5. 
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abolished, for their ranks would thin gradually, leaving fewer and 
fewer hands to do the same amount of work.®2  The implication, of 
course, was that slaves presently in the islands would benefit from 
prolonging the slave trade rather than from abolition. Walterstorff 
ignored the assumption of the Committee on the Slave Trade that 
abolition would lead to improved slave treatment. 
Walterstorff noted that the Danish example on abolition had 
not been followed by any other nation, but praised the work of the 
committee in 1791 as fair and just. Unfortunately, as the planters 
had pointed out in their appeal of July 1, 1802, the ten-year period 
during which the islands were to prepare for abolition had been 
shortened by events in 1799, 1800, and 1801 which had left the 
planters unable to buy all the slaves they needed. The loan for 
buying slaves had also been discontinued, though Walterstorff did 
not mention that nearly all the funds set aside for it had been 
loaned out by March 1799. Nor did he mention the allegations 
concerning misuse of loan funds by some members of the loan committee 
in the islands, nor the failure of the colonial government to supply 
the Crown with data on the slave population during the 1790s, 
including information on those slaves purchased by means of the loan. 
He tried to explain the failure of planters to buy more of the slaves 
offered for sale on St. Croix in recent years by arguing that the 
planters had lacked sufficient credit. Walterstorff said that he had 
^Ibid., p. 6. 
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no self-interest in a resumption of the slave trade, as the slaves 
now on his plantation were sufficient to maintain production, and 
births on it  normally exceeded deaths; thus, motivated solely by 
the public interest, he asked the committee to approve a three-year 
extension of the slave trade, beginning with the date the extension 
was publicly announced in the islands, and said that if a resumption 
of the trade were permitted, a new royal loan fund to help planters 
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buy slaves would have to be established. 
Schimmelmann responded to Walterstorff's critique of his plan 
for a colonial institute and to Walterstorff's argument in favor of 
resuming the slave trade and providing a new loan to buy slaves for 
three years by sending a pro-memoria to the General Customs Department 
along with a reply to the criticism of his plan. Schimmelmann told 
the department that, although Walterstorff's opinions deserved 
attention because of his knowledge of West Indian affairs, it  was 
important to avoid further delay in a matter already sufficiently 
discussed by both sides. The committee therefore left it to the 
department to present to the Crown for a final decision the results 
of the various studies regarding the planters' appeal for a three-year 
extension of the slave trade.^ 
Schimmelmann's response to Walterstorff, entitled "Einige 
^Ibid. , pp. 5, 7-10. 
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DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Pro Memoria from 
Committee on the Slave Trade, to General Customs Department, May 1, 
1804, pp. 1-2. 
i; 
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Bemerkungen," accompanied the Pro Memoria. He said that if 
Walterstorff was correct in his belief that 6,000 more slaves were 
needed on St. Croix, and if approval were given to import slaves for 
three more years, all 6,000 slaves would have to be imported in 
three years, a formidable if not impossible task. He implicitly 
ruled out extending the slave trade for more than three years. 
Furthermore, as Walterstorff believed each slave would cost 500 
riqsdaler dansk courant, a sum of three million rigsdaler (Thaler) 
would be needed. Even if the Crown accepted Walterstorff's view 
that Crown loans to the planters were essential, it  would be 
difficult to provide so large a sum. And what if another crop 
failure occurred during the three years? Also, Danish slave traders 
could meet only a small part of the demand for 6,000 slaves, so that 
most of the money used to buy slaves would go to English slavers 
and thus hurt Denmark's balance of trade. Another problem would be 
the sudden infusion into the islands of so large a number of Africans. 
And, as many of the new slaves would merely be used to replace a 
decline in the slave population, improvement in the treatment of 
slaves would continue to be postponed.^ 
Schiranelmann was trying to ward off the proposals of 
Walterstorff, the colonial government led by Milhelenfels, and the 
St. Croix planters, but having made his points, he left it to the 
General Customs Department to offer more vigorous and perhaps decisive 
65DSA, V6RGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Einige 
Bemerkungen from Ernst Schimmelmann to General Customs Department, 
May 1, 1804, pp. 1-4. 
247 
opposition to the foes of abolition. Always cautious and tending to 
favor compromise, he shied away from an all-out defense of the 
abolition edict, and he was aware that a forceful advocate of 
abolition was prepared to carry on the struggle within the depart­
ment. Rosenstand-Goiske, who had been the department's secretary 
in 1792 when he had strongly endorsed abolition in Borgervennen, 
had continued to speak out in favor of reform measures during the 
1790s, with several of his speeches being published in Minerva. 
Now a commissioner (kommitteraad), he presented an eighteen-page 
Betaenkning to the department, arguing against granting permission 
for even a temporary, limited resumption of the slave trade. 
Rosenstand-Goiske, having no financial interest in the West Indies 
or the Danish sugar industry, could allow his moral aversion to the 
slave trade always to remain uppermost in his mind, while Schimmelmann 
could never quite free himself from the influence of his own invest­
ments in the colonies and their produce. Unlike Schimmelmann, 
Rosenstand-Goiske never felt a need to convince himself that the 
slave trade could be abolished without endangering the prosperity 
of the Danish islands and their trade with Denmark. For him a just 
cause assured a beneficent outcome. 
66Rosenstand-Goiske praised "gradual" abolition in a speech 
printed in the March 1795 edition of Minerva; he joined the 
Praemierselskab for den jtfdiske Ungdoms Anbringelse til Kunster og 
Haandvaerker and gave a speech praising the Crown's decision to allow 
Jews to join guilds, published in the April 1796 edition of Minerva; 
he lavishly praised "enlightenment" (Oplysning) and its value for the 
"common good" (Almeenvel), expressing great faith in the role of 
education as an agent of reform, in another speech published in 
Minerva in May 1797. 
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In his Betaenkning of April 24, he began with a reminder 
that the abolition edict had "gladdened the hearts of humanitarians 
in every nation [glaeddede opl.yste Menneskevenner af hvert Folkeslag 
sig]" and added that the Crown, if it now surrendered to the demands 
of the West Indian planters, would disillusion those who in 1792 
had applauded its humanitarian decision. Worse, a revocation of the 
abolition edict would mean losing the chance to abolish the slave 
trade and the horrors its continued existence involved, because if 
abolition were once delayed, there would always be other excuses for 
further postponement. Rosenstand-Goiske argued that the edict of 
March 16, 1792, should stand, as should all royal edicts, unless 
there were extremely persuasive reasons for tampering with it .  He 
suggested that only "incontestable proof [uimodsigelige Beviser]" 
that the slave population could not sustain itself and maintain 
production in the islands without a continued infusion of new slaves 
from Africa should suffice to cancel the abolition edict. He hoped 
that abolition would compel absentee planters to live on their 
plantations, for resident planters were more likely to treat their 
slaves fairly. A resident planter was more likely to be "an 
attentive and fair head of family [en opmaerksom og retfaerdig 
Husfader].Rosenstand-Goiske's belief that slaves would benefit 
^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Rosenstand-Goiske's 
Betaenkning on the planters' appeal for a three-year extension of 
the slave trade, presented to General Customs Department, April 24, 
1804, pp. 1-3. In an article in Minerva Rosenstand-Goiske praised 
the stern and just patriarchal slave master as one who knew each of 
his slaves and was present to see both that they did the work 
expected of them and that they were not overworked. Yet "Justice, 
even when connected with sternness, compels a person to respect his 
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from a reduction in absenteeism had some foundation in fact, as 
overseers were widely considered more inclined than the slaves' 
owners to physically abuse their charges, though he tended to 
exaggerate the extent to which paternalism could mitigate the evils 
of slavery, especially in the sugar islands with their gang slavery. 
The planters had no case, he wrote, if the following two 
questions could be answered in the affirmative: 
"Can the cultivation of the islands always be maintained with 
the workers presently on the islands and with those they 
propagate [Kan 0ernes Kultur stedse vedligeholdes ved de 
Arbeidere som Neqerne paa 0erne selv og ved Formerelse 
frembringe]?" Do the islands now have a slave population 
sufficient for cultivation [Have Qerne for Tiden et til 
Culturen tilstraekkeliqt Antal Neqere?]?"b8 
Rosenstand-Goiske said the December 28, 1791, report of the Committee 
on the Slave Trade had answered the first question affirmatively, 
so he would devote his attention solely to seeking an answer to the 
second. He referred to his article published in Borqervennen 
("Brev fra Landet") in 1792, noting that his conclusions on the 
potential growth of the slave population had not been publicly 
refuted, and then proceeded to argue that no more slaves were needed. 
Rosenstand-Goiske's determination to defend the abolition 
edict led him to contradict himself, as he wrote in his Betaenkninq 
superior in a way that is perhaps more binding than gentleness when 
the latter is combined with weakness [Retfaerdighed, endog med 
Straenghed forbunden, aftvinger Mennesket en Agtelse for sin 
Overmand, som maaskee binder staerkere, end Mildhed, naar den er 
forenet med Svaghed]." See Minerva, February 1805, "Om Negerhandelens 
Ophaevelse i  Hensyn til de danske vestindiske 0er," p. 200. 
68Rosenstand-Goiske's Betaenkning, April 24, 1804, p. 3. 
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of April 24 that the planters would save money by raising all their 
69 
slaves instead of buying them from the slave ships. But in a 
twelve-page follow-up report which he presented to the General 
Customs Department on April 27, he calculated that it cost a planter 
seventy rigsdaler more to raise a slave to the age of fourteen than 
to buy an adult slave brought in from Africa. This cost 
differential did not deter Rosenstand-Goiske from pressing his 
case for abolition, however, as he believed the extra cost should 
be "sacrificed on the altar of humanity [ofret paa Menneskehedens 
Alter]."70  
Rosenstand-Goiske said the islands already had enough slaves, 
as indicated by the population figures which showed there were more 
slaves present than ever before and by the fact that only half of 
the slaves brought to St. Croix in 1803 had been sold there. If a 
real shortage had existed or been expected, he argued, all available 
slaves would have been purchased. If there were cases where 
individual planters still lacked as many slaves as they desired, their 
problem was presumably the result of failure to care properly for 
their slaves and to promote a higher birth rate among them in the 
years after 1792. Planters who had failed to prepare for abolition 
from 1792 through 1802 should not be rescued now by a revocation of 
69Ibid., p. 9. 
70 
DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Rosenstand-Goiske's 
Bemaerkninger explaining the assumptions on which he based his 
opposition to the planters' appeal for a resumption of the slave trade, 
April 27, 1804, pp. 6-7. 
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the abolition edict. Beneath his strident optimism Rosenstand-Goiske 
did harbor some doubts regarding the ability of the slave population 
to replace itself by reproduction alone; however, he believed it 
would take another ten to fifteen years' experience to provide 
proof one way or the other. The only concession he was willing to 
make to the planters was to promise them that if the islands lacked 
enough laborers after another ten years had passed, the reopening 
of the slave trade could be reconsidered.^ 
Rosenstand-Goiske had to mention Schimmelmann's plan for a 
colonial institute, which had been presented to the General Customs 
Department, and he lavishly praised its humanitarian spirit [saa 
indlysende et Beviis som den giver om Aqtelse for Mennesket, og for 
Retfaerdighed og Mildhed, og saa klare som dens Grundsaetninger ere 
fremsatte, og saa mesterliqen som dens Udarbeidelse viser siq), 
but said he personally lacked enough knowledge of West Indian affairs 
72 
to make any specific comments on it .  He was probably suspicious 
of it ,  because it  would necessitate a limited reopening of the slave 
trade, which he so strongly opposed. To support this contention one 
might note that the Forestilling the department presented to the 
Crown on May 15, 1804, though generally deferential towards 
Schimmelmann's proposals, said there was no need to import slaves 
Rosenstand-Goiske1s Betaenkning, April 24, 1804, pp. 8-12. 
72lbid., pp. 12-13. 
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for his colonial institute.^ In commenting on the plan's emphasis 
on acquiring productive workers for the islands, Rosenstand-Goiske 
resurrected one of the topics discussed at length in 1792 and then 
allowed to fade: he urged imposition of a special tax on "excessive" 
house slaves; he thought 3,000 field slaves could be obtained if 
white families limited themselves to two house slaves each.'74  
In his criticism of absentee planters Rosenstand-Goiske 
provides a clue to his approach to slavery: he apparently regarded 
slavery as acceptable if the planter lived on the plantation, as if 
he were an independent farmer (Selv-Eierbonde), and looked after the 
needs and responded to the complaints of his workers as would a 
stern but just head of the household. The planters' wives should 
look after the workers' children during the day, "keeping an eye 
on their condition, cleanliness, and taking care of them while their 
mothers worked." Now, unfortunately s  "The master and mistress 
answer the plaintive slave by saying: go to the overseer, for what 
do I have to do with y o u ?"75 
Absentee planters had to rely on overseers who consumed a 
/ 
large part of the profits of the plantation, with an average annual 
wage of 1,200 riqsdaler plus control of part of the plantation's 
^DSA, VGRGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, General Customs 
Department's Allerunderdanigste Forestilling on the planters' appeal 
for a continuation of the slave trade, May 15, 1804, p. 31. 
^Rosenstand-Goiske's Betaenkning, p. 16. 
75 
Rosenstand-Goiske's Bemaerkninger to the General Customs 
Department, April 27, 1804, pp. 1-2. 
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provision grounds and a supply of Madeira wine. In order to cover 
the expenses incurred by having an overseer and still provide the 
absentee owner with a profit; the slaves had to work harder. He 
suggested that those absentee planters who found it impossible to 
reside on their plantations should sell their land to persons who 
would live on the plantations and take a direct interest in the 
welfare of the slaves. Prominent among such absentee planters were 
Walterstorff and Schimmelmann, the greatest of them all, but 
Rosenstand-Goiske did not mention them by name.?6 
He dismissed Walterstorff's argument that, because of its 
small size, abolition of the Danish slave trade would have no 
international impact and would not help Africa. Rosenstand-Goiske 
noted: "According to such reasoning, no improvement should take 
place in Denmark unless it also occurred in most of Europe; thus 
the stavnsbaand77  would not have been abolished, and so forth 
[Altsaa efter slig Grundsaetning skulle ingen Forbedrinq finde 
Sted Danmark, uden at den fandt sted over det meste af Europa, 
altsaa ikke F0destavnsbaandet vaere ophaevet o.s.v.]." Unlike 
Walterstorff, Rosenstand-Goiske was sensitive to the value of even 
a small blow against the evil of the Atlantic slave trade: "Every 
evil that is abolished diminishes the total quantity of evil for all 
of humanity and benefits the individual saved from it [Ethvert 
haevet Onde formindsker Massen for den hele Menneskehed, oq gavner 
76Ibid., p. 2 and pp. 10-11. 
77For a discussion of the stavnsbaand see p. 44. 
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Individet som undqik samme.l." After considering all the evidence, 
including population data from the West Indies, the planters' 
appeal, MUhlenfels' letter, Schimmelmann1s plan for a colonial 
institute, Walterstorff1s plea for reopening the slave trade, 
and Rosenstand-Goiske's Betankning and subsequent Bemaerkninqer 
opposing even a temporary resumption of the trade, the department 
sent its report to the Crown on May 15, 1804. 
The report, forty-four pages long, was a victory 
for Rosenstand-Goiske and a defeat for Walterstorff and the 
foes of abolition. Rosenstand-Goiske was able to convince the 
rest of the department to support his contention that the abolition 
edict of 1792 should continue in force and that Walterstorff's 
arguments for resuming the slave trade were seriously flawed. 
The department's report presented an overview of the problem, 
listing the alternatives available to the Crown. After discussing 
at length and with sympathy Schimmelmann's plan, the department began 
its criticism of Walterstorff's belief that at least 6,000 additional 
field slaves were needed, noting that Walterstorff provided no proof 
for his contention. The only way of determining whether there was an 
actual shortage of slaves was to carefully study the population as 
it existed at the end of 1802, based on the tax rolls sent to 
Copenhagen in 1803 by MUhlenfels. The department commented that, as 
the figures derived from the tax rolls depended on the word of the 
^Rosenstand-Goiske's Bemaerkninger to the General Customs 
Department, April 27, 1804, p. 11. 
planters themselves, their reliability was open to doubt. In 1792 
Oxholm had reported there were 17,942 plantation slaves on St. Croix, 
9,619 of them Creoles and 8,323 African born. At the end of 1802, 
there were 22,404 plantation slaves on St. Croix, 11,328 Creoles and 
11,076 African born. This was an increase of 4,462 in the number of 
plantation slaves frum 1792 to 1802. But in 1802 there were, 
according to the tax rolls, only 2,753 more African-born slaves than 
in 1792, despite the importation of twice that many slaves in the 
1790s with help from the Crown loans, and many other Africans had 
been imported without use of the loan fund. The department 
expressed skepticism that the imported slaves could have suffered 
such a high mortality rate and noted that if the data were accurate, 
there was all the more reason for relying on Creole slaves rather 
than Africans. But the point the department was really interested 
in making was that the planters were not giving accurate data on the 
number of slaves they owned. As evidence for this, the department 
pointed to the dramatic difference between the slave population as 
indicated by the tax rolls for 1799, 1801, and 1802, and St. Croix's 
slave imports as shown by the customs ledgers. The slave population 









Yet the customs ledgers showed that in 1799, 3,132 slaves had been 
imported and retained on St. Croix, 793 in 1800, 61 the first two 
months of 1801, and 1 ,684 in 1802 for a total of 5,670.^ The tax 
rolls showed 1,845 slave deaths in 1799, 1801, and 1802. The 
obvious conclusion was that the planters had not registered on the 
tax rolls the actual number of slaves they owned. "There is thus 
good reason for supposing that the number of slaves on St. Croix is 
presently much greater than that given [Per er da vel Aarsaq til at 
formode, at Antallet af Negre paa St. Croix er nu lanqt st0rre end 
det er opgivet]. 
The department showed its bias against Walterstorff and 
those seeking at least a temporary extension of the slave trade when 
it  wrote that in 1792 the planters on St. Croix had said they needed 
6,309 more slaves before the abolition edict took effect in 1803, 
failing to mention that Oxholm had raised the number needed to 8,000 
and the St. Croix Burger Council to 10,000. According to the tax 
rolls for 1802, there were 4,462 more plantation slaves on St. Croix 
then than in 1792. Taking into account that more slaves were present 
than were listed on the rolls, it  was reasonable to assume that the 
7Q 
Nearly all of the customs ledgers were subsequently 
destroyed, though the ledger for 1799 survives and confirms that the 
figure of 3,132 slave imports for 1799 is correct. See Green-Pedersen, 
"The Scope . . .  of the Danish .  .  .  Slave Trade," pp. 150ff. 
80DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, General Customs 
Department's Allerunderdanigste Forestilling on the Planters' appeal 
for a continuation of the slave trade, May 15, 1804, pp. 19-21. Data 
were lacking on slave imports for the last ten months of 1801 because 
of the English takeover of the island, according to the department, 
Allerunderdanigste Forestilling, p. 24. 
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planters already had all the slaves they needed. The harvests of 
1800 and 1801 were good, and that of 1802 excellent, indicating 
that the present slave population was capable of supplying the 
needed manpower. "It is therefore not apparent to the department 
why another 6,000 field slaves should be needed [Pet er da ikke 
Kamret t.ydeliqt, hvorledes endnu 6,000 Marknegre skulle beh0ves]. 
The department seized upon Walterstorff's statement—in 
his critique of Schimmelmann's plan—that it  was erroneous to 
believe that two slaves were needed for each acre planted in cane, 
as Walterstorff was able to plant more than 300 acres in cane with 
a labor force of 164 slaves, only 130 of whom were "capable" 
(see p. 241 above). Walterstorff's remark that he had enough slaves 
and did not fear that their ranks would ever require replenishing 
was used to support the department's contention that the Danish 
islands had all the slaves they would ever need. Using Walterstorff1s 
statement that 130 healthy slaves sufficed to work 300 acres planted 
in cane, the department wrote that, as St. Croix had between 27,000 
and 28,000 acres of sugar cane, only 11,700 to 12,133 healthy slaves 
were needed. In 1802 the island had, according to the tax rolls, 
11,713 healthy adult field slaves and 1,395 artisans, for a total of 
13,108. There were also 2,615 adolescent slaves over ten years of 
age. Walterstorff was clearly mistaken when he said St. Croix 
needed 6,000 more slaves, the department concluded. As final proof, 
it  pointed to the experience of the last slave ship to arrive at 
Ibid., p. 22. 
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St. Croix before the abolition edict took effect. The ship had 
brought 388 slaves from the Gold Coast to St. Croix in February 
1803, in the middle of the harvest, and had been able to sell only 
138 of them. The rest had to be removed from St. Croix and sold 
elsewhere.82  
The department used Schimmelmann's argument that if 6,000 
more slaves were imported in 3 years at an average cost of 500 
rigsdaler, nearly three million rigsdaler would be paid to foreign 
slave traders, as Danish slavers could supply only a small part of 
the total. This outflow of money, besides harming Denmark's balance 
of trade, involved a sum that the planters could not raise without 
another massive loan program funded by the Crown. A loan was not 
feasible. Furthermore, i t  would be difficult if not impossible to 
obtain 6,000 slaves in only three years, the time limit Schimmelmann, 
not Walterstorff, had placed on importing additional slaves. As a 
result, additional years would probably be needed and the abolition 
edict would never be implemented. The department agreed totally 
with the Committee on the Slave Trade that granting permission for 
a three-year extension of the slave trade would -  lead only to a 
similar demand from the planters to continue importing slaves after 
the original period had expired, until there was a permanent 
suspension of the edict. For the Crown to back away from an earlier 
command would encourage the planters to ignore the need to improve 
the treatment of their slaves and foster disrespect for royal authority. 
82Ibid., pp. 22-24. 
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The department therefore recommended that the Crown reject the 
OO 
appeal of the planters and keep the abolition edict in force. 
Regarding Schimmelmann's proposed colonial institute, the 
department cautioned that it was not necessary to bring in more 
slaves from Africa to work the plantations which were to comprise 
the institute. Importing slaves from Africa would also violate 
the abolition edict. Having just used Schimmelmann's criticism of 
Walterstorff's proposal, the department now used Walterstorff's 
argument against Schimmelmann's proposal to import slaves for the 
colonial institute. Such a large number of slaves, with all the 
"seasoning" difficulties their presence would entail, would be a 
burden on the institute. Furthermore, if slaves from the institute 
were hired out to planters as Schimmelmann proposed, those slaves 
would be given the heaviest and hardest tasks and would be badly 
overworked by the planters, whose interest would lie in preserving 
the health of their own slaves and exploiting those slaves employed 
as day laborers. The department warned against the threat to order 
posed by "a mass of raw, unwilling, mistreated and embittered slaves" 
created by such exploitation.^ The department did not, however, 
reject the proposal that the Crown buy plantations and, by exemplary 
treatment of the slaves on them, produce a surplus of slaves who 
could be sold to planters in dire need of laborers. It sided with 
Schimmelmann's view that more land should be devoted to raising food 
83Ibid,., pp. 25-29. 
04 
° Ibid., pp. 29-44. 
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for the slaves. 
The proponents of abolition faced a difficult situation in 
the Council of State, for Walterstorff had persuaded Crown Prince 
Frederik to favor the planters' request for resuming the slave traded5  
No one knows what happened in the Council of State, but a letter 
from Schimmelmann to the Duke of Augustenborg mentions that the slave 
trade was discussed for three hours. It is apparent that Schimmelmann 
used the arguments of Rosenstand-Goiske to counter the planters' 
assertion that they needed more slaves. Particularly important was 
the contradiction which Rosenstand-Goiske had shown between the 
large number of slaves listed as imported in the customs ledgers 
and the stagnant slave population revealed by the tax rolls. The 
doubts raised in the General Customs Department's Forestilling of 
May 15, 1804, concerning the actual number of slaves in the Danish 
islands permitted Schimmelmann to convince the Council of State that 
more data were needed before a decision could be reached. Only when 
such data had been obtained would the proposal to resume the slave 
trade be reconsidered.^ 
The resulting royal resolution of May 25, 1804, was the 
most important victory for the Danish abolitionists since the abolition 
edict itself. In a brief paragraph the Council of State declared: 
®5Linvald, Kronprins Frederik oq hans regerinq, p. 327. 
Christian Ditlev Reventlow noted this in his unpublished diary, entry 
for May 16, 1804. 
86 „ 
Bobe, Reventlowske Familiekreds, VII, 65-66. Letter from 
Ernst Schimmelmann to the Duke of Augustenborg, May 22, 1804. 
Schimmelmann wrote: La chambre des douanes avait insiste sur 
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Before we make a decision regarding an appeal from some 
planters on St. Croix for permission to import slaves for an 
additional period, we want our General Customs Department to 
obtain, through our West Indian government, more detailed 
information and reliable data on the actual population of the 
slaves on our islands, which would put us in a position to 
judge the pled that more slaves are needed for the cultivation 
of sugar there. Investigation into the proposal to purchase 
plantations with public funds as well as the manner of 
administering such plantations . . .  is postponed.87  
By warding off approval of the planters' plea and successfully 
countering Walterstorff's arguments, the men who favored abolition 
had insured more than a year's delay before the matter could be 
reconsidered by the Council of State, as it  would take at least 
that long to collect and send to Denmark the detailed population 
data needed before the Crown could reach a decision on the future 
of the slave trade. And consideration of Schimmelmann's proposal 
for a colonial institute had been deferred indefinitely.88  
Vabolition de 1'importation des esclaves sans aucune restriction, 
elle a cru pouvoir appuyer son avis sur les tableaux fautifs du 
denombrement des negres, elle a cru pouvoir demontrer par les 
contradictions des registres, des douanes et du denombrement des 
negres africains, que le nombre effectif des negres excedoit de 
beaucoup celui des listes officielles. Le prince royal penche' 
beaucoup pour la proposition de perme tt re 1'^importation pour 3 ans, 
mais en dernier re'sultat la resolution a ete prise, que la suplique 
des planteurs dans laquelle on demande 1'importation pour un terme 
limite", resteroit sans response. 
87DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Royal 
Resolution on the appeal of the St. Croix planters for permission to 
import slaves for three more years and on Schimmelmann's proposal 
for a colonial institute, Fredensborg Slot, May 25, 1804. 
88This victory for abolition in Denmark corresponded with a 
revival of the abolitionist movement in England, where in 1804 the 
Abolition Committee met for the first time since 1797; and 
Wilberforce's abolition bill easily passed all three readings in the 
Commons in May and June 1804 before being killed by the insistence 
of the Lords on hearing evidence and by the lateness of the session. 
But now there was hope for eventual success; for one thing, the 
262 
That Schimmelmann himself was active in campaigning against 
the planters' appeal is shown by a letter written to him on 
November 29, 1829, by Georg Philip Schmidt, Schimmelmann's secretary 
from 1803-06. Schmidt referred to Schimmelmann's work on behalf of 
the slaves as "the most beautiful pearl in your life as a Minister 
of State [den skj0nneste Perle i deres Minister!iv]He added "I 
still remember vividly the struggle . . .  to obtain victory for the 
good cause against the efforts of Walterstorff, Oxholm and other 
plantation owners, and I consider myself fortunate to have been able 
at that time at least to write copies of your excellency's calcu-
1ations and statements [oc[ jeg skatter mig lykkeliq ved den Gang i_ 
det mindste at kunne afskrive Ds. Excellences Beregninger og 
Fremstillinger]."8^ 
Yet Schimmelmann lacked Rosenstand-Goiske's dedication to 
abolition as a just cause to be pursued without regard for 
consequences. In his letter to the Duke of Augustenborg he stated 
that he had always regarded the slave trade as something that ought 
to be abolished or restricted (elle devait etre abolie ou restreinte), 
a position in keeping with his proposed colonial institute's need 
for additional slaves from Africa who would be transported to the 
West Indies under government regulations designed to guarantee their 
despotic French government was moving toward support of the slave 
trade,and "support of abolition could almost bear the colour of 
patriotism." See Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British 
Abolition, 1760-1810, pp. 343-44. 
89Bobe', Reventlowske Famil iekreds, V, 304. Letter from 
Georg Philip Schmidt to Ernst Schimmelmann, November 27, 1829. 
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well-being. It must have been with some reluctance that he 
had finally comprehended that the planters had not taken the 
abolition edict seriously and, as a result, had not yet changed 
their attitude toward their slaves. He recognized that nothing was 
more important than changing the viewpoint of the planters, for 
they generally regarded the slaves as agricultural instruments which 
one renewed when they were used up.90  
The General Customs Department and the Committee on the 
Slave Trade used the reprieve provided by the royal resolution of 
May 25, 1804, to prolong the time it would take the colonial 
government to gather data on the slave population. On June 2 the 
department sent a letter to the committee, informing it of the 
results of the deliberations of the Council of State. The post­
ponement of further consideration of Schimmelmann's plan for a 
colonial institute was not mentioned, however, and nothing more 
was heard of the plan. This undercuts Thorkild Hansen's assertion 
that if the British had not occupied the Danish West Indies in 
1807, Schimmelmann's colonial institute would have been established 
on St. Croix.The department asked the committee to suggest the 
kind of data needed from the colonial government and the format in 
which the data ought to be presented.92  
9^Bobe, Reventlowske Familiekreds, VII, 66. Letter from 
Ernst Schimmelmann to the Duke of Augustenborg, May 22, 1804. 
QT 
See Hansen, Slavernes 0er, p. 279. 
92DSA, V6RGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen til 
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Letter from General 
Customs Department to Committee on the Slave Trade, pp. 1-2. 
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The committee replied to the department's letter four weeks 
later, requesting that the department ask the colonial government 
to provide a complete breakdown of the slave population according to 
age and to discard the broad categories previously used, such as 
boys, girls, and adolescents. The government should indicate births 
by sex and provide a list of deaths in the first year after birth. 
The number of slaves listed under "baptized" should be divided by 
congregation; in addition to listing married slaves, a new list 
should indicate those couples living together, as well as the number 
of births to married and unmarried couples in the previous year 
and whether the couples lived on the same plantation. An enumeration 
of the slave huts on each plantation would also be of value, for the 
coiraiittee could then determine the average number of persons in each 
hut.93 The committee, in requesting such detailed population data, 
surely knew it was handing the colonial government a major task that 
would require much time and effort and, furthermore, would be subject 
to additional requests from Copenhagen for clarification, ensuring 
additional delays before the future of the slave trade was discussed 
once more in the Council of State. 
In the meantime, the St. Croix planters, having heard nothing 
from Copenhagen, sent to the colonial government another appeal for 
an extension of the slave trade. The planters argued that the 
colonies could not survive without a yearly supply of slaves 
DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from 
Committee on the Slave Trade to General Customs Department, June 29, 
1804, pp. 1-3. 
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(Jord-D.ykere). The slaves' mortality rate was consistently 
greater than their birth rate and, furthermore, the island had 
never had enough slaves for its proper cultivation. The planters 
were repeating the same arguments advanced in 1802: The Crown's 
intention of helping the planters obtain a sufficient number of 
slaves had been thwarted by unforeseen and unavoidable difficulties 
(Uhaeldigvis, bleve Hans Majestaets landsfaderliqe Hensigter 
tilintetgiorde i_ cte seenere Aaringer, ved uforudseete oq uoverstigelige 
Forhindringer.) If the ban on importing slaves continued, the 
planters wrote, sugar cultivation, especially of the new and highly 
productive Otaheite cane, would diminish. The inevitable result 
would be a'loss of revenue for the Crown and its subjects. The 
planters would not be able to pay the debts they owed European, 
including Danish, creditors. Blackmail was still, as in 1802, a 
weapon the planters relied on in trying to gain acceptance for their 
views, though this time a new loan for buying slaves was not 
mentioned. Surely, they wrote, "Amonarch who placed his highest 
honor in promoting the welfare of his subjects [En Monark, som 
saetter sin hgijeste Aere i_ at freircne sine Undersaaters Velstand]" 
would not be indifferent to the desire of the island's inhabitants. 
Several more years at the very least were needed to import more 
<34 
slaves and thereby assure the continued prosperity of the colony. 
^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from 
St. Croix Burger Council to the government of the Danish West Indies, 
St. Croix, June 28, 1804, pp. 1-2. 
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The planters' use of the phrase "at the very least [i det mindste]" 
lends credence to the suspicion voiced by the Committee on the Slave 
Trade and the General Customs Department that a temporary extension 
would lead to abandonment of the abolition edict. 
Accompanying the Burger Council's letter were seven letters, 
all in English, from planters on St. Croix, expressing their 
disappointment at the Crown's failure to respond to the appeal 
sent to Copenhagen in 1802. One planter, Joseph Blake, himself a 
member of the Burger Council, warned: "Our Cultivation has already 
suffered considerably from the want of Laborers; the Spirit of 
improvement which is so conspicuous in this Colony and the great 
industry which characterises its inhabitants have as yet been kept 
up by hope, but must soon yield to necessity if the difficulty which 
oppresses the one and extinguishes the other is not quickly 
removed. 
A letter from "The Proprietors in Company's Quarter" stated, 
regarding the Crown's goal of providing the islands with a 
sufficient number of slaves by January 1, 1803: "We sincerely 
lament that the Humane and beneficent Views of his Majesty 
have not answered the proposed Purpose; we shall not pretend 
to describe reasons for it, but we believe it to be owing 
in part to the introduction of the Otaheite Cane, which being much 
95 
Undated Letter from Joseph Blake, member of the St. Croix 
Burger Council, to the Burger Council, sent by the Burger Council to 
the colonial government along with the Burger Council's letter of 
June 28, 1804. 
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more productive requires more hands to cultivate it, particularly 
as we find it does not rattoorP6 as well as the Brasil Cane, and are 
97 
obliged to renew it more frequently." Letters from planters in 
Prince's Quarter, Westend Quarter, and Queens' Quarter also complained 
that cultivation of Otaheite cane required as many as 25 per cent 
more workers than Brazil or common cane; the Otaheite cane produced 
98 
more sugar but had to be replaced every three or four years. 
Several themes ran through the planters' letters. One was 
that the colonies would be ruined without the slave trade; a limited 
three-year prolongation, as requested in 1802, was not mentioned, 
implying that the trade should continue indefinitely. The planters 
also warned that the Crown would suffer a loss of revenue if the 
islands' sugar production declined. They also argued, as had 
Walterstorff, that abolition would increase the slaves' workload, 
for planters would seek to maintain present production levels with 
a steadily diminishing labor force; indeed, the planters of Westend 
96A cane plant's ability to "rattoon" refers to its capacity 
for growing back each year without replanting. 
9^DSA, V6R6T, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse. Undated letter 
from planters in Company's Quarter to the St. Croix Burger Council, 
sent to the colonial government by the Burger Council on June 28, 
1804. According to Deere, History of Sugar, I, 19-21, the 
Otaheite cane was a major advance in sugar production; it was first 
planted in the Caribbean on Martinique in the 1780s. Lowell J. Ragatz 
demonstrated that sugar production increased dramatically on Jamaica 
after the Otaheite cane was introduced there in the mid-1790s. See 
his Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833 
(New York: Century Co., 1928), p. 90. 
go 
Letters from planters of Prince's Quarter, May 15, 1804; 
Westend Quarter, March 7, 1804; and Queen's Quarter, April 26, 1804, 
to the St. Croix Burger Council. 
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and Queen's quarters blamed the excess of slave deaths over births 
on the shortage of workers, which necessitated overworking the 
present labor force." That the planters could advance such an 
argument is evidence of their abiding interest in immediate 
production and their refusal to concern themselves with the welfare 
of their slaves. The planters probably hoped their appeal would 
receive a better response if they could convince the authorities in 
Copenhagen that continuing the slave trade would benefit the slaves 
in the Danish islands. They were advocating their own peculiar 
version of "humanitarian" reform. 
The calamities referred to by the St. Croix planters in 1802 
and again in 1804—the crop failure and epidemic—were exaggerated 
and served merely as an excuse for demanding access to the slave trade. 
The planters of Prince's Quarter did not even agree with those of 
Northside Quarter on when the "epidemic" occurred.^0 The planters' 
constant references to the harm caused to the slave trade by the 
British occupation of the Danish West Indies in 1801 are also 
misleading, as British slavers, according to Walterstorff (see p. 243 
above), provided most of the slaves bought by local planters and 
would surely not have been deterred from continuing to sell slaves 
to the Danish colony after its takeover by their own country. 
The colonial government in 1802 had shown sympathy for the 
"DSA, V6RGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse. Letters from 
planters of Westend Quarter, p. 1, and Queen's Quarter, p. 1. 
100Letters from Planters of Prince's Quarter, p. 1, and 
Northside Quarter, p. 2. 
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planters' appeal in its cover letter accompanying Til Kongenl 
but had refrained from a direct endorsement of the need for more 
slaves. Now, however, Governor MUhlenfels sided with the planters, 
stating that, without the slave trade, the slave population would 
decline and sugar production would suffer. Mtlhlenfels added that the 
Crown also would lose money if the sugar islands lacked sufficient 
"working hands." He also agreed with the planters that the slaves 
working the islands needed the assistance of new African slaves in 
order to avoid being overworked. He blamed the islands' failure to 
acquire enough slaves on problems faced by the planters in 1800, 
1801, and 1802, the suspension of the loans for buying slaves (Neger 
Laanets Ophaevelse), and the English occupation of the islands.101 
The concern of the planters and the colonial government with 
obtaining permission to import slaves once more suggests that, though 
some smuggling of slaves into the islands was inevitable, only 
regular access to the Atlantic slave trade was considered sufficient 
to meet present needs and, what seems likely to have been the planters 
real fear, future needs. Without access to African slaves, the 
planters would have to devote more resources to caring for their 
present slaves, and as yet there seemed little likelihood of a 
self-perpetuating slave population on a Caribbean sugar island. The 
first colony to achieve such was Barbados, an old colony with 
101DSA, V6RGT, Vestindisk Journal, No. 1064, letter from 
government of Danish West Indies to the General Customs Department, 
July 12, 1804, pp. 1-3. 
270 
relatively few Africans in its slave population, and Barbados 
managed a surplus of births over deaths only after 1807.^ 
On July 5, 1804, the General Customs Department wrote 
Governor MUhlenfels, informing him of the Crown's decision to 
seek detailed and reliable data on the slave population of the 
Danish islands before reaching a decision on the planters' appeal 
for resuming the slave trade. MUhlenfels responded, on October 9, 
promising to collect the requested information as soon as possible.^03 
He had already sent the planters' appeal of 1804 to Copenhagen. 
As undoubtedly anticipated by the General Customs Department 
and the Committee on the Slave Trade, it took many months for 
MUhlenfels to gather the needed data on the slave population. The 
St. Croix slave census was completed by MUhlenfels on July 8, 1805, 
arrived in Copenhagen in the fall of 1805 and was sent by the General 
Customs Department to the Committee on the Slave Trade on November 26, 
1805. MUhlenfels now sided more openly than before with the planters, 
as he concluded, after a discussion of the slave population and the 
number of births and deaths, that it would never be possible for 
St. Croix to obtain enough slaves to work the fields by relying 
solely on births. Slave women continued to induce abortions rather 
102Richard B. Sheridan, "Mortality and the Medical Treatment 
of Slaves in the British West Indies," in Race and Slavery in the 
Western Hemisphere, pp. 288-89. 
^03DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from 
General Customs Department to Governor MUhlenfels, July 5, 1804, 
p. 1, and Letter from Governor MUhlenfels to General Customs Depart­
ment, October 9, 1804, p. 1. 
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than have children, even though some planters offered them small 
presents for each child they bore. Slavery, which was crucial for 
the survival of the Danish sugar islands, kept the fertility rate 
of slave women below what it should be. In order to maintain 
cultivation of the 24,283 acres now planted in sugar on St. Croix, 
MUhlenfels wrote, an additional 10,000 slaves were needed in order 
to avoid overworking the present labor force of 22,076 plantation 
slaves. Also, the proper ratio of male to female slaves had never 
been achieved. There were 11,601 men and 10,475 women; yet 
MUhlenfels argued there should be one-third more women than men. He 
ended his letter by recommending adoption of a slave code to protect 
slaves from brutal overseers, for "Protected by wise laws, the slaves 
in the colonies would be much better off than in their Father Land, 
where a despot could, for his own pleasure or the satisfaction of 
religious customs, have their heads chopped off." Even without 
such a protective black code, one would probably find in the Danish 
West Indies few slaves who would wish to return to Africa if given 
the opportunity.^ This was the same man who had been described by 
Walterstorff as, if anything, open to criticism for being too 
solicitous of the slaves' welfare (see p. 243 above). 
The census showed that in the two most densely populated and 
productive sections of St. Croix, Prince's Quarter and Queen's Quarter, 
^DSA, V6RGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from 
Governor MUhlenfels to General Customs Department, St. Croix, July 8, 
1805, pp. 1-4. In 1796, 27,655 acres had been planted in sugar; 
by 1804, only 24,283 were. 
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there were 205 births in the previous year and 317 deaths. For 
St. Croix as a whole, there were 547 births and 815 deaths J05 
Slave births on St. John numbered 58 in 1805, exceeding the 49 deaths. 
On St. Thomas there were 107 births and 129 deaths among the 
plantation slavesJO6 Thus the population of the plantation slaves, as 
opposed to house slaves and those in the towns, was declining on all 
three islands. 
Despite the downward trend of the plantation slave population 
in the Danish islands, there was still an ample number of slaves in 
1804-05. There were 2,417 plantation slaves on St. John where there 
were only 1,652 acres planted in cane, so there was surely no need 
for more slaves on that island. The plantation slaves numbered 
3,344, and there were 2,458 acres planted in sugar cane. As on 
St. John, there was an ample supply of slaves.107 
In his letter accompanying the population figures for St. 
Thomas and St. John, MUhlenfels argued more slaves were needed per 
acre on St. Thomas and St. John than on St. Croix because of the 
mountainous nature of the two smaller islands. The difficulty of 
working the land on those islands exhausted the slaves far more than 
did field labor on St. Croix, which had large areas of flat land. 
MUhlenfels noted that St. Thomas had 10,558 acres of unused land 
1Q5 
Governor MUhlenfels' census of the St. Croix slave 
population, 1804-05. 
106Governor MUhlenfels census of the St. John and St. Thomas 
slave populations in 1804-05. 
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and St. John 8,655 and urged that the Crown provide the two islands 
with more slaves so that they could be fully cultivated. Yet on 
these old sugar islands, land not planted in sugar by the early 
nineteenth century was surely too steep to plant or too severely 
eroded to be productive. MUhlenfels said St. John needed another 
1,000 slaves to plant additional acres in sugar cane. That island, 
according to MUhlenfels, was well suited to produce a regular excess 
of births over deaths. There were no towns on it in which the slaves 
could obtain rum in exchange for eggs and hay, and proceed to under­
mine their health by excessive drinking. On St. John at the end of 
the day a slave "went directly home from his work to rest, ate the 
food which his wife prepared while he smoked his pipe, and the two 
of them then lay down peacefully to sleep [og saa laegger de sig 
trygt til at sove]."^8 MUhlenfels had obviously succumbed to the 
planters' ideology. 
The St. Croix census data reached Copenhagen in the fall of 
1805 and were sent by the General Customs Department to the Committee 
on the Slave Trade on November 26. Eighteen months had elapsed since 
the royal resolution of May 25, 1804. The census of the slaves on 
St. Thomas and St. John arrived in the spring of 1806 and was sent 
to the committee on March 18. The victory won by Rosenstand-Goiske 
and Schimmelmann in May 1804 had thus provided a delay of nearly two 
1°8DSA, VGRGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from 
Governor MUhlenfels to General Customs Department, St. Croix, 
September 5, 1805, pp. 1-4. 
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years before reopening the slave trade could again be considered by 
the Crown. 
In the meantime, Rosenstand-Goiske and Oxholm debated 
abolition in the press, with Rosenstand-Goiske publishing a forty-one 
page article in Minerva in February 1805. He sought to soothe those 
who had hoped the slaves would be freed by the Crown, noting that 
abolition was not the same as emancipation and adding that the 
government could not free the slaves in the immediate future, for 
the slaves would first have to be prepared for freedom by "improved 
education and increased morality." Without such careful preparation, 
emancipation would be unwise, harmful to both the slaves and their 
masters. Rosenstand-Goiske was adopting the same stand toward 
emancipation as the Committee on the Slave Trade had in its report 
of December 28, 1791. He wrote that the Danish government preferred 
to move slowly and carefully toward emancipation, and the abolition 
edict had been a step in the right direction; the edict had also 
ended Denmark's role in the forced transport of Africans from their 
homeland. Another advantage of ending the slave trade was a reduction 
in the death rate of Danish sailors, as the "unhealthy" journey on 
the slave ships from the Gold Coast to the Caribbean claimed the lives 
of many sailors J 09 
109Rosenstand-Goiske, "Om Negerhandelens Ophaevelse i Hensyn 
til de danske vestindiske 0er," Minerva, February 1805, pp. 190-193. 
This reference to a higher-than-average death rate among Danish 
sailors on slave ships may have been inspired by Clarkson's compu­
tation of losses on English slave ships. 
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Oxholm's response to Rosenstand-Goiske's defense of the 
abolition edict came more than a year later. He agreed that the 
slave trade was immoral, but argued that Rosenstand-Goiske was 
mistaken in believing that sugar production could be maintained 
after abolition of the slave trade. He added that so long as the 
sale of slaves was permitted within the Danish islands, abolition 
of the trade in slaves from Africa and outside the islands would 
have little effect on slave treatment. Oxholm said it was nonsense 
to believe that a human being who was subject to sale cared where 
he was sold. He thereby ignored a basic tenet of the abolitionists: 
that when new slaves from outside the Danish West Indies were no 
longer available, the planters would place a higher value on their 
present slaves and, accordingly, treat them better. Oxholm, as 
Walterstorff in 1804, argued that the Danish slave trade was too 
insignificant to affect the well-being of Africans on the Gold Coast. 
And after providing the standard excuses for the planters' failure 
to buy more slaves in 1800-02, Oxholm failed to mention that African 
slaves had been legally available for sale on St. Croix in 1803 and 
that only 138 slaves out of 388 had been bought by St. Croix planters. 
(See p. 258 above.) Oxholm concluded by urging a reopening of the 
Danish slave trade for at least three years or, better yet, for as 
long as it might take to increase the plantation slave population of 
St. Croix to 30,000J10 This would require importing another 8,000 
TlOOxholm, "Nogle Anmaerkninger over en Afhandling om 
Negerhandelens Ophaevelse udi Maanedskriftet Minerva af Februarii 
1805, N.y Minerva, May 1806, pp. 129-131, pp. 146-47 and pp. 159-60. 
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slaves at least and, with a continued excess of deaths over births, 
would involve the indefinite continuation of the slave trade. 
Rosenstand-Goiske's reply to Oxholm was published two months 
later in N.y Minerva. He argued that the planters had exaggerated 
their need for slaves in 1792 in order to get the Crown to loan them 
as much money as possible, and he sought to refute Oxholm's article 
page by page. In response to Oxholm's statement that the slave trade 
from Africa to America was no more evil than the continued sale of 
slaves within the Danish islands, Rosenstand-Goiske wrote that surely 
Oxholm "cannot seriously mean that it is not a greater burden on a 
slave to be transported several thousand miles away from his homeland 
in an enclosed, unhealthy, foul room, uncertain of his fate and 
under agonizing fear for his future, than to be sold by one master 
to another in the same place?" He added: "Is there not an 
enormous difference for a peasant, .  . . when he is sold for a 
hunting dog, whether he remains in his own country or is sent, for 
example, to Siberia?" Regarding Oxholm's contention that discontinuing 
the Danish slave trade would not really help Africa, as the Danish 
islands normally required only 1,000 slaves a year, Rosenstand-Goiske 
commented that the fact remained that 1,000 fewer slaves would be 
taken from Africa for sale in the Caribbean: 
Is the fate of 1,000 persons so unimportant? One should not 
forget that the question here is not what is best for the slave 
traders but rather what is best for mankind [Er 1000 Menneskers 
Skiaebne saa liqeg.yldig? Man glemme dog ei, at her er ei 
Sp0rqsmaalet om Fordeten" for Menneskehandlere, men for 
Menneskenel.il 1 
mRosenstand-Goiske, "Noget mere om Negerhandelen i 
Anledning af Hr. Generalmajor Oxholms Anmarkninger," Ny Minerva, 
Rosenstand-Goiske said the Danish islands, even if the 
slave trade were permitted, would never acquire the number of 
plantation slaves which Oxholm believed they required, for the 
islands simply did not need that many slaves. To allow the slave 
trade to continue until 32,000 plantation slaves were present on 
St. Croix (Oxholm had said 30,000, not 32,000, were needed) would 
in effect guarantee that Denmark, which had provided the first 
example of a European nation ending its slave trade, would become 
the last nation where abolition actually occurred (og altsaa 
Danmark, som qav det f0rste Exempel paa at ophaeve Handelen, skulde 
bl ive det sidste, hvor det virkeligen skete.)112 
While Oxholm and Rosenstand-Goiske engaged in their debate, 
the Committee on the Slave Trade stalled further action by the 
Crown by making a careful study of the census data sent to Copenhagen 
by Mllhlenfels. The St. Croix Burger Council tried once more to get 
a response to its petition for a resumption of the slave tradeJ^ 
The General Customs Department told Crown Prince Frederik on 
November 3, 1806, that it was awaiting suggestions from the committee 
July 1806, p. 23, and pp. 28-29. That he was carefully following 
the progress of abolition in England, as Schimmelmann surely was, 
seems apparent from Rosenstand-Goiske's comment on p. 3 that Lord 
Grenville had been quoted in the British press as noting that Denmark 
had already ended its slave trade. 
112 Ibid., p. 39. 
I^dsA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, No. 840, 1806, Letter from 
Burger Council to General Customs Department, St. Croix, July 10, 
1806, p. 1. 
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before presenting its report on the future of the slave trade. 
The Crown Prince was constantly distracted by the threat of 
invasion and, beginning in 1803, he established headquarters near 
the southern border at the head of an army corps that eventually grew 
to 20,000. His control over the government in Copenhagen declined 
during his absence. It was therefore difficult for him to actively 
push for measures he favored, such as resumption of the slave trade, 
so long as the threat of attack from abroad persisted. 
The General Customs Department and the Committee on the Slave 
Trade took advantage of Frederik's preoccupation with foreign policy 
and his absence from Copenhagen. They obstructed the wishes of 
the planters and of the Crown Prince by delaying further action on 
the slave trade. As Schimmelmann and Rosenstand-Goiske observed 
the progress of the British abolitionists, they were surely 
encouraged to hope that British endorsement of abolition would 
ensure the survival of Danish abolition. 
As Britain had acquired foreign colonies during her conflict 
with France and the latter's allies, the threat of overproduction 
became obvious. Such underdeveloped colonies as Trinidad and Dutch 
Guiana, if sufficiently supplied with slaves, might produce enough 
sugar to glut the market and, consequently, force down the price of 
^DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Kopibog, Letter from General 
Customs Department to Crown Prince Frederik, November 3, 1806, p. 1. 
115Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, VII, Part 1, pp. 119-20, 
161-62. 
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sugar produced by the old British sugar islands. An initial step 
toward coping with the problem of overproduction was taken in 1802, 
when the British government decided against a massive sale of 
Crown land on Trinidad, thereby eliminating a potentially enormous 
market for the slave trade.^6 An Order-in-Council of August 15, 
1805, banned the slave trade to captured colonies. In 1806 
Parliament outlawed the sale of slaves to foreign colonies as well 
as captured territories, ending more than half of the British slave 
trade. The remainder of the British slave trade was abolished by 
a law signed on March 25, 1807.^ 
Denmark's traditional, and profitable, policy of neutrality 
was subjected to increasing pressure in 1807. After a British force 
attacked Copenhagen in August and seized the Danish fleet there, 
Crown Prince Frederik allied his country with France. Danish 
overseas territories, including the West Indian islands, were 
occupied by Britain. Denmark's future role in the Atlantic slave 
trade had been decided permanently. The British occupation of the 
Danish West Indies ended only in April 1815 when Major General Peter 
Lotharius Oxholm, the new Danish governor, resumed control of the 
islands for Denmark.^8 
^Patrick C. Lipscomb, "Party Politics, 1801-1802: George 
Canning and the Trinidad Question," The Historical Journal, XII 
(1969), 446-47, 462-63. 
^7See David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age 
of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975;, 
pp. 443-49, and Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British 
Abo!ition, pp. 395-402. 
^8Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 230-36. 
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Conclusion 
Three considerations influenced Ernst Schimmelmann in 1791 
when he began his inquiry into the feasibility of abolishing the 
Danish Atlantic slave trade. First, he was keenly aware of the 
unprovability of the slave trade. Second, he was carefully 
following the progress of the British abolitionists and feared that 
abolition by Britain, and perhaps France, would endanger the future 
supply of slaves to the Danish West Indies. Third, he was personally 
opposed to the slave trade as an immoral enterprise. 
The slave trade was always a risky venture, and the various 
Danish companies involved in the trade during the eighteenth century 
normally staved off bankruptcy by relying on government largesse and 
on wars between other European colonial powers. But the government 
tired of the burden, and wars did not last forever. The committee 
Schimnelmann created in 1786 to study the Guinea trade concluded that 
nothing but further losses could be anticipated. There was obviously 
no future for any Danish slave-trading company. This was the main 
"economic" motive for abolishing the Danish slave trade. But this 
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desire to avoid further losses from participation in the slave trade 
does not suffice to account for abolition; the earlier failures of 
Danish slave-trading companies had not given rise to a move to end 
Danish participation in the trade. Also, the Danish government, in 
supporting abolition iri 1791-92, could merely have ended active 
Danish participation in the trade, sold the Guinea forts, and relied 
on foreign slavers to supply the Danish West Indies. This would have 
been welcomed in the colonies, where Danish monopoly slave-trading 
companies were traditionally regarded with suspicion and even hatred. 
A secondary economic influence on Schimmelmann's thinking 
in 1791 was his realization that slaves born in the sugar islands 
were more cooperative and dependable than those brought from Africa. 
He criticized the West Indian planters in a letter of June 18, 1791, 
for failing to realize that their own benefit lay in creating a 
stable, self-perpetuating labor force rather than continuing to 
depend on the slave trade. The abolition edict was in part an 
attempt by the Crown to encourage the planters to adopt a more 
reasonable approach to the long-range needs of the colonial economy. 
Schimmelmann's preference for creole slaves was also based on 
evidence that they were less inclined than African slaves to revolt. 
Schimmelmann's Bedenken showed that he believed the British 
abolitionists would soon put an end to their country's slave trade. 
He thought the abolitionists' failure in 1791 had resulted from 
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their insistence on immediate abolition. Perhaps other slave-trading 
nations, such as France, would join Britain in outlawing the slave 
trade. If they did, Denmark would face strong pressure to abolish 
its slave trade on dangerously short notice, and the Danish sugar 
islands might suffer a serious shortage of laborers. Schimmelmann 
felt the risk of untimely pressure from foreign powers could be 
reduced if Denmark soon announced its intention to abolish the 
slave trade to its colonies. But a period of preparation was 
needed to assure a smooth transition and to minimize any problems 
for sugar production after the trade ended. 
There can be no doubt that Schimmelmann despised the slave 
trade. He devoted five pages of his twenty-page Bedenken to 
criticism of the trade, pointing out not only the horrors it 
inflicted on the slaves during the Middle Passage but emphasizing 
its evil impact on African society as well. The report of the 
Committee on the Slave Trade—a committee Schimmelmann called into 
being and dominated—amplified his attack on the slave trade as 
inhumane and said the trade was virtually indistinguishable from 
murder. The committee placed greatest emphasis on attacking the 
trade as immoral and uncivilized. If abolition could be accomplished 
without harming the economy of the islands, it was the duty of the 
Crown to end the trade. Schimmelmann and the committee managed to 
convince themselves that abolition would not be harmful. They were 
taking a "leap in the dark," however, as no sugar island had ever 
achieved a balance of slave births and deathsJ 
By setting a date for abolition, Schimmelmann hoped that 
the planters could be induced to adopt a policy of amelioration to 
protect their own self-interest. But amelioration failed, for 
the planters did not take the abolition edict seriously and 
continued to concentrate on short-term profits. Reforms to benefit 
the slaves were never enforced because the colonial government 
advised against any tampering with the property rights of the 
slaveholders. The Crown, fearful of antagonizing the planters, 
accepted this advice. 
The abolition edict had been predicated on the assumption 
that Britain would soon adopt abolition and that the Danish islands 
would, by 1803, have succeeded in balancing slave births and deaths. 
Neither of these assumptions had proved true when the date came for 
ending the slave trade to the Danish West Indies. The St. Croix 
planters appealed for an extension of time for the slave trade, and 
Walterstorff convinced Crown Prince Frederik to favor their point of 
view. Schimmelmann, however, refused to abandon his earlier stand 
^As pointed out earlier, the abolition edict and the version 
of the committee's report published in Minerva endeavored to avoid 
inflammatory statements regarding the immorality of the slave trade 
so as not to raise unnecessary opposition to abolition. Carol Gold, 
because she read only the edict and Kirstein's summary of the report 
in Minerva, recently concluded that the Danish edict was motivated 
primarily by economic considerations. See Carol Gold, "The Danish 
Reform Era, 1784-1800 " (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wisconsin, 1975), p. 182. A reading of Schimmelmann's Bedenken 
and the full unprinted report of the committee, however, reveals 
the presence of a powerful humanitarian influence. 
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in support of abolition. In opposing an extension of the slave trade, 
Schimmelmann was guided by his long-standing belief that the trade 
was immoral. His own plantations suffered a decline in their slave 
population from September 1800 to 1804.2 Abolition clearly meant 
that his plantations might continue to lose slaves. As his great 
wealth was derived primarily from the productive capacity of his 
slave labor-force, it is apparent that the humanitarian aspect of 
abolition was of primary significance for him in 1804. Yet 
Schimmelmann was surely aware that his plantations would probably 
enjoy an advantage over others in adjusting to abolition. 
Schimmelmann was joined by Rosenstand-Goiske of the General 
Customs Department in warding off the planters' appeal. 
Rosenstand-Goiske, unlike Schimmelmann, was motivated exclusively by 
humanitarian considerations. He lacked Schimmelmann's gentlemanly 
tolerance for the views of others and was prepared to wage a single-
minded, uncompromising struggle to protect the abolition edict. 
He, not Schimmelmann, pointed out the flaws in the slave-population 
data provided by the colonial government and forcefully attacked 
Walterstorff's arguments for resuming the slave trade. Rosenstand-
Goiske was more effective than Schimmelmann as a defender of the 
abolition edict in 1804. He shares credit with Schimmelmann for 
2DSA, Ernst Schimmelmanns Privat Arkiv, Pk. 73a, 
Fideikommisset vedkommende Papirer, 1801-1815. In September 1800 
the four Schimmelmann plantations had 948 slaves; in September 1801 
they had 932; in September 1804, 913. From September 1801 to 
September 1802, fourteen slaves were bom on the St. Croix plantations 
and twenty-six died. 
compelling the Danish Crown to enforce the edict. Because of their 
efforts, Denmark remained the first European slave-trading power 
to outlaw participation by its subjects in the slave trade. The 
example provided by Denmark did not pass unnoticed in Britain, where 
the most important struggle against the Atlantic slave trade was 
being waged. 
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APPENDIX I 
Slave Code for the Danish West Indies, 
prepared by Governor Philip Garde!in, 
September 5, 1733 
1. The ringleaders of runaway slaves shall be pinched three times 
with red-hot iron and thereafter hanged. 
2. Slaves involved in a conspiracy shall lose a leg, unless the 
owners wish to lower the sentence to 150 lashes and the loss of 
an ear. 
3. Participants in a conspiracy, who do not reveal the conspiracy 
to a white, shall be branded on the forehead and given 100 
lashes. 
4. A slave who provides information about a slave conspiracy shall 
receive ten piasters for every slave found guilty, and his name 
shall be kept secret. 
5. A runaway slave who has been gone eight days shall be punished 
with 150 lashes, one who has been gone twelve weeks shall lose 
a leg, and one who has been gone six months shall be executed, 
unless his master wishes to lower the punishment to the loss of 
a leg. 
6. A black who has stolen something worth four rigsdaler shall be 
pinched [with red-hot iron] and then hanged. Small thefts shall 
be punished by a branding on the forehead and 100 to 150 lashes. 
7. Slaves who receive stolen goods .  .  .  shall be branded and 
receive 150 lashes. 
8. Those who conceal runaway slaves [Maroon-Negre] shall receive 
the same punishment. 
9. A black who in anger raises his hand against a white or 
threatens a white or speaks harshly to a white [giver ham 
knubbede Ord], shall . . .  be punched three times [with red-hot 
iron] and then hanged, if the white demands it; if not, the 
black shall lose a hand. 
10. The word of an honorable [retskaffen] white shall suffice 
against a black, and if there should be unsolved questions 
[Formodninger] in the case, the black can be tortured. 
11. A black who meets a white on the road shall step to the side 
and stand still until the white has passed him by, under 
punishment of a beating [Lusing] by the white. 
12. No slave may be seen in town with a club [Stok] or a knife, nor 
may the slaves fight among themselves with clubs or knives, 
without receiving fifty lashes. 
13. Witchcraft practiced by the blacks shall be punished by a heavy 
beating. 
14. A black who is convicted of having intended to poison someone 
shall be pinched three times with red-hot iron, and thereafter 
broken on the wheel and placed while still alive on a raised 
platform. 
15. A free Negro who receives stolen goods from a runaway [Maroon] 
or a thief or other harmful black, shall lose his freedom, his 
possessions, and after a lashing be deported. 
16. Dancing, celebrations, gambling and the like by the blacks shall 
be strictly forbidden, unless such activities occur with the 
permission of the master or overseer and in the presence of the 
latter. 
17. No black may sell supplies for cattle or anything else without 
a permission card from his master. 
18. Plantation slaves may not stay in town after taps [Tappenstreg], 
under punishment of being brought into the fort and given a 
beating. 
19. The prosecutor shall strictly maintain observance of these 
articles, in accordance with which free Negroes and slaves shall 
be judged in court, and this manifesto shall be publicized three 
times a year with a beating of the drums J 
H0st, Efterretninger om 0en Sanct Thomas, pp. 85-88. 
298 
APPENDIX II 
Paul Erdmann Isert 's account of the slave revolt on the Danish 
slave ship "Christiansborg," October 8, 1786, and the 
journey to St. Croix, concluding with the sale of the slaves. 
Isert described the fears that gripped the slaves as they 
were loaded onto the ship: 
In their homelands such a multitude of frightful tales are 
told about the way slaves are used in America that, if they had 
heard them, they were terrified. A slave once asked me, in full 
seriousness, if the shoes that I wore were not made of the skin 
of Negroes [Neger-Leder]. For he had noticed that my shoes were 
of the same color as his skin. Others say that we eat the slaves 
and make gunpowder out of their bones.'  They can not imagine 
that they will only be used in agricultural and other occupations, 
since in their homeland so few hands and so little time are 
needed for the work of sustaining life that it  would be quite 
The belief that Europeans intended to eat their black 
slaves was widespread in Africa. See Mungo Park, Travels in the 
Interior Districts of Africa: performed under the Direction and 
Patronage of the African Association, in the Years 1795, 1796, and 
1797 (New York, 1813), pp. 231-32, cited in Elizabeth Donnan, 
Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, 
Vol. II, The Eighteenth Century (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Institution of Washington, 1931), pp. 634-35. Park traveled with a 
slave caravan from the interior down to the Coast. He noted the 
slaves' fear that Europeans were cannibals. The slaves refused to 
believe Park when he told them that in America they would be used 
as agricultural workers; their belief "that the whites purchase 
Negroes for the purpose of devouring them, or of selling them to 
others that they may be devoured hereafter" made necessary a careful 
watch over the slaves during the journey to keep them from escaping. 
Oldendorp wrote that African-born slaves in the Danish West Indies 
had told him of their initial fear that they were to be eaten by 
white cannibals in America. See his Geschichte der Mission der 
evangelischen Brdder, I,  p. 361. 
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unnecessary fdberflflssig] for them to import foreigners.2  
Now a word about an insurrection [tlberlaufe] of the slaves on 
the ship on which I sailed. In the middle of the deck a slave 
ship is equipped with a high, strong, wodden barrier [Scheidewand] 
which is called the quarter-deck [Schanze], the side of which 
facing the forward part of the ship is extremely smooth and must 
be without any open grooves so that the slaves can not get a grip 
in it with their fingers. On top of this barrier there are placed 
as many small cannon and muskets as there is room for; these guns 
are always loaded and are fired every evening to keep the slaves 
fearful. There are always guards by the guns; the guards must 
keep a close watch on the movements of the slaves. Astern [im 
hintertheile] . . .  of the quarter-deck are all of the women 
and children, and outside in front of the quarter-deck are the 
men, who can neither see nor get together with the women. The 
men are always chained together in pairs, hand and foot. 
Moreover, through the rows, as they sit on the deck, heavy chains 
are drawn across their feet, so that they cannot stand without 
permission; furthermore they must not move from that place except 
in the morning when they are allowed up on the deck and in the 
evenings when they go back down below deck. However, because 
their number is so great, they can enjoy this motion only every 
other day; on alternate days they must remain below, where they 
are packed together like herring. 
It was on the second day of our journey, .  .  .  that the 
insurrection broke out. I was at the time alone among the slaves, 
joking [scherzte] with some of those from the most civilized 
tribes whose own language I understood. Since among such a crowd 
there is always considerable confusion, I was made aware that 
something was amiss when suddenly a great stillness began. 
Because at that time the greater part of the crew were eating, 
I wanted to go towards the bow in order to see whether everyone 
there was at his post, in case the slaves were thinking of 
staging an insurrection. As I reached approximately the middle 
of the ship, the door of the quarter-deck opened and the first 
mate started to come toward me. But at that moment a cry rang 
out from all the men that was the most horrible sound imaginable, 
which nevertheless bore a resemblance to a cry which I had heard 
, previously during an attack in battle. With this cry every man 
rose who previously, as usual, had been sitting. Some of them 
struck me on the head with the manacles with which they were 
chained together, so that I immediately fell to the deck. Since 
they were also bound together by their feet, I was able to crawl 
away from them and reach the quarter-deck door. But here I 
knocked this time in vain. Then when the crew wanted to let me 
^Isert, Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln, 
p. 306-07. 
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in, such a mass of slaves grasped the door that it was very 
difficult for the crew to close it again. And it  is the agreed 
policy preferably to let some Europeans be killed rather than 
allow the slaves to take control of the door, for once they did 
they could reach the rear of the ship where all of our weapons 
were located, and then it would be simple for them to become 
masters of the ship. In the meantime they did not let me 
remain idly by the door for long, but rather soon made me as 
before hit the deck [den Boden suchen]. However, as the crew 
at the rear of the ship learned what was happening outside, they 
sought to keep the quarter-deck clear by using bayonets from 
above. So, in order to get me into a better place in which to 
kill me, the slaves pulled me by my feet to the front of the 
ship, where one of them who had grabbed a shearing knife 
[Scheermesse] from the slave who was shaving him when the 
rebellion began, slashed me across my forehead, cutting the 
temporal artery and my ear, and stabbing deeply into my throat. 
But because I wore a thick silk kerchief, he remained occupied 
with my throat and could not accomplish his purpose at once, 
and a bullet from the quarter-deck came to my rescue, passing 
through the slave's chest, at which he fell back and the other 
slave who held me let go, by which means I once more became free. 
The crew fired still more assorted shots in addition to two 
three-pound cannon which were loaded with peas. At this the 
slaves as quickly as possible retreated towards the bow of the 
ship in order to escape the shots. In this way thus the quarter­
deck door was cleared, and as I was still strong enough I crawled 
over there, with a stream of blood marking my progress, for my 
right temporal artery had been cut. The first mate had also 
received various wounds, though they were not as serious as mine, 
and because he was a better seaman than I, he saved himself by 
means of going overboard through a cannon hatch and climbing 
back up on the other side of the quarter-deck. In the meantime 
the slaves had already in varying degrees hammered off their 
manacles, when the crew made a sortie from the quarter-deck in 
order to take the slaves, either by conciliatory [Gdte] or 
forceful means back down into their chambers. And when the crew 
did this, supported by their guns, a number of slaves who had 
not been included in the conspiracy went down to their chamber 
without any more ado. But the others, when they saw that they 
could accomplish nothing, all jumped overboard into the sea. 
Some boys from the same tribe who lacked the heart for this rash 
step were intentionally pushed overboard by their parents. The 
crew made sure of the slaves below deck, launched as quickly as 
possible the small boats, and took custody once again of as many 
slaves as possible, some still alive, others dead. It was 
astonishing how several of the pairs of slaves, although they had 
only a hand and a foot free (they were chained together with the 
other hand and foot) nevertheless were able with great skill to 
keep themselves above the water. Some were obstinate in the face 
of death itself and definatly threw away the ropes which had been 
thrown down around them from the ship in order to pull them out, 
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and then they sank forcefully. Among the others was a pair 
which could not agree: one demanded to be saved, but the other 
wanted to die; therefore the one who desired to drown pulled 
the other forcibly with him under water as the latter screamed 
pitifully- The latter slave was saved, though his comrade had 
already surrendered up his spirit [Geist]. 
The chaos lasted for two hours before it  was entirely 
quelled. After a count we found that we had lost thirty-four 
slaves during the insurrection, all of whom had drowned; whereas 
of the Europeans, there were none killed, though two .  .  .  were 
wounded. 
As for me, I found myself in very awkward condition. For 
by that time I had lost so much blood that my strength swiftly 
declined to the point where I could not even bind my wound, but 
rather merely put a few handkerchiefs around my head in order 
a s  m u c h  a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  s t o p  t h e  b l e e d i n g  . . . .  
Isert passed out but was well tended to and had fully 
recovered by the time the "Christiansborg" reached St. Croix two 
months later. 
In that I could not have caused the slaves to suffer much 
in those two days at sea prior to the rising, you may well ask 
why they were so incensed against me from the start of the 
insurrection. I learned later that they had believed that, 
because I was the last to board the ship, I was the owner of 
all the slaves, and that it would be best to send me to the 
next world first, for then the rest of the Europeans, as 
h i r e l i n g s ,  w o u l d  s u r r e n d e r  q u i c k e r  . . . .  
One of the ring leaders of the conspiracy was a slave who 
had already been in the West Indies and in England and who, 
I do not know how, had returned to the Gold Coast, where he 
found a place in our service as a boatsman. On the coast he had 
gone so deeply into debt that, merely in order to get rid of 
him, he was sent to the West Indies on our ship. This villain 
[Btisewicht] had persuaded the slaves that they simply ought to 
beat the whites to death; then he would soon bring the ship 
back to land, even if they were still far out at sea. He told 
them moreover many things both true and false about the West 
Indies; for example, that it  was a land of misery [Plage], where 
they would have little to eat but would be worked hard and beaten. 
H e  w a s  i n  f a c t  a  d a n g e r o u s  p e r s o n  . . . .  
Except for this unhappy uprising, we would have made a very 
profitable [vortheilhafte] journey, as only seven slaves died 
on the way to St. Croix, which for such a crowd of people in 
such a situation is a very small number. There are instances 
where slave ships have brought to the West Indies no more than 
half the slaves which they purchased in Africa . . . .  On the 
"Christiansborg" the greatest cleanliness was observed, and the 
slaves had to go up onto the deck every other day and move about 
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as much as space permitted. By means of ventilators .  .  .  
the slaves were provided with as much fresh air below deck as 
possible. In the evening, before they were allowed back down 
in their quarters, all the chambers were well fumigated with 
dampened gun powder [rflucherte man alle Kammern mit anqefeuchteten 
Schiesspulver wol ausj. The slaves' food consisted for the most 
part of products from their native land, such as maize, wild rice, 
a n d  y a m s  . . . .  
A few days after our arrival at St. Croix the fate [Schicksal] 
of our slaves was decided. They had been brought ashore, cleaned 
[ausputzen] in the best manner possible according to the way of 
their homeland, permitted all kinds of liberties, . . .  so that 
they were persuaded that they had arrived in a paradise. But 
appearances deceived. The day of their sale arrived. They were 
placed in rows and ranks . . . .  The door was opened: an army 
of buyers rushed in, and scrambled away, like maniacs, with 
those male and female slaves whom they had noticed in previous 
days, when the slaves had been on display, and brought them 
before a seller in order to agree on a price. The whole thing 
occurred in such a fury, that I myself soon became frightened 
.  .  .  .  After four hours most of the slaves had been purchased. 
The remaining forty-eight slaves consisted mostly of frail 
[Gebrechlichen] or aged Negroes, who were sold the next day 
through the bank for 200 thaler each. The sum price for all the 
slaves sold amounted to more than 97,000 thaler.3 
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Number of ships used in the slave trade, 1778-1789 
Year Ships Year Ships 
1778 3 1785 8 
1779 2 1786 3 
1780 1 1787 4 
1781 5 1788 2 
1782 5 1789 2 
1783 7 1790 1 
1784 8 1791 12 
^"Udtog af Forestillingen til Kongen angaaende Negerhandelens 
Afskaffelse," Minerva, April 1792, p. 53. 
2 I b i d . ,  p .  5 4 .  
APPENDIX IV 
Slave deaths on Danish ships sailing 
to St. Croix and on St. Croix prior to sale, 1778-87 
Name of Name of Number of Slave Deaths Slaves sold Slaves sent 
Ship Captain Slaves On. journey On St. Croix Total on St. Croix for sale 
bought in to St Croix prior deaths elsewhere 
Af ri ca to sale 
Christiansborg Westmarker 304 27 16 43 261 
Fredensborg Terents 421 102 41 143 276 
Rio Volta Hammer 472 77 24 101 371 
Acra Aseni us 440 10 3 13 427 
Christiansborg Hiorth 576 10 13 23 379 173 
Ningo West Bohn 476 22 16 38 438 
Rio Volta Hammer 469 71 7 78 391 
Acra Mtfller 592 230 27 257 155 180 
Christiansborg Hiorth 457 120 5 125 132 199 
Fredensborg Terents 540 26 4 30 510 
Gehejmeraad Beck 250 102 1 103 147 
Guldberg 
Gehejmeraad Holm 331 41 1 42 289 
Stampe 
Greve Boldt - - 2 2 296 
Schimmelmann 
Uppernavik Wall0e 201 5 3 8 193 
Greve Schroder — 2 2 115 
Bernstorff 
Christiansborg Berg 457 49 2 51 406 
Ada Higgins 120 1 0 1 119 
Total 6,106 893 167 1,060 4,905 552 
SOURCE: Government of Danish West Indies, Report on Slave Trade, October 15, 1787. 
APPENDIX V 
Lists of slaves from Africa sold on St. Croix, 1778-1787 
Name of Ship Name of Captain Date of Arrival Number of slaves brought to St. Croix Amount of 
sale in 
rigsdaler 
Men Women Boys Girls Babi es Total 
Christiansborg Niels Westmarker May 24, 1778 121 70 43 27 2 261 53,311 
Fredensborg Johann Terents Feb. 10, 1779 155 74 31 16 3 276 56,248 
Rio Volta Andreas Hammer March 18, 1779 206 109 41 15 4 371 81,759 
Acra Erich Asenius May 22, 1779 244 77 72 34 4 427 89,789 
Christiansborg Jtfrgen Hiorth Dec. 6, 1779 292 135 69 56 3 552 112,601 
Ningo Niels "West Bolin Aug. 29, 1780 196 72 112 58 3 438 92,540 
Rio Volta Andreas Hammer June 2, 1781 169 68 95 59 391 86,400 
Acra S. A. M/611 er Aug. 30, 1,781 48 39 25 43 155 25,870 
Christiansborg Jjirgen Hiorth Oct. 12,1781 18 30 52 43 6 143 28,592 
Fredensborg Johann Terents Nov. 16,1781 269 130 55 56 11 510 121,286 
Geheimeraad Niels Beck Feb. 29, 1784 64 44 21 18 2 147 33,155 
Guldberg 
Geheimeraad Holm June 1, 1784 125 61 71 32 289 59,472 
Stampe 
Greve Rasmus Boldt Nov. 27, 1784 106 70 82 38 296 61,302 
Schimmelmann 
Uppernavik Walltfe March 9, 1785 67 75 29 22 1 193 38,893 
Greve Schroder Jan. 11, 1786 51 37 21 6 115 24,410 
Bernstorff 
Christiansborg Berg Dec. 18,1786 160 96 86 64 6 406 97,440 
Ada Isaac Higgens June 28, 1787 51 27 22 19 4 119 27,061 
Total 2,342 1 ,214 927 606 49 5,089** 1,090,132a 
aBecause of some rounding off, the sums from each sale ^Total does not include babies, 
add up to a few riqsdaler less than this total. 
SOURCE: Government of Danish West Indies, Report on Slave Trade, October 15, 1787. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Excerpts from the report by the government of the Danish 
West Indies to the General Customs Department on the condition of 
the Danish slave trade with suggestions as to ways in which the 
slave trade might be improved, October 15, 1787. 
Because the investigations made with regard to the slave 
trade indicated that the excessively low prices which are paid 
for slaves in the Danish West Indian islands in comparison with 
prices paid for slaves in the colonies of other nations have 
had not a small influence in making the slave trade unprofitable, 
we believe that the following circumstance is well deserving 
of attention: that most of the Guinea Company's [Baltic-Guinea 
Company] expeditions took place in war time, when the French 
islands had virtually no supply of slaves, except for what the 
Danish Guinea Company or Portuguese ships could supply them, 
which meant that prices for slaves had to be higher in the 
French colonies, where there were more buyers J 
In calculating the outcome of each individual expedition, 
it  is possible that the profits of the return cargo have been 
included, and this naturally must have favored the sales made 
on the French islands. Indeed, with regard to the cargo, a 
noticeable difference results depending on whether a ship is 
loaded with brown sugar or with partly refined [daekkede] 
sugar, coffee, and indigo.2 The majority of the slaves who 
have been brought to St. Croix come from Fort Christiansborg. 
The ships have had a trip of three or four months' duration, 
with considerable illness and fatalities among the slaves. Also, 
The Baltic-Guinea Company was created only in 1781; from 
1777 until 1781 there was no "Guinea" company, though Danish merchants 
enjoyed a monopoly on the slave trade to the Danish West Indies in 
those years. 
O 
'•Unlike the French islands, the Danish West Indies produced 
only brown sugar. For production of semi-refined or clayed sugar 
on the French islands, see Deerr, History of Sugar, I,  pp. 232ff. 
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because of slave risings [overlflb], especially on the ships 
"Christiansborg" and "Acra" in 1781 and on the former also this 
past year, a considerable number of slaves have been lost. On 
the other hand the ships destined for the French colonies sailed 
for the most part from Upper Guinea fOvenkysten] which involves 
a trip of six to eight weeks; the slaves on these ships are 
healthier because of the shorter journey, and they haven't 
been locked up in a crowded fort, often without a roof, in rain 
and filth; this is especially the case at Fort Fredensborg. 
But however much lower the price in the Danish colonies 
might have been than in the French colonies, we are still 
convinced that the company might have profited from the cargoes 
of slaves sold here on St. Croix, if the Company had always 
supplied its forts, lodges, and ships with enough merchandise 
of the right kind and of dependable quality; if it  had used 
suitable ships .  .  .  for the slave trade, and if the ships were 
economically and quickly fitted out; if the Company's captains 
had imposed neatness, economy, cleanliness, and vigilance on 
board their ships, so that neither sickness nor rebellion had 
caused a loss for the Company, if the captains had been active, 
.  .  .  and experts at business; if the Company had sent its 
expenditions to and from the most appropriate places--we know, 
for example, from reliable sources that during the war one 
could buy on the Gold Coast a fine male slave for 120 gallons 
of rum, and a fine female slave for 100 gallons of rum; and, 
finally, if the cargoes brought to St. Croix had been properly 
balanced as to the numbers of men, women, boys, and girls. 
But if the employees of the Company who are concerned with 
the details of the trade have not followed the so-very-necessary 
rules listed above in every trading operation but especially in 
the Guinea trade, then one should not be surprised that the 
Company has suffered losses on its expeditions, but rather that 
the Company still exists. 
From the year 1778 until today 5,089 slaves have been sold 
for the Guinea Company on St. Croix, namely: 2,342 adult male 
slaves; 1,214 adult female slaves; 927 boys; and 606 girls. All 
of these were delivered for 1,090,132 riqsdaler vestindisk courant 
or 214 rigsdaler apiece. 
The report estimates the slaves brought to St. Croix cost 
the company about 653,948 rigsdaler vestindisk courant, so that 
slave trading should have yielded a profit of 436,184 riqsdaler. 
The poor condition the ships of Captain Westmarker and Captain 
Terentz were in when they arrived at St. Croix in 1778 [because 
of disease on board] .  .  .  naturally reduced very much the profit 
on the slaves sold here. 
But what has been of particular importance in making the sale 
of slaves unprofitable on St. Croix was that the Royal Guinea 
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Trade Management [den kongelige Guineiske Handels Direktion] 
gave instructions on April 17, 1781, that of the slaves on the 
four ships then en route to St. Croix from Africa—the "Rio 
Volta," "Aira," "Christiansborg," and "Fredensburg"--only a 
limited number could be sold on St. Croix so that there would 
remain on each of the ships between 250 and 300 of the best 
slaves who were to be taken to St. Thomas to be sold there or, 
as circumstances might dictate, be sent on from St. Thomas for 
sale elsewhere; these instructions were not removed by subsequent 
letters of September 3, 1781, and March 26, 1782, but rather 
were made into a general rule. This step naturally has caused 
great discontent [Misforn0ielse]; indeed, it  has led to a feeling 
of hatred for the company among the St. Croix planters, who 
believed the purpose of the company was to supply this colony 
frequently with good slaves. Other merchants were in effect 
barred from participating in this particular branch of commerce 
because of the company's monopoly on trade with the Danish forts, 
especially Rio Volta, where the best slaves are and where there 
was no danger of being seized by the privateers of the warring 
powers. 
Everyone who knows the least bit about the slave trade is 
aware that if, out of a cargo of 400 to 500 slaves, one removes 
250 to 300 of the best, the remainder must be rather wretched 
material [uselt T0j] and can not be worth close to 50 per cent 
as much as the choice ones. We might also add, for we know it  
with certainty, that nothing but the most extreme need for slaves 
can have induced the residents of St. Croix to purchase these 
rejects . . . .  Many have belived that the losses which the 
Company has suffered in the French islands because of rejection 
of a certain number of slaves, unreliable debtors, often poor 
return cargoes, and the Guinea Company ships' long stopover and 
the costs that such a delay runs up, can have appreciably reduced 
the difference between the sales price of slaves on the French 
islands and the sales price on St. Croix. 
We have stated all of these details [Omstaendiqheder] without 
holding back anything because government servants ought not fear 
to speak the truth, and as we never suspect and even less cast 
aspersions on the motives [Hensigter] of others, so we are not 
ashamed to mention certain errors that have been committed 
whenever we happen to discover them and when we must mention 
them so that we can give the correct reasons for the lack of 
success of one or another branch of commerce. 
It cannot be denied that 214 rigsdaler apiece is, in view of 
the difficulties and risks associated with the slave trade, not 
a concordant price. But if one wants, in addition to what has 
already been pointed out, further proof that this price is not 
the result so much of local conditions on St. Croix as of a 
combination of abundant bad luck and the poor condition of the 
slaves brought to St. Croix due to illness or rebellion on board 
the ships, then one can consult the enclosed Table A for more 
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detailed elucidation.^ From i t  one can see that the mortality 
rate, especially during the journey from the Gold Coast to 
St. Croix, has been particularly great on most of the ships 
[see Appendix III]. This then is also proof that the slave 
cargoes have not been good, healthy ones. .  .  . The two ships 
previously used in whaling, the "Geheimeraad Guldberg" under 
command of Captain Beck and the "Grev Ernst Schimmelmann" under 
command of Captain Rasmus Boldt, will in particular be found to 
have suffered losses of about 40 per cent of the total number of 
slaves on board. The doctors appointed to this island have also 
noted that in general the surgeons on the ships of the Guinea 
Company are ignorant and unskilled. The planters easily pump 
[udfritte] information from the crew members and learn whether 
there has been a slave rising on board; and when they find out 
that there has been, they become less inclined to purchase slaves 
from that particular cargo. 
When one adds the value of the select slaves that are sent 
away from St. Croix for sale on St. Thomas to the value of the 
slaves sold on St. Croix, it  becomes apparent that the actual 
price of slaves arriving here has ranged from 220 to 240 rigsdaler 
apiece.4  In the future, according to our best judgment, healthy 
and well-assorted slave cargoes will continue to be delivered 
here for between 230 and 240 rigsdaler apiece. 
It is certainly important to guarantee the Danish West Indies 
a regular supply of good slaves. This matter deserves the 
greatest support of the General Customs Department [here referred 
to as det kongl. vestindiske Kammer]. 
The enclosed Table B shows that the supply of slaves to 
St. Croix with the ships of the Guinea Company does not amount 
to more than 508 slaves per year; one should also note that in 
1782 and 1783 not one cargo of slaves was brought to St. Croix. 
As this colony needs at least three times the aforesaid number 
of slaves each year, we cannot see that any loss for the planters 
and residents would result were the Baltic-Guinea Company to be 
freed of all duty [Forpligtelse] to transport slaves to St. Croix 
in exchange for the Company's renunciation of its monopoly on the 
slave trade from Danish Guinea.5  
^In fact Table A, here used as Appendix III, shows that nearly 
all slaves brought to St. Croix were sold on the island and were not 
taken on to St. Thomas, as the colonial government charged. 
^This is merely an attempt by the government, based on its 
false assertion that the better half of each slave cargo was withheld 
from sale on St. Croix, to show that prices for slaves on St. Croix 
were higher than they actually were. 
^Actually, the Baltic-Guinea Company had no legal duty to 
supply slaves to St. Croix; it  could and did sell slaves whereever 
prices were best. The "duty" which the colonial government refers 
to was a moral one only. 
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We propose (1) that all Danish ships and vessels, including 
those based at St. Croix (but not those from St. Thomas, because 
they are less likely to be Danish-owned), be allowed to visit 
all places on the Guinea Coast, including the Danish forts and 
establishments, for the purpose of buying slaves which they 
should be allowed to sell anywhere they desire; (2) that such 
ships be permitted to load, at any place in or outside of the 
King's states and colonies, the most suitable cargo with which 
to conduct trade on the Guinea Coast, in return for paying a 
double tax [Recognition] on each slave brought to St. Croix in 
instances where the consignment [Partfliet] has not sailed 
diectly from the King's European states or from St. Croix, or 
has visited foreign states during its journey; (3) that in 
regard to every type of cargo (with the single exception of 
slaves) which such ships might contain when they reach St. Croix, 
the ships are to be treated according to the customs regulations 
of the colony. 
Because the English captains are in general better acquainted 
with the slave trade, have less fear of the influence of the 
climate on their health, and therefore work with greater pleasure 
and energy than most Danish captains; also because it  is of such 
great importance for the outcome of an expedition that the 
captain understand the trade and be able to speak the most common 
language [English] on the Gold Coast [er det paa Kysten meest 
giaengse Sporg maegtig] and that he not become so ill or 
uncomfortable as a result of discouragement or yearning for his 
native land that he neglects to look after the best interests 
of the shipping company, we would think that in order to promote 
the slave trade an exception could be made to the rule which 
requires that a captain be a native-born Danish subject [indf0dt 
dansk Undersaat] and that, on the contrary, the following rules 
could be accepted, by which in addition Danish first and second 
mates would be made into [klaekket] good captains for the 
slave trade: The captains of all Danish ships sailing 
to the coast shall hold Danish citizenship [danske Borger], 
but the first and second mates, as well as half the crew 
.  .  .  shall be the King's native-born subjects; and neither 
the captains nor more than one-third of the crew shall be the 
subjects of warring powers. 
It will be the responsibility of the party concerned 
[Vedkommende] when granting sea-passes to ships, especially on 
St. Croix, to make sure that all the owners of the ship for which 
a pass is requested are really Danish citizens and subjects, and 
no foreigner, neither directly nor indirectly, has a share in the 
consignment. Such careful study of each request for a sea-pass 
would mean less dependence on oaths--the sacred nature of oaths 
was only too seldom respected during the last war--and more 
dependence on local knowledge about the capability and situation 
of the person requesting a pass, and the trust which his 
assurances deserve. It can presumably be left up to the governor 
general or to the discretion of the West Indian government to 
decide against granting a pass to a ship based solely on the 
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circumstances of the case, without being responsible to anything 
other than their own duty and the royal government in those cases 
where a pass must be denied. 
The slave trade is of such great importance and promises 
such a steady and certain circulation of capital for those who 
understand it  and have the aptitude for entering it that we do 
not venture to advise that foreign ships be permitted to supply 
St. Croix with slaves .  .  . for it is certain that the Americans 
can sail with less expense than most other nations, especially 
ours, and would therefore soon undersell the Danish merchants 
if their ships were permitted to transport slaves to St. Croix. 
On the other hand, we feel compelled to recommend that the 
following encouragement might be granted to domestic ships, 
including those registered on St. Croix: for every slave 
brought to St. Croix and sold here, the ship should be allowed 
to take to foreign places in or outside of Europe the following 
quantities of sugar: for an adult male slave, 2,000 pounds; 
for an adult female slave, 1,000 pounds; for an adolescent 
[halvvoxen] male slave, 600 pounds; for an adolescent female 
slave, 400 pounds. 
The purpose of these humbly proposed regulations is to make 
the needs of this island a result of new trade freedoms for 
His Majesty's European subjects. We find no reason to adopt 
the view that the Guinea Company ought to have other privileges 
with regard to the slave trade. One might wish, however, to 
instruct the Guinea Company, in case a pressing shortage of 
slaves should develop on St. Croix, to transport slaves to St. 
Croix first and offer them for sale there in return for being 
allowed either to take out the amounts of sugar listed above to 
foreign places or to bring into the King's European states a 
similar quantity of foreign sugar; we do not see how such an 
encouragement could involve any appreciable harm for other Danish 
m e r c h a n t s  . . . .  
We have not had to dwell on the harmful influence and unsteady 
course [ustadige Gang] of monopoly privileges, because the fate 
of the many monopoly trading companies created in Denmark has 
demonstrated the value and usefulness of freedom of trade, and 
the patriot can now, with hopeful anticipation, look forward to 
less splendid [gl imrende] but happier times for the state.6  
The Government of the West Indies, October 15, 1787 
Walterstorff Lindemarm Colbi0rnsen 
%y the time the colonial government made its report, the 
Baltic-Guinea Company had been replaced by a new company enjoying 
similar privileges. 
APPENDIX VII 
Slave Population on St .  Croix,  1780-90 
Slaves Bi rths Deaths 
780 22,409 398 625 
781 22,687 470 623 
782 22,448 407 1,118 
783 •21,809 383 983 
7m 21,808 518 485 
785 21,922 437 816 
786 22,081 444 658 
787 22,460 487 561 
788 22,525 419 656 
789 22,021 426 1,278 
790 21,847 366 731a  
aDSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt General toldkammer, 
Doltumenter vedkomrnende Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre 
Indretning o<| Ophaevelse, Negernes Antal paa St. Croix for Aarene 
fra 1780 til 1790 incl- The data are imperfect, of course, but 
suffice to indicate that a preponderance of deaths over births 
was normal and, occasionally at least, enormous. 
APPENDIX VIII 
The Slave Population on the Four Schimmelmann Plantations, 1772-83 
Year Men Women Boys Girls Total Births Deaths Slaves Purchased 
1773 385 311 125 153 998 33 34 28 
1774 383 315 133 167 996 27 31 2 
1775 378 316 138 164 1,005 31 25 0 
1776 372 318 149 167 1,000 29 45 10 
1777 358 314 157 173 1,008 27 41 19 
1778 350 313 166 179 1,024 23 29 22 
1779 336 321 172 191 1,030 31 50 35 
1780 343 329 171 187 1,040 33 34 17 
1781 346 318 177 198 1,027 28 39 0 
1782 349 326 174 179 982 24 71 1 
| .  per 
year 360 318 156 176 1,011 286 399 1343 
aDSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt General to!dkammer, Dokumenter vedkommende 
Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Tabelle (lber die Neger 
auf den Grclfl. v. Schimmelmannschen Plantagen. There are some minor discrepancies in 
the yearly totals. The large increase in deaths in 1782 was caused by smallpox and 
measles epidemics, according to the report of the Committee on the Slave Trade, p. 33. 
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APPENDIX IX 
Married Slaves at Friedensberg and Friedensthal 
In 1792 there were 220 married black couples in the Moravian 
congregations at Friedensberg and Friedensthal on St. Croix. In 
three instances both husband and wife were free, and thirteen 
marriage? involved male slaves and free Negro women. Of the 204 
marriages in which both partners were slaves, 128 of the couples 
had different owners or lived on different plantations, while only 
76 had the same owner and lived on the same plantation. The 
preponderance of the former group suggests a surprising degree of 
slave mobility, though part of the explanation might be that slaves 
from different plantations met first at one of the missions and 
subsequently married, so that this group of slaves might not be 
representative of the population as a whole. But, if the data 
from the Moravian missions were only partially applicable to the 
rest of the slave population, they would nevertheless provide ample 
explanation for the slaves' desire to engage in those "night visits" 
on neighboring plantations of which Walterstorff complained.1  
^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Negerhandelens bedre 
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Verzeichnis derer Neger Ehe-Paare, welche 
.  .  .  zu Friedensberg und Friedensthal auf St. Croix .  .  .  ehelich 
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9? f & C f < -$> « it Beits. 
CQ'rijHautsfiorg Slot Ben itf&j fftatili 2792. 
i£ {often Dai? it, 
Wjft JoO SDirctlcuc 3)j, ^opffrttr, Jjims ifeiijcfije tBa)<p#ta 
eg Uniuccjitctem foc'fle SSogtajIfec. 
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i i f i l M  
*  J i r*"  - S ! t * ;  
jppS^ 
mmm 
• glial Mr, q̂ ;;k 
*%uf m  ̂ *S 1 
*qp*»v. ifOfuMfflgtit, 
- S o n f l e  t i l  S a i i t n a r f  0 3  f t n ' g t /  
t»c 03 ©itljcrt/ J>a-iHi5 
uft &M$r $>m,' ©^niutnty &\p 
marjfrn q$ ^l^iiO-or#, fan <mc vntteriujt: 
21t, i $m|7<|t til i)e DniflcenbijiOjbcr, foiu fcTqc mtb <Slaoc$anE>cfcti pan Sit}-
(ten af (5) it turn 03 mcl> Dc bee fie&tc SfZcgrca DuctfeiTtf til ©or(2?ePin?i|Fc 
!0cr, eijfaa i iSelMfjtnini} nf, (it Det i adc JpcnfceiiDn- manttc uatc uclijictni; 
be ofl fiamilijt, oiti ^itfotjcl af tujc SRcjcc fca Guinea- funSc mitwcs 0$ 
SSore SScfiinbifPe 0ert ©grfuiufl i Siben ijefhibes mcQ Wv&ciberc, fom, yaa 
;0crne ftbte 05 opbroriite, vare fro tinmen mi en af unuit til Sli-frlSet, inu 
niclc<)iieii og tern, utiicr (wilPo be ffiilfe nrCcibe, {jaw Q3i Intel tiiiJcrfr'Si', 
(morlcbco o(j naar bcttc mantle tlioe inuelijt. SJetibciiiic Uiibct-feKfiecr Hot 
btevit fat iibcn foe "Juiul, «t bet fan Mioc niuclijt 05 cc |oi:tn't(aj}ti".t for 25ere 
9 3 c f t i n b i | F e  > 0 c r  < 1 1  u u b o e v r e  3 n b f i o 6  n f  n t ) t  J J l i j r c ,  i t a o r t r i f l f l i i j  
cce Meonc forfyuebt mci) tifflrrcPMi.1t Qlntal i Set fov gocmcrclfcn forncSn? 5°t; 
foIQ; rniar iliitk-rftettelfer foe Cf 5>Iniiraf]crC£iere, font ba-fil traiigc, fimiie 
Siecco mufliflt, o<] ber fergeis fornt frcnmte 3Z«jrcnc& '•JGjjtcfMer, Diterelf? 
03 ©#&eli<|£cb. 
jjotaltfaa at fretts 33or: 93cjlinii|Te i&ep&bcfftf uiMf i>«it <?if(in:rii]cti&ci>, 
(tteti 6c oare 03 tee i'̂ enfcenCt til iftcflK# Sllfavfcf, 01) fotomjibec «t gi«c 
91et 
Sttegreo "Silforfel uncbuenbig, cr bet at 53Si tin ti[ (juur OTiinbe (Eftorrrtuini) 
fuuDfjiorc £>or attmiaabigflc 9Mie om en SDeel (icrfjcn firrcubc, fem nil lie.-
fceoer firiip at Oefienbtgiereo, og (ier»cb fnalebes Otjbe 03 Oefale: 
1. 
®eb SBcnnnbclfcn af %irct 1803 vitfc 93', (it nt SJegerfmnbfl forSSore 
Ittrterfaatter |M opfiure pan be 5lfvifaiitTe .Sijfler, 03 cllera (>uor bcir fimDe 
ftnbe ©tcb tibeii for S3ore iScfibbelfer i iUeftiiibien, fnalcbes, ntefterbette 
SibanniioUBIi'6i!igeii97eiiev cflcc Sicgevinbe entcii pnn £ijflcn cller pan anDre 
franmcbe ©teber mane ocb eller for SSore Unberfnattcr inDfie&i'O, i 5i3orc litis 
bcrfantt.Ttf ©fiOc fores, eller til 33ore SJeflinbitT'e 0:t ti( Gaff] inbfcrcs, .03 
at almob'bctte gorOub flribeitbe .Ijanbd \¥al cftec Scmic 'iib aufoca fom ulouUg. 
2. 
Smibfertib, fra tut af ticm[if| og iubtil llbgatigeii af 9laret 1802, niaae 
bet uccre tiffo&t for a((e Stationer uben J^orlY'tcI 03 tinber atfc {Jfoge at iubfere 
SJ?c;)i'c og Olcgcrinber fra .Stiffen til 33orc iSeftinbiffe $<t. 
3-
gor b( fiinbe 03 frifFe 9?egre 03 jyfcgcrinber, fom i benne "Jib fanlcbes 
iiibfored til SSorc SJJe|linbi|T'e 0cr, IkoilgeSSi, at fi'lfloiibcQ.VirtifcinnegiiP.-
fre itiaae t cgne cller fremmete ©fi6e iiibcit eet 9lar fraSjnbforielcn libfavo fra 
i0erue til fremmebe &tcbcr i eller uben for (Suropa, ucnilig for (jocr «o;cit 
(Reger eller Ofegeritibc 2000 Q)b. Orntto, 03 for (iucr (mluuoxcii bet (wlue, 
nemlig 1000 "))b., tibeu gocfpicl i J&enfeciibe til .8iennci)c; intn for iSctti 
intet 
CDen i gorotbningeme af 9 9fpril 1764 03 is SJfno i777» ^oiffet 
feenbe til 9iener£anbelen 6creet for fMcffeii {iwoed, Dcftemte 3(f<jiet »cb ©ln« 
tterfl Snbfarfcl, utile SJi allcmaabigfl flanfFe eftcrgiue for be 9?egerinber, 
fom (icreftcr iiibforeu; liuorimob af be ©ttffre, font for iubfortc 9?cgre eller 
Sicgerin&er ttbforet) til fremmebe ©teber, eclccggce i tibgaaenbe Solb i 9>i'0» ' 
cent nicer, ettb bcc uu cr paa&u&et. 
5> 
33ibere utile 93i, i JpenfTflt til bet retregorfcolb niellem ^ienneite, fra 33 e= 
flUnbelfciv af 91«ret 1795 03 for ben fulgenbc 'Sib cftergioe £op|1faiteit of be 
SJlcgcD&uiiiber elfer 9)iger, font ar&eibe paa $>lnntagenie, og iffe ere J?mi03 
Sfagcrinber, (luorimoti frn fainme $i& at regne bemte 2lfgit)C (tteggco &o&r,elt' 
af allc 9>laMage-5ft<mbfc3Zcgre. 
6. Itfc 
6. 
l!t>fov|H of Oicjjre D<J Wcqeriittci1 fca SQorc StVfHirtifFc .flcr fcvfnl\-:< fro 
nil af part Dct flritii<!cftc, 03 miBtaflcfl frn Scire luuhifi alfciu* N-, )Vtr- (Vvcnc 
fctjt'c nt utujAae, fault ftc, £tn(Pc 9Sor @fncra(s(3cuumi.ur cq ri'ViiUnui )va 
be SScfiinbiff'f $tr j mcflet cufcfte SilfretDe eftcc Omfraiti;](H'Ccnic tvcc 
f?3 bcfcict til nt (n&c iiijflnnf. 
J&vorrftcr nt(c 03 cn&ttcr fmine vibe (T3 nt tftte 03 forfjoftc. f; 1 iwt pna 
S3m (Errt £(iviflinnts&org tifi 5>oc ivongcligc 9icfit)cntc; = <£/t(ib jiu'frujjauii 
ten 16 231ni'tii 1792. 
ilnbcu SSoc ^oitflclifle ^aanb 03 £<$. 
Schccl. Hagerup. Trant 
llofenfhnd Goiikc, 
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